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Abstract 
 
This thesis follows the development of a particular set of large technical systems in South 
Africa from the late apartheid era into the age of democracy. During apartheid technological 
prowess, upheld by the network of state corporations or parastatals, bolstered the 
authoritarian rule of the white minority government in South Africa. The economic and 
political liberalisation of the late 1980s challenged the power of the parastatals and altered the 
underlying rationale of infrastructure development. In particular I describe the transformation 
of Iscor and Eskom, two of the country’s major parastatals, and their activities in the 
Waterberg coalfields, an isolated region on the country’s north-western border. While 
Eskom’s activities in the region began in the 1980s they gained public notoriety with the 
construction of the Medupi power station two decades later. The obstacles that Eskom faced 
at Medupi represent the main challenge of developing large technological infrastructures in 
the democratic, post-colonial order, where the fruits of infrastructure development demand to 
be spread beyond the bounds of an elite minority. But the eventual completion of some power 
generating units in 2015 at Medupi demonstrates that failure is not inevitable. I argue that this 
success is due to the fact that the autonomous parastatal network negotiated the political and 
economic liberalisation of the early 1990 by incorporating the changing socio-political 
conditions into its operations. The parastatal network retained a momentum, in the sense first 
described by the historian of technology Thomas Hughes, which was also a product of the 
“locked-in” nature of investment in the infrastructure project. Because of the large capital 
investment required for the infrastructure development, proceeding tenaciously against the 
odds to see the project to completion was cheaper than retreat for those involved. 
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Introduction 
Key Themes  
In October 2016, South African president Jacob Zuma sought to convince a group of visiting 
foreign dignitaries that the country’s evident political turmoil at the time signified its 
democratic well-being. He had just returned from a visit to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
and Oman and recounted his impressions of these countries in his address:   
I saw in UAE, in the sea, an impression of a palm tree being a settlement [Dubai’s Palm 
Jumeirah, a man-made island built in the shape of a palm]. You can’t build it in [a] 
democracy. Because they will say we are wasting taxpayers’ money, and correctly so. 
Why do you make an impression of a palm tree there? But once the ruler says do it, it is 
done, there’s no debate. Much as you can say there is development without debate, 
generally people in those places have got no voice. Whether you like it or not you just 
take it. [But] Democracy is a debate, people argue. SA is one of the countries that puts 
this example in, perhaps at times, an exaggerated way. At times we debate over and 
over. But that is democracy. You can’t go wrong.”1  
President Zuma’s statement encapsulates what is presumed to be the difficulty of 
infrastructure development in the age of democracy. Despite his insistence that there are 
particular features inherent to the democratic order that thwart infrastructural development, 
this thesis suggests that failure is not inevitable. The organisations and engineers responsible 
for infrastructure development, through their historic autonomy from government, have 
adjusted to the changing prerogatives occasioned by the political transition of the 1990s. 
There have been significant changes in the challenges infrastructure projects face, between 
the 1980s and the 2010s, such as the changed financing climate, the greater clout of labour 
and environmental organisations, and the de-industrialisation of the 1990s. But the 
periodisation of these changes does not coincide with that of the transition from apartheid to 
democracy. The tale of Medupi, currently under construction by South Africa’s national 
electricity utility Eskom, demonstrates that while difficult, such infrastructure projects are not 
doomed to failure. At the time of writing the completion of Medupi has been postponed by 
four years. But with two out of its six planned generating units already operational, it appears 
to be on track for completion. When it eventually operates at its full capacity the Medupi 
1 “Zuma’s Message to Diplomats: This Is Democracy, Deal with It,” Daily Maverick, October 18, 2016. 
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power station will be one of the world’s largest power stations, with a generating capacity of 
4800 MW. To place this amount in perspective, Kenya, the economic powerhouse of East 
Africa, had a total electricity generating capacity of 1916 MW in 2010 by World Bank 
estimates.2  
The small town of Lephalale (previously called Ellisras) lies close to the South African 
border with Botswana and is an arid, remote and altogether unlikely setting for a power 
station of Medupi’s size. However the location is less surprising when one considers that 
Eskom’s Matimba power station, built during the 1980s, and the open cast Grootgeluk coal 
mine stand in Medupi’s vicinity. In its totality, these developments constitute five decades of 
sophisticated engineering and massive investment by South Africa’s state corporations 
towards creating the large technical systems (LTS) that Thomas Hughes has described.3 I 
explore in this thesis the inner workings of a historic parastatal network that attained a 
developmental trajectory of its own, independent of government machinations. The network 
consisted of interconnected large technical systems. Due to its large-scale nature the large 
technical systems described here necessarily involve a mingling of the technical and political. 
They managed the political prerogatives of colonial and post-colonial governments by 
absorbing over-arching political prerogatives into its own inner workings.4 Because of the 
“locked in” nature of the investment, in the sense described by Albert Hirschman, the 
interested parties have a vested interest in seeing the project to completion. 5 The fact that 
their activities encompassed various social and political facets meant that government had to 
play a facilitating role. The relationship between the government and the parastatals was at 
best one of mutual assistance and co-operation.   
South Africa shares with other post-colonial African states the challenge of achieving 
inclusive development amid stark demographic and spatial economic inequality. The 
developmental burden has been a particularly pressing one for governments that sought to 
expand the fruits of infrastructure development outside of the enclaves. Colonial governments 
2 The World Bank, “Turning the Lights on Across Africa: An Action Agenda for Transformation,” Sustainable 
Development Series, p53. 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/16623/769910WP0SDS0Energy0Box374393B00
PUBLIC0.pdf;sequence=1. 
3 Thomas Parke Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930, Reprint edition 
(Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993). 
4Hughes, Networks of Power; Thomas Hughes, “Technological Momentum,” in Does Technology Drive 
History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism, ed. Michael L Smith and Leo Marx (Cambridge MA: 
MIT Press, 1994), 101–13. 
5Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States 
(Harvard University Press, 1970). 
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in Africa directed infrastructure development to the resource exporting enclave, creating a 
political order that Fred Cooper has dubbed the “gatekeeper state”.6 Road and railway 
builders followed the well-worn paths that led from the sites of resource extraction- the mines 
or plantations- to the coastal ports for export to the European metropole. In South Africa the 
economic primacy of resource exports is encapsulated in Ben Fine and Zavareh Rustomjee’s 
concept of the Minerals-Energy Complex (MEC).7 They emphasise the inter-connected 
nature of the mining sector with the country’s electricity network. I argue, however, that 
while it is true that the Minerals-Energy Complex drove much of South Africa’s industrial 
development, the presumed hegemony of the MEC eclipses other, equally urgent, drivers of 
large technical systems. Parastatals worked to satisfy the requirements of the MEC but they 
also had their own institutional prerogatives to uphold. Thus they were not wholly or directly 
subservient to the demands of the MEC.  
Following the Sharpeville massacre of 1960 the apartheid government confronted rising 
hostility to its racist order from the international community. The South African economy 
grew increasingly insular over the ensuing decades in response to the opprobrium. The 
decolonisation of neighbouring Southern African countries during the 1970s also forced the 
South African government onto the defensive. Due to its fear of foreign invasion it invested 
heavily in securing the country’s borders. Technological prowess was an important weapon 
in the battle for national survival and the government allowed the parastatals a large amount 
of operational autonomy. The combination of autonomy and desperation endowed the 
parastatals with a high appetite for risk. Motivated by the need to attain national economic 
self-sufficiency the parastatals, in this case Iscor and Eskom, forged ahead with remarkable 
perseverance. They placed large technical systems in the form of power plants, mines and 
manufacturing plants across the countryside. The political context described above set the 
scene for Iscor’s arrival in Ellisras. Driven by an ambitious plan to secure its coking coal 
supply, Iscor’s engineers turned their attention to the expansive and largely untouched 
Waterberg coalfields during the 1970s.  
I argue that in the case of Ellisras, state power was enacted through the engineers of the large 
technical systems, who became political agents in their own right. In light of Jeffrey Herbst’s 
description of the uneven coercive capacity of the African state it is important to consider the 
6 Frederick Cooper, Africa since 1940: The Past of the Present, New Approaches to African History 
(Cambridge, U.K. ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
7 Ben Fine and Zavareh Rustomjee, The Political Economy of South Africa: From Minerals-Energy Complex to 
Industrialisation (C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, 1996). 
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local level configuration of politics.8 In considering the relationship between politics and 
technology the techno-politics literature has demonstrated that despite some of the best 
rhetorical efforts of politicians, infrastructure is not politically neutral. Gabrielle Hecht, for 
instance, has described techno-politics as one among many other political instruments, 
operating for instance in the same vein as political party systems.9 Similarly, in the 
Waterberg, the parastatals and the industrial networks they developed operated in techno-
political ways. However, parastatal engineers should not be equated with state officials. 
Rather, parastatal engineers were nominally autonomous from the official organs of the state 
and mediated the state’s presence in these regions. This is demonstrated across periods 
throughout the thesis, where the parastatals frequently enacted their infrastructural visions 
with only the reluctant consent of the government.  
Techno-politics arguably became the main mode of governance from the late 1970s.10 The 
apartheid government transformed its domestic economic and social policies in the aftermath 
of the student uprisings of 1976.11 It adopted a new “language of legitimation,”12 in a 
departure from the rigid ideological commitment to separate development earlier espoused by 
Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd. In this reformulation of authoritarian governance, the 
government approached its racial segregationist policies pragmatically to quell black protest. 
Antina von Schnitzler has described the government’s efforts to depoliticise its interventions 
during this period through the material spread of infrastructural development. Neo-liberal 
ideas, that saw the African subject as a consumer began to filter into the policy thinking of 
the verligte government circles.13 The Riekert Commission of 1979 urged government and 
industry to recognise the permanency of an urban African working class. But the 
Commission’s recommendations proved unworkable when revolts in black townships 
intensified from 1984. Von Schnitzler argues that this political reform failed to prevent unrest 
in the townships because it continued to deny Africans political rights.14 Thus attempts to 
encourage African stabilisation in urban areas, which emphasised decentralisation and local 
8Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control (Princeton 
University Press, 2000). 
9 M.T. Allen and G. Hecht, Technologies of Power: Essays in Honour of Thomas Parke Hughes and Agatha 
Chipley Hughes (The MIT Press, 2001). 
10 Antina von Schnitzler, Democracy’s Infrastructure: Techno-Politics and Protest after Apartheid (Princeton 
University Press, 2016). 
11ibid.  
12Deborah Posel, “Language, Legitimation and Control: The South African State after 1978,” Social Dynamics 
10, no. 1 (June 1, 1984): 1–16. 
13von Schnitzler, Democracy’s Infrastructure, 56. 
14ibid, 63. 
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political autonomy, did not create the acquiescence government hoped for. I argue that the 
formal recognition of independent black trade unions in the early 1990s at the Matimba 
power station in Ellisras signalled a sea change in the nature of reform in the district. From 
the late 1980s the parastatals’ unfettered drive for national economic self-sufficiency had 
begun to stumble. This period marked an important turning point in the history of South 
African parastatals, as public dissatisfaction with parastatals’ levels of capital expenditure 
drew the era of heavy power station and steel manufacturing investment to a close. This 
investment had been based on mistaken demand forecasts. Iscor was wholly privatised and 
“unbundled” while Eskom escaped privatisation but underwent a process of far-reaching 
commercial reform. At the Matimba power station, independent black trade unions played an 
important role in negotiating the neo-liberal transition. They oversaw the gradual withdrawal 
of the paternalist regime of labour management to one in which the free market nominally 
prevailed. The techno-political project was thus refracted through a democratic prism that 
trade unions helped negotiate. It is however important to note that while the trade unions 
assisted in navigating the transition, labour relations assumed a life of their own. Along with 
the emphasis on stabilisation or the recognition of a permanent urban black population, 
demands increased for local development in a rural, peripheral region. Thus the large 
technical system had to absorb the pressure of racial transformation in a context of stark 
economic inequality.  
Eskom’s emphasis on cost cutting prevented any new capital investment until 2007, when the 
country’s looming electricity supply crisis became apparent. In 2008, driven once again by 
desperation, Eskom began the construction of the Medupi power station in the Limpopo 
province and the Kusile power station in Mpumalanga. Medupi’s completion has been tied in 
the popular imagination to the end of the country’s electricity supply crisis and the resurgence 
of its economic growth. But its completion has taken longer than hoped, with Eskom 
constantly shifting the completion goalposts. The construction delay and cost overruns have 
raised the ire of opposition politicians, newspaper columnists and political commentators, 
who attributed the failure to the post-apartheid government’s inability to prioritise technical 
efficiency. Critics argued that rent-seeking compromised Medupi’s technical standards and 
curtailed its ability to become operational.  In October 2015 Mmusi Maimane, the leader of 
the opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, wrote that: 
 Corruption is one of the greatest enemies of our democracy and certainly not a 
victimless crime. The victims of this crime are millions of people who have been 
11 
 
profoundly affected by the ANC’s decision to get into bed with Hitachi15 for personal 
enrichment. Medupi and Kusile have been plagued by cost overruns and delays, and 
Eskom is on record as having admitted that faults with Hitachi’s boilers are the main 
reason for these delays. This has led to load-shedding, crippling tariff hikes and, 
ultimately, an economic slowdown that has cost thousands of South Africans their 
jobs.16  
Against this background of the frustrated hopes that the Medupi power station embodies, I 
consider the conditions under which infrastructure projects are successfully developed in 
post-apartheid, democratic South Africa. Under the democratic order infrastructure 
developers have to manage the numerous expectations loaded onto the development of a 
multi-billion rand infrastructure project such as Medupi. 
This thesis also considers the frailty of infrastructural and technological development and 
their proneness to failure. I argue that the scholarly field of science and technology studies 
(STS) has failed to effectively account for the interaction between the political prerogatives 
of state and that of technology or engineers. A significant limitation of the existing literature 
on science and technology studies is its failure to account for processes of technological 
change on the African continent. Scholars have treated the state analytically as a “black box”, 
ignoring its role in technological development. By contrast the predominant image of 
infrastructural projects across the African continent is one of narrowly inclusive 
infrastructure geared towards the gatekeeper state.17 Failure is attributed in large part to 
political interference that ranges from predatory patronage politics to misguided projects 
designed to serve political leaders’ conception of “development”.  
Literature Review 
Allure of infrastructure 
Social anthropologists have demonstrated the multi-faceted nature of infrastructure projects, 
which encapsulate fantasies of transformation held by both their designers and the citizens 
who chance to engage with them. As such, they mean different things to different people, and 
15Hitachi is the contractor responsible for manufacturing the boilers for the two power stations. 
16Mmusi Maimane, “It’s Our Job to Fight Corruption, No Matter What the Odds,” Daily Maverick, October 5, 
2015. 
17 Frederick Cooper, Africa since 1940: The Past of the Present, New Approaches to African History 
(Cambridge, U.K. ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Herbst, States and Power in Africa; 
Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Black Classic Press, 2011). 
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achieve a lasting autonomy from the original intentions of their designers.18 While the allure 
of infrastructure has ebbed and flowed in global discourses of development, its appeal has 
grown as the driver of the economic growth in the 2010’s. China’s spectacular rise in recent 
years has seen the country’s massive investment in infrastructure development that has drawn 
raw materials from mineral exporting countries all over the world. The World Bank has 
bemoaned the failure of infrastructure developments across the African continent. In 2010, it 
published a series of reports describing the dire state of Africa’s “infrastructure deficit”, 
concerned that the absence particularly of transport and communications infrastructure boded 
ill for the continent’s economic growth. In 2012 President Jacob Zuma launched the 
Presidential Infrastructure Co-ordinating Commission (PICC) in South Africa. The PICC was 
to be directly controlled by the office of the Presidency avowedly to streamline the 
cumbersome bureaucratic processes that infrastructure development requires.  
In South Africa large-scale construction projects also fulfilled a particular vision of 
transformation in a starkly differentiated social context characterised by high levels of 
inequality. In 1996, Mbeki first spoke of the country’s “dual” economy, containing a first 
economy that is “modern” and a second economy in which people are unskilled and 
unemployable in the first. 19 Because of its tiered nature, a blanket and universal economic 
transformation policy would have unfairly benefitted those already advantaged members of 
the “first economy”. For this reason, Gillian Hart writes, government considered the 
Expanded Public Works programme a more reliable pathway to poverty alleviation and 
upliftment than the Basic Income Grant (BIG). Expanding the network of public 
infrastructure was thus a suitable route to social development because it would improve 
service provision and because the construction work would create employment.20 Job 
creation was an explicit prerogative of the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) that 
began in 2003. But this was not a sustainable path to reducing unemployment because of the 
short-term nature of these construction projects, which generally relied on low-skilled labour.  
18 Brian Larkin, “The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure,” Annual Review of Anthropology 42, no. 1 (2013): 
329. 
19 Gillian Hart, ‘Post-Apartheid Developments in Historical and Comparative Perspective,’ in Vishnu 
Padayachee, ed., The Development Decade?: Economic and Social Change in South Africa, 1994-2004 (Cape 
Town, South Africa: Human Sciences Research Council, 2007). 
20 ibid. 
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African States and the Burden of Development 
Ineffective social control is a profound problem for African states. Saul Dubow has described 
the apartheid regime as “autocratic” but not “totalitarian”,21 pointing to its inability to 
completely overpower autonomous institutions. In a similar vein, Nic Cheeseman argues that 
democratisation in Africa has a long historical pedigree, with “fragments of democracy” 
present during periods of “authoritarian” rule.22 Drawing on Jeffrey Herbst, he attributes this 
to African rulers’ “uneven” coercive capacity, which diminished as the distance from the 
state capital grew. 23 Where state presence reached the peripheral regions, state power was 
mediated by local actors. This is highlighted for instance in Catherine Boone’s analysis of the 
roots of the differential distribution of state power, conditioned by the receptivity of local 
elites.24 Rather than exerting a deliberate, hegemonic force, state power was transmitted in a 
halting, incremental manner. While African rulers at times harboured pretensions to 
totalitarian rule they were hamstrung by practical constraints to the exercise of control. In 
Politics of the Belly, Jean Francois Bayart writes: 
 The majority of African politicians have, however, yearned for a total, well-policed 
State, not very different from the absolutist dreams of Campanella during the 
Renaissance. It should be said that up until now they have not achieved this ideal...25   
State weakness and the failure of the transmission of state power in Africa are partly an 
infrastructural failure. Herbst describes the absence of road and communication networks 
linking the capital to the peripheral areas as a key constraint on the transmission of state 
power. 26 While technology and infrastructure have in some cases served as the handmaiden 
of authoritarian rule, South African historians have highlighted the constraints on the 
technological power of the apartheid state, of the failure of the technological systems it 
marshalled to implement control, and of the considerable autonomy engineers enjoyed from 
21 Saul Dubow, Apartheid, 1948-1994 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 120. 
22 Nic Cheeseman, Democracy in Africa: Successes, Failures, and the Struggle for Political Reform (New York, 
NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
23 Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control (Princeton, N.J: 
Princeton University Press, 2000). 
24 Catherine Boone, Political Topographies of the African State: Territorial authority and Institutional Choice, 
Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
25 Jean-François Bayart, The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly (London; New York: Longman, 1993), 
261. 
26 Herbst, States and Power in Africa, 2000. 
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the dictates of the state.27 These have exposed the limits of technology as an instrument of 
state power and the difficulties of the machine age.  
These failures have a spatial character. Cooper suggests that both colonial and post-colonial 
states have struggled to extend the fruits of development outside the bounds of the resource 
exporting enclave. When Britain and France tried, during the period immediately preceding 
decolonisation, to re-make African societies in their own image, mass resistance forced them 
to retreat. Post-colonial governments inherited the burden of unfinished development. Their 
failure to ensure an egalitarian spread of development, both spatially and demographically, 
hastened the onset of authoritarian methods of rule to temper dissent in the neglected regions. 
Their duty was thus to retain a fragile and fractious political control while introducing some 
semblance of industrial development. This was a particularly crushing prerogative for the 
post-colonial Congo state. As Crawford Young has shown, industrialisation under the 
despotic rule of Mobutu sese Seko failed not for want of state investment, capital or political 
will.28 It was rather a failure of the large technical systems he hoped would dramatically 
transform the Zairian economy. One of the grand testaments to his modernising project was 
the Inga dam hydroelectric Scheme, the construction of which began in 1968. He imagined 
that the dam would provide cheap electricity to emerging industrial plants, particularly an 
iron ore smelting plant situated at the mineral-rich borderland of the Katanga region. But the 
dam’s construction difficulties led to massive cost overruns that were transferred on to the 
price of electricity, rendering it too high to attract a reliable clientele.29 Since the main source 
of state revenue was copper exports, once copper earnings fell in 1974, so did the state’s 
ability to keep afloat the mega projects it had initiated. The result was large-scale state 
indebtedness and the looting of established commercial and political institutions, as they fell 
to the predatory pressures of patronage politics.  
The inability of the mega projects to fund themselves is related not only to the costs of the 
construction but also to the difficulties of finding customers to purchase the final product. 
Lack of consumer demand is a running theme through many of the descriptions of white 
27 Keith Breckenridge, Biometric State: The Global Politics of Identification and Surveillance in South Africa, 
1850 to the Present (Cambridge University Press, 2014); Stephen Sparks, “Apartheid Modern: South Africa’s 
Oil from Coal Project and the History of a Company Town.” (PhD Thesis, University of Michigan, 2012); 
Nancy L. Clark, Manufacturing Apartheid: State Corporations in South Africa (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1994). 
28 Crawford Young, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State: Crawford Young and Thomas Turner (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1985). 
29 Ibid., 301. 
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elephants littered across the continent, which epitomised the high modernist fantasies of post-
colonial governments that “bigger was better”. This is tied to the extent of inclusivity that the 
construction project allows. In the contemporary era the combination of “high modernism” 
and extensive exclusion is best exemplified in the case of Angola. The country comes close to 
Jean Francois Bayart’s ideal type of “extraversion”, a model in which elite hegemony is 
assured by virtue of its control of export revenues.30 In 1979, Jose Eduardo dos Santos 
succeeded Agostinho Neto as the President of Angola having won the trust of fellow heavy 
weights in the ruling party (the MPLA) by his apparent lack of grandiose political 
ambitions.31  Dos Santos has been in power ever since; the longevity of his rule assured by 
the steady flow of oil revenues. As d’Oliveira argues, in contrast to the relatively chaotic 
system of oil management of Nigeria, the MPLA has tightly controlled the Angolan oil trade. 
The hegemony of the oil sector is illustrated in the emergence of a “parallel state” centred on 
the sophisticated state-controlled oil marketing entity Sonangol. Sonangol is directly 
controlled by the office of President Dos Santos.32 
This thesis is inspired by a rising tide in African studies that challenges the assumption 
inherent in the characterisation of African polities as “neo-patrimonial” and thereby 
dysfunctional, that governments act on purely utilitarian motives and disregard the valence of 
ideology.33 In their study of African “illiberal state builders” William Jones et al describe the 
emergence of a form of government that relies on infrastructural prowess to assert its 
otherwise precarious control over the general population.34 The authors write that: “high-
modernist ideology underpins the belief that bureaucratic enclaves of excellence and huge 
infrastructure projects can qualitatively reconfigure domestic political-economic systems.”35 
Rwanda, Ethiopia, Angola36 and Sudan37 are grouped into this category because they all 
emerged from prolonged periods of civil war to the authoritarian rule of the military victors. 
The governments in these countries uphold enclave development by a combination of 
coercion and co-option. For instance, the MPLA’s strong party structure and its tight control 
30 J.-F. Bayart, “Africa in the World: A History of Extraversion,” African Affairs 99, no. 395 (April 1, 2000): 
217–67. 
31 Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, Magnificent and Beggar Land: Angola Since the Civil War (London: C Hurst & 
Co Publishers Ltd, 2015), 33. 
32 ibid., 44. 
33 Thandika Mkandawire, “Neopatrimonialism and the Political Economy of Economic Performance in Africa: 
Critical Reflections,” World Politics, 2013, 1–50. 
34 Will Jones, Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, and Harry Verhoeven, “Africa’s Illiberal State-Builders,” Working 
Paper Series (Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford University, 2012). 
35 ibid., 6. 
36 d’Oliveira, Magnificent and Beggar Land. 
37 Harry Verhoeven, Water, Civilisation and Power in Sudan (Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
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of oil revenues, which it distributed to a few strategic allies, allowed it to temper dissent 
outside of the developed enclave. A heavy police force protects the lavish enclave of Luanda 
from the rural poor. The exclusionary ethic goes hand in hand with the securitisation impulse 
of authoritarian rule and allows the Angolan government to ignore the “burden of 
development” altogether. In addition, the persistent stream of oil revenues meant that the elite 
conflict Robert Bates describes as following the drying up of mineral export revenues, has 
not occurred.38 In Bates’s formulation, elite conflict typically took the form of regional 
fragmentation or in the case of Rwanda in 1994, tragic fragmentation on ethnic lines. 
The Minerals-Energy Complex in South Africa 
South Africa has been equally vulnerable to the developmental challenges of the resource 
dependent economy and exhibits certain key features of the ‘gatekeeper’ state. Fine and 
Rustomjee describe South African infrastructure as having developed to serve the interests of 
the Minerals-Energy Complex (MEC).39 This idea assumes its explanatory power from the 
fact that gold exports have historically constituted the lion’s share of the country’s export 
earnings, allowing the treasury to maintain a stable balance of payments. This stability 
enabled the importation of specialised machinery to support the country’s industrial and 
agricultural sectors. The South African government also levied extra charges on the gold 
mines to subsidise commercial agriculture and manufacturing.40 Mineral exports thus played 
a foundational role in the diversification of productive activities in the South African 
economy. For Fine and Rustomjee, South Africa’s manufacturing sector remained dependent 
on mining capital for its survival. Manufacturing exports largely consisted of beneficiated 
raw materials.41 I do not attempt to refute the hegemonic role of the mining sector in the 
historical development of the South African economy or its role in encouraging the electricity 
network to meet its needs. Rather I consider the other, occluded consequences of parastatal 
activities and their development of large technical systems.   
Systems-builders  
One defining feature of the term “infrastructure” that is used here is that its normal operations 
are hidden from view. Infrastructures are “embedded” or “sunk into other structures, social or 
38 Robert Bates, When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late-Century Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008). 
39 Fine and Rustomjee, The Political Economy of South Africa. 
40 Charles H. Feinstein, An Economic History of South Africa : Conquest, Discrimination, and Development 
(Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 106. 
41 Bill Freund, “The Significance of the Minerals-Energy Complex in the Light of South African Economic 
Historiography,” Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa 71, no. 1 (2010): 3–25. 
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technical”42. Only during times of breakdown do their inner workings become visible and 
targets of public consternation.43 Infrastructure is also a complex “system” in which the 
technical is intertwined with the socio-economic organisational structures necessary to ensure 
its effective functioning.44 Paul Edwards provides a typology of infrastructure that 
distinguishes “systems” from “networks”. Networks are “linked systems” that are composed 
of the various systems necessary for the technological development. While systems are 
characterised by strong centralised control, networks are more diffuse and are “co-ordinated” 
rather than “controlled”. For instance a “system” could describe a power station or power 
company while a “network” would refer to the inter-connecting electricity grid.45 
 
This concept of infrastructure utilises elements of Thomas Hughes’s classic description of the 
large technical system, as one containing an inter-connected web of parts that combines the 
social and technical. Hughes’s seminal contribution to scholarly understandings of the history 
of technology was to dissolve the dichotomy between the human and technical and focus 
instead on their mutual shaping. The idea that technological developments were enacted 
through systems development challenged the idea that technological artefacts operated in 
isolation. In this sense the collectivism imbued within the systems building technology 
differed fundamentally from the conception of pre-war technological development, which is 
classically posited as the province of the lone inventor fortuitously befriended by a visionary 
financier.46  
 
In particular, I borrow the idea of “technological momentum” from Hughes’s formulation of 
large technical systems. Technological momentum arises when the technological system is 
insulated from social and political pressures to a sufficient degree. It is more commonly 
found at the latter stages of a system’s development as the system reaches a technologically 
normative status. This is demonstrated in the growth in standardisation of the system which 
enables it to potentially dominate other technological networks. Paul Edwards describes the 
idea of technological momentum as follows:  
42 Susan Leigh Star and Karen Ruhleder, “Steps Toward an Ecology of Infrastructure: Design and Access for 
Large Information Spaces,” Information Systems Research 7, no. 1 (March 1, 1996): 111–34. 
43 ibid. 
44 Paul N. Edwards, “Understanding Infrastructure: Dynamics, Tensions, and Design,” Final Report of the 
workshop, History and Theory of Infrastructure: Lessons for New Scientific Cyberinfrastructures, 2007, 6. 
45 Ibid., 12. 
46 The story of James Watt and the steam engine epitomises this classic image: F. M. Scherer, “Invention and 
Innovation in the Watt-Boulton Steam-Engine Venture,” Technology and Culture 6, no. 2 (1965): 165–87. 
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Eventually, competing networks must convert to these standards, find ad hoc ways to 
connect nonstandard equipment with them, or else die out. Standards reduce the risk to 
manufacturers and the cost to consumers, thus increasing the dominant system's overall 
momentum.47  
Thus standards or translatability are a key component of the network’s ability to achieve a 
momentum of its own. The idea that engineers and technologists are “system-builders” 
emphasises the intricate economic and social web that holds the technological network in 
place. Hughes’ idea of the “reverse salient” emphasized its patchwork, iterant quality as 
opposed to a seamless, efficient web of technological flows.48 Thus “technological 
momentum” was constantly negotiated and actively upheld by those responsible for its 
maintenance.  
 
The prevailing rhetoric among the engineers interviewed for this thesis is of dogged 
determination to successfully complete the infrastructure projects despite seemingly 
insurmountable obstacles. I suggest that this tenacity is a function of the “locked-in” feature 
of the large-scale investment that infrastructure development requires and this is sufficient in 
itself to ensure a large amount of “technological momentum”. The tenacity of the engineers is 
a product of the fact that once the wheels are set in motion, reversing is a highly undesirable 
option. Thus one of the main characteristics of infrastructure projects is that by virtue of their 
heavy capital investment, there are few available “exit” options, in the sense that Albert 
Hirschman describes.49  
Another characteristic of infrastructure is its capital intensive and consequent high-risk 
nature.50 Two contradictory images inform our understanding of infrastructure development 
on the African continent. On the one hand, they contain the gleaming promise of modernising 
transformation and on the other are plagued by delay, cost overruns, and the wastage of 
scarce resources. To some extent the disillusionment is a natural consequence of 
infrastructural development all over the world. In a recent book on mega-projects, Brent 
Flyvbjerg et al identify a disjuncture between the immense faith placed in the power of these 
projects as instruments of socio-economic transformation, and the high levels of failure and 
47 Paul N. Edwards, “Infrastructure and Modernity: Scales of Force, Time, and Social Organization in the 
History of Sociotechnical Systems,” Modernity and Technology, 2002, 199. 
48 The “reverse salient” is discussed in more detail in Chapter Three. 
49 Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. 
50 Bent Flyvbjerg, Nils Bruzelius, and Werner Rothengatter, Megaprojects and Risk: An Anatomy of Ambition 
(United Kingdom ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
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cost overruns associated with their actual construction. The promise of mega-projects, the 
authors argue, is to reduce the constraints of time and space with the ultimate aim of 
achieving a “frictionless capitalism”. Flyvbjerg elsewhere adopts the definition of “mega-
projects” used by the United States Federal Highway Administration, as a project of public 
interest that costs more than $1-billion.51 The initial project appraisals of mega-projects are 
over-optimistic in part due to the difficulty of predicting success and in part to present an 
appealing picture to prospective investors.52 Thus the frequent cost overruns stem from initial 
cost under-estimates. But once investors are on board, they are “locked-in”53 because the 
costs of turning back and scrapping the project in its entirety would be higher than the cost of 
cutting losses and proceeding against the odds.  
Systems-builders assumed a particular political role in the context of the Cold War. Hughes 
notes that the US government, during the administration of President Lyndon Johnson, 
encouraged the spread of systems theory outside its traditional bounds in the military, as a 
mechanism of governance to resolve problems of social welfare and urban infrastructural 
design. This gave rise to a hierarchical method of urban management which saw the rise of 
city engineers like Robert Moses, who was later criticised for his authoritarian approach to 
infrastructure development.54 Puzzled by the political impediments they encountered, 
engineers like Moses attempted to bypass them completely in pursuit of technical efficiency. 
This idea of science and technology as being the premise of the sophisticated “expert”, who 
ignores the wealth of knowledge formed by the layman, raises the question of popular and 
democratic participation in scientific practice. Langdon Winner suggests that items of 
technology contain within them particular modes of political operations.55 In discourses of 
environmental conservation for instance, there emerged the idea that centralised, fossil fuel 
generated energy systems gave rise to autocratic politics. By contrast, renewable sources of 
energy were considered to be potentially more inclusive and democratic, because their small 
scale nature made them more amenable to decentralised ownership. While not disputing that 
technological artefacts and the arrangement of the technical systems carried a particular 
politics of their own, Winner forwarded a weaker case for their determinant role. He also 
51Bent Flyvbjerg, What is a megaproject? Blog post, http://flyvbjerg.plan.aau.dk/whatisamegaproject.php 
52 Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, and Rothengatter, Megaprojects and Risk, 43. 
53 Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. 
54 Thomas P. Hughes, Human-Built World: How to Think about Technology and Culture (Chicago; London: 
University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
55 Langdon Winner, “Do Artefacts Have Politics?,” in The Social Shaping of Technology (London: Open 
University Press, 1985), 120–36. 
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evokes the classic case of Robert Moses, the engineer responsible for much of the design of 
the public infrastructure in New York City, as illustrative of the fact that technological 
systems are imbued with the political ideologies of their designers, which in the end outlast 
them. Winner writes of Moses that, “Many of his monumental structures of concrete and steel 
embody a particular social inequality, a way of engineering social relationships among people 
that after a time becomes just another part of the landscape.”56  
In a later article he criticised a group of scholars he collectively dubbed “social 
constructivists”, concerned with “opening the black box” of technological artefacts to 
examine the social basis of its construction. 57 In particular Winner criticised their tendency to 
render the social and technological indistinguishable, arguing that this overlooked the 
political effects of the technological systems. Paul Edwards suggests that the controversy is a 
product of the different vantage points of the analysts. Adopting a micro-level scale of 
analysis, he argues is bound to generate faith in the causal effect of incremental, contingent 
actions from “users” but also one can assume, those responsible for maintaining the network. 
On the other hand, macro scales of analysis emphasise the dominance of the technological 
network over human endeavours while exposing for instance their vulnerability to the 
destructive forces of nature.58  
The rise of systems theory coincided with the rise of the faith in authoritarian modernisation 
that governments across the world adopted as the engine of development. But it grew 
discredited as the atrocities of the Vietnam War became apparent because of its association 
with the military industrial complex. Hughes writes that: 
 This distrust of government and technology focused not only on military technology but 
on large-scale technology in general. Hierarchy, bureaucracy, and governance by experts 
fell into disfavour.59  
Hughes argues that the reformed “postmodern” approach to systems development was more 
diffuse and characterised by its “layered” and “horizontal” leadership.60 Across the globe, the 
top-down nature of the rule of experts fell out of favour at the same time as authoritarian 
56 Langdon Winner, “Do Artefacts Have Politics?” Modern Technology: Problem or Opportunity? 109, no. 1 
(1980): 124. 
57 Langdon Winner, “Upon Opening the Black Box and Finding It Empty: Social Constructivism and the 
Philosophy of Technology,” Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Summer, 1993), 362-378. 
58 Edwards, “Infrastructure and Modernity.” 
59 Thomas P. Hughes, Rescuing Prometheus: Four Monumental Projects That Changed Our World  (New York: 
Vintage,  2011). 
60 ibid. 
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modes of governance in general, laying the ground for the shift towards deregulation and 
democratisation during the late 1980s and 1990s.  
 
Techno-politics  
As the techno-politics literature has demonstrated, engineers and technologists by nature of 
their work act in a particularly political manner. Importantly this literature has encouraged an 
analytical focus on the power of material objects. Antina von Schnitzler suggests that 
technological artefacts are a “political terrain” for the enactment of local politics. She 
recounts the introduction of pre-paid electricity meters to poor black South African 
households that were first designed for working class homes in Britain. 61 As a “travelling 
technology”, the pre-paid electricity meter transverses “ethical regimes”, and assumes 
different political connotations within the particular context in which it operates. The focus 
on the material basis of politics encourages a consideration of local level political 
configurations. Mucha Musemwa, for instance, convincingly demonstrates the importance of 
control over water infrastructure to the governing power of colonial and post-colonial 
municipal governments in the Zimbabwean city of Bulawayo.62 Andrew Barry argues that 
rather than a top-down process of rule “the ‘macro’ political order of the state, in the neo-
liberal era in particular, is built up from a complex network of localised technical practices 
and devices.”63 The technological and material give rise to political controversy and debate.64 
These peculiar “assemblages” in themselves constitute the political.  
But there are important limits to the generalizable nature of the link between materials and 
the political configurations they encourage. For instance, Timothy Mitchell has recently 
forwarded a case for “carbon democracies”, an idea that links the type of mineral mined to 
the type of polity that emerges over time.65 Mitchell’s central argument is that coal dependent 
economies are more likely to lead to democratic government while oil-rich countries more 
commonly encourage authoritarian systems of governance. His argument for materiality 
however rests on the particular organisation of labour required to extract coal and required to 
61 Antina Von Schnitzler, “Travelling Technologies: Infrastructure, Ethical Regimes, and the Materiality of 
Politics in South Africa,” Cultural Anthropology 28, no. 4 (November 1, 2013): 670–93. 
62 Muchaparara Musemwa, “Early Struggles over Water: From Private to Public Water Utility in the City of 
Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, 1894–1924*,” Journal of Southern African Studies 34, no. 4 (December 1, 2008): 881–
98. 
63 Andrew Barry, Political Machines: Governing a Technological Society (A&C Black, 2001), 12. 
64 Andrew Barry, Material Politics: Disputes Along the Pipeline (John Wiley & Sons, 2013). 
65 Timothy Mitchell, Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil (Verso, 2011). 
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extract oil. The underground nature of coal mining grants workers more autonomy in their 
daily operations and creates strong dissident networks with a greater power to disrupt the 
production process. By nature of its extraction process however, oil fails to afford workers 
the same subversive power. The linkage of the material to the political is thus mediated by 
the role of workers whose functions in turn are dependent on the nature of the extraction 
process. However, Mitchell fails to account for the effect of coal extraction methods other 
than underground coal mining. For instance, open-cast coal mining promotes a fundamentally 
different form of labour organisation to of underground mines. Thus the equation of material 
to political system is difficult because of numerous intervening factors which could just as 
easily shift the political trajectory in a separate direction to the one supposed. In this thesis, I 
demonstrate that trade union activity has shaped the political role of labour. This coincided 
with the admission of black trade unions into collective wage bargaining processes during the 
early 1990s at the Matimba power station. The power station’s managers and engineers were 
not in constant opposition to the demands of labour and their relationship was characterised 
by compromise as well as conflict. In France, where Hecht has detailed debates surrounding 
the development of nuclear power stations during the 1960s, scientists and engineers gained 
their political clout in large part from their public image as harbingers of reason and 
rationality. Their ability to engage in reasonable and measured tones was considered a key 
attribute of the democratic citizen so that engineers were important agents of nation-
building. 66   Their ability to mesh the political with the technical arose from their role as 
“systems-builders,” which allowed engineers to legitimately make political interventions in 
their own right.67 This mingling of social and technical roles is not necessarily a peculiar 
feature of the latter twentieth century. Rather it is the legitimation of the all-encompassing 
role of the scientist or engineer that was a particularly novel feature of the Cold War period.68 
This thesis emphasises the organisational distinction between the state and the parastatals. 
This distinction complicated the political role that the parastatals played because their 
particular organisational prerogatives at times contradicted those of the state.   
Security imperative of the 1960s  
In South Africa the apartheid government geared infrastructure development to secure the 
country against threats from within and without its borders. Against the backdrop of the Cold 
66 Gabrielle Hecht and Michel Callon, The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after 
World War II (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2009), 301. 
67 Ibid.., 53. 
68 Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2002), 15. 
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War, the government aligned itself with the Western powers and boasted of the country’s 
particular technological ability to keep communist elements in Southern Africa at bay. 
Predictably, the South African government spurned involvement in pan-African forums. 
Hecht and Edwards have highlighted the fallacious bases of South Africa’s claim to scientific 
excellence on the global stage, particularly in its ambitions of nuclear exceptionalism.69 
Apartheid’s rulers appreciated the power of technology as a mechanism of Afrikaner 
advancement along the path towards full sovereignty,70 and following the Sharpeville 
massacre of 1960, prioritised the protection of white rule at the southernmost tip of Africa.  
Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd, dubbed the “architect of apartheid”, rose to power in 1958 
and wholly embraced the possibilities of technology for effective rule over the black 
majority.71 Verwoerd’s rule coincided with the general acquiescence of the organisations of 
scientific research such as the Centre for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), which 
was set up under the government of Prime Minister Jan Smuts in 1945. The first apartheid 
Prime Minister, DF Malan, assured the CSIR once he assumed office that the government 
would respect its independence provided it adopted a “South African colouring”. This 
implied that the CSIR would have to place the country’s interests before those of any other. 
With institutions of scientific research toeing the Afrikaner nationalism line, Dubow writes 
that:  
By the end of the 1970s science and technology were firmly invoked in support of an 
ideology of modernising techno-nationalism which ensured that white—and particularly 
Afrikaner—intellectual prowess was celebrated as a key weapon in the fight against 
communism and African nationalism.72 
To meet the security imperative of nation-building and the economic imperative of self-
sufficiency, the apartheid government focussed on publicly-funded, infrastructure 
development, the depth and vigour of which has been only cursorily discussed in the existing 
literature.73 During the 1960s the government invested heavily in public works and 
earmarked R4-billion, an enormous sum for its time, to expand the operations of Iscor, 
Eskom, and Sasol. It also directed these funds towards the much vaunted Orange River 
69 Paul N. Edwards and Gabrielle Hecht, “History and the Technopolitics of Identity : The Case of Apartheid 
South Africa,” Journal of Southern African Studies 36, no. 3 (January 1, 2010): 619–39. 
70 Ibid.. 
71 Saul Dubow, A Commonwealth of Knowledge : Science, Sensibility, and White South Africa, 1820-2000 
(Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
72 Ibid.., 258. 
73 ibid, 259. 
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Project, which was modelled on the United States’ Tennessee Valley Authority.74 Public 
works projects traversed the territorial breadth of the country, and Iscor’s engineers identified 
strategic “growth points” to situate their plants. The development of the town of Ellisras and 
the Grootgeluk coal mine, which I discuss in the first and second chapters, is rooted in this 
period of significant public works investment.  
In prioritising security in the context of the Cold War, the apartheid regime found common 
cause with the then embattled colonial forces of neighbouring Southern African countries. In 
Mozambique, the Portuguese colonial government’s fears of rural insurrection informed the 
development of the Cahora Bassa hydropower project in the early 1970s. The Portuguese 
colonial government agreed that part of the electricity generated by the dam would be 
transmitted to South Africa in return for South Africa’s aid in controlling the anti-colonial 
forces of Frelimo. As Allen and Barbara Isaacman write, the dam’s designers adopted a 
particularly authoritarian stance. The dam changed the river’s historical ebb and flow patterns 
and the traditional cultivation methods of the peasants living alongside the river collapsed. In 
addition, peasants living alongside the river were moved without compensation and re-settled 
in the “strategic villages,” which the colonial government had encouraged as a counter-
insurgency measure.75 Insensitivity to local residents should thus be read in the context of an 
entrenched colonial suspicion of the African populace. South Africa’s power in the region 
was to a large extent exercised through its infrastructural prowess. In this regard, South 
African parastatals were an important political entity in their own right as key players in the 
negotiations between South Africa and neighbouring countries. For instance, Eskom’s role in 
negotiations between Frelimo and Renamo in the 1990s was lauded in parliamentary debates 
at the time.76 
Science and Technology in South African governance 
In the early part of the twentieth century, infrastructure development played an important part 
of the white government’s ability to enact its rule over the African majority. Control over 
infrastructure was vested in the powerful- the government, state corporations, and businesses- 
and was largely divorced from any imperative to uplift the majority of the black and 
impoverished populace. This white monopoly over the control of science and technology was 
74 P. F. Palmer, “Gold and South African Economic Development,” Economic Inquiry 2, no. 2 (March 1, 1964): 
142–55. 
75 Allen Isaacman, “Displaced People, Displaced Energy, and Displaced Memories: The Case of Cahora Bassa, 
1970-2004,” The International Journal of African Historical Studies 38, no. 2 (January 1, 2005): 215. 
76 Hansard, May 10, 1992, col 8685. 
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reflected in the segregationist system of education and skills development. Schools and 
universities excluded black students from scientific education. Renfrew Christie’s argues, in 
his study of the historical development of Eskom, that electricity allowed industrial 
corporations to mechanise its operations and reduce their reliance on labour-intensive 
methods and thus on the demands of black labour.77 Infrastructural development was 
particularly influential in the agricultural sector. The extension of the railway network into 
the country’s interior during the early twentieth century revolutionised the speed in which 
farmers could deliver their crops to the market and enabled the “reconstruction of Highveld 
agriculture”.78 As the century wore on successful commercial farmers invested in agricultural 
machinery, such as ploughs and threshing machines, to reduce their dependence on African 
labour. But mechanisation carried its own risks, conditioned by the significant capital 
investment it required. This led to a crisis in white agriculture during the 1980s when an 
unexpected rise in interest rates adversely affected farmers’ ability to repay the loans that had 
financed their purchases of agricultural equipment.  
Technological instruments often proved unwieldy to those who sought their assistance to 
implement control. Deborah Posel places the apartheid government’s “mania for 
measurement” to transform and control the population at large, within the broader global 
context of faith in the power of state driven initiatives. 79 But the apartheid state’s control was 
far from absolute, and the technological systems it employed were at times prone to 
breakdown. Failures, when they occurred could be catastrophic. This is illustrated in the tale 
of Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd’s panopticon administrative system, the bewysburo, 
during the 1960s.80 The failure of the system lay partly in the manifold techniques ordinary 
people used to bypass its control. As a result the system never gained legitimacy in the minds 
of its users, and this is an important reason for the discrediting of high modernist 
interventions more generally. Stephen Sparks argues that the rhetoric of the “apartheid 
modern” consistently propagated the idea of the country’s technological successes, rarely 
admitting to its failures. He also argues that the supposedly hegemonic and efficient “techno-
modernity” was bolstered by a political reality in which Africans provided the cheap labour.81 
77 Renfrew Christie, Electricity, Industry, and Class in South Africa (London: Macmillan in association with St. 
Antony’s College, Oxford, 1984), 3. 
78 Timothy Keegan, Rural Transformations in Industrializing South Africa: The Southern Highveld to 1914 
(Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1986). 
79 Deborah Posel, “A Mania for Measurement: Statistics and Statecraft in the Transition to Apartheid,” in 
Science and Society in Southern Africa, ed. Saul Dubow (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 116. 
80 Breckenridge, Biometric State. 
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Cheap black labour underwrote the apartheid government’s peculiar technological success, 
where it was successful, throughout the twentieth century.  
Parastatals’ early history 
South African corporations tended towards large-scale operations and became particularly 
concentrated during the 1950s.82 For Fine and Rustomjee the MEC overpowered 
independent, small-scale producers, illustrating the oligopolistic nature of South African 
industry. As nationalised entities the parastatals enjoyed legal protection of their monopoly 
status. But they struggled at first to achieve market dominance over private steel 
manufacturers and electricity producers in the early part of the twentieth century. Under the 
guidance of Hendrik van der Bijl, who Clark has termed “South Africa’s economic czar”83, 
parastatals only realised their full might during the Second World War. The wartime 
conditions of constrained imports and straitened supply allowed parastatals to realise the 
benefits of scale in their operations and achieve a market monopoly. While they operated as a 
parallel, state owned network, Nancy Clark argues that parastatals resembled corporations in 
the private sector because both had to obey the country’s racially based segregationist laws. 
Working within the Nationalist Party’s vision of racial segregation parastatals adopted a 
particular operational model, which Clark suggests, was the only way that industry could 
operate. Common features included their desire for monopoly control of markets and the 
supply of raw materials; the preference for remote rural areas to avoid militant black union 
activity; and the fact that their operations were highly mechanised to ensure that the work 
force was split between a minority of (white) technicians and a majority of unskilled (black) 
workers.84  
Parastatals and the state 
Bill Freund suggests that the apartheid state was a successful developmental state, achieving 
the “embedded autonomy”85 necessary for industrialisation.86 First coined by scholar Peter 
Evans, the term describes the optimal combination of state guidance and industrial autonomy 
82 D. Innes, Anglo: Anglo American and the Rise of Modern South Africa (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1984); 
Feinstein, An Economic History of South Africa : Conquest, Discrimination, and Development, 91. 
83 Clark, Manufacturing Apartheid: State Corporations in South Africa, 117. 
84 Clark, Manufacturing Apartheid: State Corporations in South Africa; Nancy L. Clark, “The Limits of 
Industrialisation under Apartheid,” in Apartheid’s Genesis, 1935-1962, ed. Philip Bonner, Peter Delius, and 
Deborah Posel (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1993), 65–95. 
85 Peter B. Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation, Princeton Paperbacks (Princeton, 
N.J: Princeton University Press, 1995). 
86 Bill Freund, “A Ghost from the Past: The South African Developmental State of the 1940s,” Transformation: 
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necessary to achieve economic development.87 Freund argues that South Africa contained a 
circle of technocratic elites who worked effectively to achieve high levels of technological 
success, such as in the sophisticated spheres of national electrification, steel manufacturing, 
and coal-to-fuel processing. The importance of “embedded autonomy” is further illustrated 
by Harry Verhoeven in his study of the Merowe dam hydropower project in Sudan, which fell 
short of its grand ambitions to supply electricity to the country’s borderlands. Verhoeven 
suggests that part of the reason for the failure was that the institutions responsible for the 
dam’s construction lacked the “benign embedded autonomy” characteristic of institutions in 
developmental states.88  
Nancy Clark’s in-depth study of parastatals reveals that they displayed a distinct autonomy 
from government from their inception. At times they were openly defiant. For instance, van 
der Bijl disregarded government’s command to increase the levels of white employment by 
employing cheaper black migrant workers in place of more expensive white workers.89 He 
also continued to encourage foreign capital investment despite government’s rhetoric of 
ridding South African industry from the shackles of imperial capitalism. But the parastatals 
also gradually drifted into a relationship of compromise with government and with the private 
sector; an alliance in which each party felt their interests were suitably served. Saul Dubow 
notes that Hendrik van Eck, who succeeded van der Bijl at the helm of parastatals in 1948 
was rumoured to have a direct telephone line from his office at the Industrial Development 
Corporation (IDC) to the office of Verwoerd.90  
Fine and Rustomjee suggest that the 1970s saw the triumph of the Nationalist Party’s (NP) 
strategy to gradually inject an Afrikaner character into the historically English complexion of 
the South African private, corporate sector. Combined with the inter-penetration of the 
parastatals with private capital, this boosted “post-war” industrial growth in the country.91 It 
also allowed for the collaborative development of such ambitious and capital intensive 
infrastructure projects as the Sishen-Saldanha railway line, which aimed to bolster the 
country’s port and rail capacity for mineral exports. Nonetheless the extent of collaboration 
should not be overstated. It is important to recognise the institutional distance between the 
parastatals, the private sector and the government. There was an identifiable boundary 
87 Evans, Embedded Autonomy. 
88 Verhoeven, Water, Civilisation and Power in Sudan, 254. 
89 Clark, Manufacturing Apartheid: State Corporations in South Africa, 70. 
90 Dubow, A Commonwealth of Knowledge : Science, Sensibility, and White South Africa, 1820-2000, 251. 
91 Fine and Rustomjee, The Political Economy of South Africa, 185. 
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between them, which at times took the form of meshed prerogatives and at other times of 
open opposition.  
It is also important to recognise that “embedded autonomy” was not the permanent state of 
parastatals under the apartheid regime. Clarke’s study is largely concerned with the period up 
to the 1960s with only cursory mention of the period from the 1970s until the end of 
apartheid. The condition of relative autonomy was not unique to South Africa during this 
period. In many parts of the world the particular Cold War context of modernisation and 
nationalisation meant that technologists all over the world were elevated as agents of nation 
building and given free rein in the sense that government provided the legislative and 
political muscle to facilitate their activities. In the 1970s a greatly changed global funding 
climate, caused mainly by the oil crisis of 1973, affected parastatal activity. On paper 
parastatals were meant to be self- financing, which meant that they had to raise money on the 
foreign loan market. But they relied, all too frequently perhaps, on government bail-outs in 
times of heavy indebtedness. Even though the parastatals enjoyed government patronage, 
there were limits to the amount the public purse could tolerate. The limits of public support 
were exposed in the late 1980s, when government considered the privatisation of parastatals 
in a bid to appease public dissatisfaction. 
While security imperatives drove much of the infrastructure development of the 1960s and 
1970s, by the 1980s, the South African government under the leadership of President PW 
Botha shifted gear in an attempt to endow apartheid with new respectability. This meant 
spreading the benefits of infrastructural modernisation beyond the narrow confines of the 
white populace. Nationalist leaders sought a radical transformation of the apartheid concept, 
altering the “language of legitimation” in a bid to mask the controversial politics of 
segregation that animated the movement from its inception.92  This model of development 
followed a classical “techno political” path, promising a better quality of life through an 
infrastructural development that was rhetorically shorn of its political motivation to quell 
black discontent.93  
92 Dubow, Apartheid, 1948-1994. 
93 von Schnitzler, Democracy’s Infrastructure. 
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Infrastructure and neo-liberalism 
On one level infrastructure development by its nature contradicts the dictates of neo-liberal 
wisdom.94 Competition, a fundamental anchor of the neoliberal system,95 is not necessarily 
desirable because of the large-scale and capital intensive nature of infrastructure projects. 
Competition is likely to result in duplicated capacity and wasted resources. During the 1980s 
the model of nationalised infrastructure development driven by state corporations fell out of 
favour in many countries around the world. Growing fiscal strains drew an irate public gaze 
to the operations and management of those state corporations responsible for infrastructure 
provision. In the United Kingdom, critics of state corporations argued that the post war 
system of nationalised infrastructure development was supply heavy. This resulted in the 
proliferation of large infrastructure projects that couldn’t pay for themselves because of a 
lack of consumer demand. 96 
The tendency of infrastructure projects towards monopoly conditions and their aversion to 
competition has prohibited the widespread privatisation of state owned entities. In his study 
of an urban heating system in a small town in post-Soviet Russia, Paul Collier observes that 
the World Bank, generally considered a key institutional propagator of neo-liberal theory, 
agreed that the state had to continue to provide heating. He writes that:  
Critical scholars have been transfixed by the image of rapacious multinationals sweeping 
in to reap profits from infrastructure privatisation in poor countries while essential 
services go unmet. However well or poorly this image conveys what actually happens 
after privatisation, the simple fact is that such privatisations have been surprisingly 
rare.97  
While the mechanisms through which infrastructure was delivered and funded changed, 
utilising elements from the “neoliberal toolkit”, such as unbundling and indebtedness, the 
state retained the ultimate responsibility for heating the city’s households.  
This peculiar feature of infrastructure development as tending towards monopoly control is 
illustrated by the remarkable proliferation of construction cartels across the globe. These 
94 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford University Press, 2007), 67. 
95 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978--1979, Reprint edition 
(Picador, 2010). 
96 Marvin and Graham, Splintering networks,’ Olivier Coutard, The Governance of Large Technical Systems 
(London; New York: Routledge, 1999), 151. 
97 Stephen J. Collier, Post-Soviet Social: Neoliberalism, Social Modernity, Biopolitics (Princeton University 
Press, 2011), 243. 
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cartels have proven easy bedfellows with unsavoury groups. In 1987 a commission of enquiry 
in New York exposed the deep penetration of the Italian mafia, the Cosa Nostra, into the 
construction industry. Their relationship of patronage dated as far back as 1922.98 The mafia 
gained its leverage from their infiltration of labour unions, which allowed it to control the 
construction process. In India, the UK and Holland competition commissions have taken 
construction companies to task for collusion. In South Africa the most surprising aspect of 
the Competition Commission’s 2013 investigation into the construction industry was that it 
had taken so long to occur. This particular investigation centred on the collusive practices of 
South African construction companies during the 2010 World Cup stadium construction, but 
by all indications collusion was a systemic and long-running practice in industry. In 2013, the 
editor of the Business Day at the time, Peter Bruce, defended collusion as a necessary hedge 
against risk. Because of the capital intensive nature of infrastructure projects, he argued, the 
cost of risk and unpredictability was intolerably high. Thus collusion encouraged a degree of 
stability. Bruce wrote that: 
The fact is that much of the world’s industrial economy has been built by cartels, some 
secret and many tolerated. Sometimes it is impossible not to collude or, put another way, 
sometimes collusion may be in the national interest.99  
There is thus a strong sense that infrastructure development requires monopolistic conditions 
for its survival. In the neo-liberal era of competition where monopolies are undesirable, 
corporations co-operate in a manner that reinforces stability. The infrastructural network 
tends to unite the otherwise disparate parts into a coherent whole.  
It is important to keep in mind that in many countries, including South Africa, privatisation of 
state corporations did occur. Corporations were “unbundled” or split into their different 
operating units and those deemed suitable for a competitive market were sold to private 
investors. In many cases, privatisation has been partial. Recent scholarship has highlighted 
the persistence of centrally controlled infrastructure provision that nonetheless adopts some 
of the “unbundling” mechanisms associated with neo-liberal ethics. James Ferguson for 
example, describes the use of the “neoliberal toolkit” to deliver social welfare ends in his 
study of social welfare in South Africa.100 The key challenge to infrastructure development in 
98 Selwyn Raab, “Many New York Builders Accept Mafia Willingly, State Unit Says,” The New York Times, 
September 9, 1987. 
99 “Thick End of the Wedge: What Were Construction Firms Thinking?,” Business Day, July 15 2013. 
100 James Ferguson, “The Uses of Neoliberalism,” Antipode 41 (January 1, 2010): 166–84. 
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the age of neo-liberalism has thus been its ability to keep intact the various forces necessary 
for its success despite the separation of the network into its constituent parts. Technological 
advancement has assisted in improving coherence, at least in the world of information 
technology. Paul Edwards argues that the information age has enabled the greater 
coordination of increasingly decentralised and disparate items. 101  
In 1996 the ANC adopted its Growth, Employment and Redistribution (Gear) policy, which 
assumed a distinctive neo-liberal complexion. In the years that followed, influential 
government officials discouraged state intervention in the economy as a matter of principle. 
But this changed to some extent during the 2000s. Gillian Hart has described a shift away 
from the tenets of Gear in the annual budget of 2001, towards "a more interventionist stance 
in infrastructural development, industrial policy and labour market concerns.102Thus by the 
time of the construction of the Medupi power station, the state had re-asserted itself. This is 
demonstrated, for instance, in the government’s encouragement of the Expanded Public 
Works Programme (EPWP), which encouraged infrastructure development in a bid to 
decrease unemployment.  
I argue that the technocratic rule of experts has not fundamentally declined in prominence 
during the neo-liberal era. For David Harvey, neo-liberal systems rely heavily on technocrats 
and are characterised by a mistrust of democratic participation.103 Andrew Barry’s work on 
technological zones suggests that the rule of experts has not changed in intensity, although 
perhaps in form. 104 Technological zones have bound the “experts” across the conventional 
borders of the nation state and created a common set of rules and regulations. For Barry, the 
state exerts a partial hold, fulfilling at best a regulatory function, because capitalism pre-
supposes an increased geographical and social mobility. Thus “neo-liberal” government is 
fundamentally shaped at the local level through the interaction of people and things. 105  
Chapter overview 
Chapter One describes the forces driving Iscor’s entrance to the Waterberg in the context of 
an apartheid government that sought to legitimate its existence through techno-political 
means. As a nominally autonomous institution Iscor was motivated by the need to protect the 
101 Edwards, “Understanding Infrastructure: Dynamics, Tensions, and Design.” 
102 Gillian Hart, ‘Post-Apartheid Developments in Historical and Comparative Perspective.’ 
103 Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, 66. 
104 Barry, Political Machines; Andrew Barry, “Technological Zones,” European Journal of Social Theory 9, no. 
2 (May 1, 2006): 239–53. 
105 Barry, Political Machines, 12. 
32 
 
                                                 
country’s coal reserves from the wiles of the global market, having absorbed the 
government’s prerogative of ensuring national self-sufficiency. The material appeal of the 
Waterberg coal reserves was in turn a product of a particular configuration of political and 
economic factors.  
Chapter Two discusses the territorial transmission of state power from the capital to the 
border region of Ellisras. Iscor’s autonomy from government meant that one of the purposes 
of infrastructure development- transmitting state power over a given territory- was mediated 
by the parastatals and their engineers. Thus the extension of the state’s tentacles was not as 
straight forward as might have been supposed. If Iscor’s engineers are considered the 
guardians of the infrastructure network, they gained legitimacy through the material benefits 
their activities promised. This won over the otherwise recalcitrant elites in the Ellisras 
district.  
Chapter Three describes Eskom’s development of the Matimba power station in Ellisras. 
Eskom was driven to the Waterberg by concern over air pollution, as the Eastern Transvaal 
became saturated with air pollution from its pre-existing power stations in the region. Driven 
by the political imperatives of self-sufficiency and national security, Eskom’s engineers had a 
high risk threshold. This allowed them to overcome the otherwise stringent barriers to entry 
of infrastructure development in the Waterberg. There existed a degree of coherence between 
the foreign specialised firms and local subsidiaries which had faded at the time of Medupi’s 
construction. This period has been dubbed “the golden age of power generation” and the local 
manufacturing industry for power station parts was at its height.  
Chapter Four describes the Matimba power station’s absorption of the imperatives of the 
democratic and neo-liberal transition of the 1990s. The conventional periodisation of neo-
liberalism, generally thought to have arrived during the late 1980s, does not coincide with the 
reality of privatisation on the ground. At a national level, pressure groups resisted the 
“unbundling” of Eskom, and the consequent fragmentation of the network because of the 
effect this might have on Eskom’s ability to supply electricity at the low prices necessary to 
ensure its affordability to poor households. Privatisation did however effect a different 
conception of power station development, one that favoured commercial reform in the 
direction of cost saving. At the Matimba power station the imperative of transformation was 
tied to that of professional autonomy. This autonomy is an essential component of the 
engineering profession.   
33 
 
Chapter Five discusses the transformation of the labour situation in Lephalale, which like 
other parts of the country saw a gradual transition from a migrant labour system to one where 
“stabilisation” was the chief imperative. Stabilisation during the 1980s in Lephalale is 
illustrated most clearly in the creation of the black township Marapong. It argues that the 
arrival of independent black trade unions signalled a fundamental transformation in the 
balance of power between workers and managers at least at the Matimba power station. From 
the early 1990s independent black trade unions assisted in the negotiation of the terms of the 
democratic transition at the power station. The new power station manager at Matimba 
introduced bargaining forums in 1992 that enabled direct consultation with trade union 
representatives. 
Chapter Six describes the construction of Medupi, which began in 2007, after years of 
deliberation over the fate of Eskom. Because of the near twenty year time lag between the 
construction of Medupi and the construction of Eskom’s last power station, the construction 
network had to be resuscitated from a long lethargy to face unprecedented challenges. 
Medupi’s overseers have faced the challenge of keeping together the disparate forces 
necessary to render the infrastructure development possible. For instance de-industrialisation 
in the South African economy since the 1980s has caused a distinctive shortage of artisanal 
skills. Those workers skilled in intricate artisanal tasks rotated continually between the 
country’s major infrastructure projects. But the presence of skilled workers from outside of 
Lephalale has pushed against the impetus for localisation and the demands of local Ellisras 
residents for development. The transition from the migrant labour system to a more settled 
and stable workforce particularly in the township of Marapong meant that local residents had 
a greater claim on the opportunities for upliftment. The “burden of development” has 
increased the expectations loaded onto the successful working of the infrastructure project.  
Methodology 
This thesis uses a combination of oral and archival sources to reconstruct the historical events 
in question. I have consulted the National Archives of South Africa, which is a depository of 
records from various tiers of government, from the local to the national. These archives 
contain a rich collection of Iscor’s records and I have drawn on the minutes of its board 
meetings from the 1970s and various correspondences between the corporation, government 
and various economic organisations in the country. However, Eskom has not deposited the 
bulk of its historical records in the National Archives. I thus had to seek special permission 
from Eskom to examine its archives, which are housed at its headquarters in Megawatt Park. 
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I also received permission to access the record collection of the Matimba power station in 
Lephalale. This permission was granted on condition that Eskom review the chapters in 
which the archival material was cited before they were publicly disseminated. These chapters, 
which are Chapters Three, Four and Five, have met with Eskom’s approval and they have not 
requested that I alter them in any way. I also made consulted roughly 600 newspaper articles 
from various national publications.  
Archival records are by their nature scattered, consisting of disparate documents. My 
challenge has thus been to piece together a narrative where the link between the events 
detailed in various documents is not entirely clear. For assistance with this task I have relied 
on the recounting of events from engineers and residents of Lephalale who had first-hand 
knowledge of the events in question. These have included engineers from Iscor who were 
responsible for setting up the Grootgeluk coal mine, residents of Lephalale who recalled the 
transformation in the town during the second half of the twentieth century, and engineers 
employed by the Matimba power station. Interviews were generally conducted with a view to 
gaining the life history of the interviewees. In some cases, due to time constraints, I restricted 
the discussion to events that directly pertained to the activities of Iscor and Eskom in the 
Waterberg. The majority of these interviews took place during periodic field trips to 
Lephalale in 2014 and 2015. In some cases I returned for follow-up interviews to request 
clarification or further explanation. I discovered that in the main oral sources complemented 
rather than contradicted the archival evidence.  
The discussion of the construction of the Medupi power station in Chapter Six does not draw 
heavily on interview material. Rather it is primarily based on court cases and about 300 
newspaper articles. I avoided interviews for this discussion because the complex nature of 
Medupi’s construction means that there are as many view points as there are people. In 
addition its fraught public image has meant that the key agents were generally cautious about 
discussing events at the power station. The advantage of Medupi’s controversial nature is that 
the media coverage of its progress has been extensive and the archive vast. The media 
coverage in general suffers from the limitation that the journalists generally work for 
Johannesburg-based publications and travel sporadically to Lephalale and the Medupi power 
station. I have drawn on these articles to reflect the progression of events over the years, 
including interviews with managers at Eskom who have been responsible for Medupi. The 
latter have been particularly helpful because they reflect facts that Eskom’s managers are 
comfortable to place in the public record and so carry some veracity. Newspaper reports have 
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thus provided a sense of the various corporation’s intentions as they changed over time and a 
useful chronology of actual events.  
A note on terminology 
The town of Lephalale, where my research is based, was originally called Ellisras. Its name 
changed in 2002. I use the name Ellisras in my discussion of historical events before the 
name of the town was changed and Lephalale for events thereafter. 
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Chapter 1: Iscor and the Grootgeluk Coal Mine  
Introduction 
This chapter discusses Iscor’s search for coking coal, a desperate quest which saw its 
engineers travel across South Africa’s northern bushveld, beckoned by the underground 
riches of the Waterberg coal fields. Iscor’s activities in the Ellisras district during the 1970s 
encouraged Eskom to build the Matimba power station there during the 1980s. The 
developments of these large technical systems in the late apartheid era set the stage for the 
construction of the Medupi power station decades later. This chapter demonstrates that the 
development of large technical systems was conditioned not directly or wholly by the 
demands of Minerals-Energy Complex106 but by the apartheid government’s desire to realise 
its vision of national self-sufficiency. As a nominally autonomous institution, Iscor absorbed 
this prerogative into its own inner workings and oriented its activities accordingly. This 
chapter also highlights Iscor’s difficulty with forecasting national supply and demand of raw 
materials in a context of public sector financed infrastructure projects rather than consumer 
demand. As the privatisation debate of the late 1980s would demonstrate, Iscor and Eskom’s 
tendency to over-estimate the demand for raw materials both globally and domestically had 
catastrophic impacts on their financial stability. 
Iscor’s quest for coking coal became an urgent one during the late 1960s and 1970s, the 
golden age of state-led infrastructure development. At the same time the government 
emphasised expanding the scope of the country’s mineral exports outside of the traditional 
ballast of gold to include coal and iron ore. Diversifying mineral exports was a lucrative 
source of export revenue for the government but it also threatened the security of the coal 
supply for domestic consumers such as Iscor. Iscor managed these conflicting government 
imperatives by starting the Grootgeluk coal mine. In so doing, Iscor’s engineers displayed a 
remarkable degree of tenacity. This tenacity was conditioned by two factors. Firstly, 
unexpected obstacles proved ultimately surmountable because Iscor was “locked in” to the 
project through its large capital investment. This ensured that retreat was more expensive 
than persistence. Secondly, Iscor had imbibed the ideal of national self-sufficiency as an 
organisational ethic and this motivated its engineers to forge ahead. 
The Waterberg, the site of Iscor’s sought after coal reserves, was a relatively sparsely 
populated region for much of the twentieth century. Its hot and arid environmental conditions 
106 Fine and Rustomjee, The Political Economy of South Africa. 
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prevented easy habitation. In her discussion of the region’s mythological connotations, Isabel 
Hofmeyr describes its distinctive topographical features that separated the district from the 
rest of the Highveld in the popular imagination of Afrikaner settlers. As Hofmeyr writes: 
“…White settlers were attracted by its 'fictions' of being 'the ideal theatre of manly adventure, 
of great endeavours and the possibility of princely wealth'." A mountain range ran along its 
south west border rendering the Waterberg an isolated district that became known as the 
“zone ‘behind the mountain’”.107 Hofmeyr traces this perception of isolation and separation 
to the 1850s. The Waterberg thus became home to renegade pioneers, to those white settlers 
striving to escape the clutches of the rudimentary state power exercised by the Zuid-
Afrikaanse Republiek (ZAR) in the Transvaal. In some cases, the Waterberg was a place of 
refuge for those escaping the servitude of tenant labour in more densely populated 
agricultural regions. The reason that Iscor’s engineers ventured to this far corner of the South 
African countryside, which had acquired a desolation of mythic proportions, is the subject of 
this chapter.  
 
As discussed in the Introduction, the relationship between the South African government and 
the parastatals closely approximated an ideal state of “embedded autonomy” under 
apartheid.108 In this case Iscor’s founding engineer Hendrik van der Bijl and his prodigal 
successor Hendrik van Eck drove the direction of the parastatals’ development while staying 
in close contact with government officials. Van Eck, in particular, gained the trust of 
government by supporting its policy of “industrial decentralisation”.109 Industrial 
decentralisation was intended to encourage industrial development outside of the main urban 
centres and across the geographical breadth of the South African countryside. The autonomy 
he enjoyed was thus conditioned by the government’s faith in his commitment to satisfy the 
needs of the national interest.  
The mid-60s to 1976 were the heydays of public sector investment in South Africa. Fixed 
investment by the government and public enterprises increased from 45% of total investment 
in 1963 to 53% in 1976 before plummeting to 27% by 1991.110 Charles Feinstein attributes 
these changes in public sector investment to the spending behaviour of the state corporations, 
particularly Sasol, Iscor and Eskom. . Government-encouraged parastatal spending during the 
107 ibid, p11.  
108 Freund, “A Ghost from the Past.” 
109 Saul Dubow, A Commonwealth of Knowledge : Science, Sensibility, and White South Africa, 1820-2000 
(Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 251. 
110 Feinstein, p221 
38 
 
                                                 
1960s, was targeted at the sectors most likely to suffer from international sanctions. The 
parastatals, especially Iscor and Eskom, spearheaded the country’s industrialisation and 
modernisation campaign in the face of international hostility that intensified after the 
Sharpeville massacre of 1960. Following South Africa’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth 
in 1961, the records of parliamentary debates reveal a palpable anxiety among members of 
parliament over the country’s appeal to foreign investors.111 Nonetheless the government’s 
strategy of nation-building through state driven industrialisation soon bore fruit. A year later 
certain members of parliament praised the government for investing in Eskom, Iscor and 
Foskor, and the role those entities played in stimulating economic activity within the private 
sector.112 Government continued to proclaim the virtues of state-directed planning and in 
1966 the Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd announced the establishment of the Department 
of Planning and Coordination. In this conception of governance and development, economics 
and scientific progress were considered crucial measures of the country’s prosperity.113 Co-
ordinated planning was to inform the country’s regional development. The Prime Minister 
stated in 1966 that: 
 In the sphere of physical planning no fewer than 15 different regions and larger areas 
are being surveyed at the moment so that the diverse types of development taking place 
within any specific area can be properly co-ordinated. Never before in South Africa, and 
in few countries in the world, has so systematic and creative an attitude been adopted as 
is being adopted in the Republic at present.114  
Under the guidance of van Eck, the parastatals enjoyed a substantial degree of autonomy 
from government in expanding their infrastructural scope across the country. The threat of 
international sanctions against South Africa, which loomed large during the 1970s, forced the 
government to come to terms with its creeping isolation. The idea of economic self-
sufficiency became the mantra within government circles and its technocratic personnel 
assumed the mission to make South Africa industrially competitive with great urgency. The 
oil crisis of 1973 further underlined the need to reduce the country’s dependence on imported 
oil, encouraging the state-sponsored coal-to-oil initiative of Sasol.  But these imperatives of 
increased mineral exports and economic self-sufficiency were at odds with each other.   
111 Hansard, March 23, 1961, col 3591 
112 Hansard, May 18, 1962, col 5939 
113 Hansard, January 15, 1966, col 74-75 
114 ibid., col 75 
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Diversifying Exports 
In the 1970s the prospects for the gold mines, the basis of the country’s economic prosperity 
for centuries began to falter after almost a hundred years of consistently positive 
performance.115 The costs of production rose as miners were forced to mine at deeper levels. 
But the price of gold remained high during the 1970s. Feinstein writes that:  
…While the price of gold was rising during the 1970s it seemed to many that the 
Republic was entering a new era of growth and prosperity. But when the price plunged 
downwards after 1980 the illusion was shattered. The engine which had once driven the 
whole economy forward so vigorously had clearly stalled.116  
Tasked with interrogating the future of the country’s economic prosperity, the Reynders 
Commission of 1972 concluded that import substitution industrialisation had run its 
course. 117 The Commission argued that there was a limited scope for further development of 
light industry and significant structural constraints to the manufacture of complex goods. 
Feinstein argues that the government rejected the one possible option that would promote 
manufacturing: termed “inward industrialisation”, this required the development of a black 
consumer market. Since encouraging an equitable income distribution across racial barriers 
defied the precepts of apartheid, it settled on the only alternative: increasing the scope of the 
export market by emphasising minerals outside of the scope of gold, particularly coal and 
iron ore.  
In their definitive work on the nature of South African industrial development, Ben Fine and 
Zavareh Rustomjee attribute the frenzy to increase mineral exports to the strategic 
manoeuvring of key players within the Minerals-Energy Complex, and particularly those that 
constituted the Transvaal Coal Owners’ Association. They suggest that the efficiency of the 
massive infrastructure development intended to ease the passage of minerals for exports- 
railway line, ports and harbours- was testament to the greater coordination between the 
government and the private sector. This in turn was a result of the erosion of the boundary 
between English and Afrikaner capital that had previously manifested in a tight division 
between the Afrikaans dominated public sector and the English dominated private sphere. By 
the 1970s, following concerted efforts at capital accumulation, Afrikaner businessmen had 
115 Feinstein, An Economic History of South Africa : Conquest, Discrimination, and Development. 
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diluted the hold of English business in the country’s capital concentration, ensuring that the 
NP-led government enjoyed a better working relationship with those in control of capital.118  
But this picture of a seamless coordination between government policy and those in industry 
with the capital and technical know-how to implement this policy fails to account for the 
contradictions that arose within each party’s organisational aims. This chapter demonstrates 
that the co-operation between Iscor and government was an uneasy one. The relationship was 
conditioned in large part by financing, particularly in convincing government to contribute 
state funds when Iscor was unable to source the required funds from its own reserves. When 
Iscor was ready to proceed with the Grootgeluk coal mine in the mid-1970s, its internal 
funding sources had dried up. But the financing constraint at the time was not strong enough 
for Iscor’s engineers to fully restrict their projects and activities in the pipeline.   
I argue that the ultimate development of the Grootgeluk coal mine was made possible by the 
peculiar historical context of the 1970s. Iscor was caught between the twin governmental 
imperatives of achieving economic self- sufficiency and diversifying the country’s mineral 
exports. To fulfil its mandate of acting in the national interest by promoting the country’s 
steel manufacturing capacity, it required a steady supply of one of its core raw inputs: coking 
coal. But the government’s drive to diversify mineral exports encouraged privately owned 
collieries to gear their production for global export, so threatening the security of supply for 
domestic consumers such as Iscor. This peculiar combination of factors created the 
conditions for the exploitation of the Waterberg coal reserves. This was a high-risk and thus 
costly decision because of the dearth of supportive infrastructure in much of the Waterberg, 
which contained no other coal mine.  
The Development of the Grootgeluk Coal Mine 
The Grootgeluk coal mine was a product of an ambitious expansion plan that Iscor’s 
managers drew up in 1968. As part of the expansion plan, and in a bid to ease the transport of 
iron ore from its Sishen mine in the Northern Cape to the port of Saldanha Bay for export, 
Iscor built the Sishen-Saldanha Bay railway line. But the collapse of global demand for iron 
ore at an unpropitious time meant that the Sishen-Saldanha Bay railway line did not deliver 
the expected profits, forcing its managers to stall the remainder of the projects in the pipeline. 
It also forced Iscor’s managers to pay closer attention to its ability to survive in a global 
market governed by the fickle movement of supply and demand. In addition, as separate 
118 Fine and Rustomjee, The Political Economy of South Africa. 
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financial entities from the government, parastatals relied on foreign loans to fund their 
operations. But the international financial market suffered from a severe downturn in the 
1970s in large part due to the oil crisis of 1973. Thus Iscor was forced to consider more 
closely the use of planning models to better survive the market as a result of its straitened 
finances. The World Bank reared its head here, as it did in other developing countries during 
this period, encouraging Iscor to utilise computer driven models of market planning 
developed by World Bank engineers.119 This evangelical spread of science and technology 
was intended to encourage forms of thinking compatible with democratic participation and to 
contribute to the creation of a rational citizenry.120  
This chapter is also an attempt to understand the nature of industrial and engineering activity 
under the apartheid regime. Iscor attempted to develop a viable and profitable steel industry 
and diversify away from an otherwise easy reliance on mineral exports. But during the 1970s 
the government emphasised the continued importance of income from raw material exports 
and forced the country to diversify its mineral exports. This interfered with Iscor’s plans to 
increase its steel production, but did not scupper it completely. Iscor’s engineers 
demonstrated a remarkable goal-oriented tenacity encouraged, at least in part, by the same 
anxiety that drove the Afrikaner nationalist movement elsewhere in the country. The 
relationship between the government and Iscor in this case can be characterised as one of 
negotiation and compromise rather than parastatal subordination to government decisions.  
One of the preoccupations of the existing historical studies of parastatals is the importance of 
ethnicity, and these often position the English-dominated private sector against the Afrikaans-
dominated public sector. Iscor had historically sourced its coking coal from collieries at the 
Witbank and Natal coalfields. But in the 1960s Anglo-American began to buy up more of 
these, particularly in Natal. The encroachment of the Oppenheimer group had already raised 
concern when it formed the Highveld Steel and Vanadium Company in direct competition 
with Iscor. It is tempting to point to the ethnic factor, in terms of the Afrikaner right’s 
antipathy to English businessmen although the evidence is not quite conclusive. Tim Cross 
has demonstrated the persistence of the ethnic divide. In the late sixties P.W Hoek, a member 
of the Broederbond and Iscor’s commercial manager, launched an investigation into 
119 M.T. Allen and G. Hecht, Technologies of Power: Essays in Honor of Thomas Parke Hughes and Agatha 
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monopoly in the steel market with the consent of Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd.121 The 
resultant Hoek report contained a scathing indictment of the Oppenheimer group and called 
for the dissolution of its Anglo-American empire. The Broederbond feared that the 
Oppenheimer group threatened its policy of separate development through “economic 
integration” and by thwarting the entrance of Afrikaners into the commercial world in 
sufficient numbers.122 Since the report was only ready after Verwoed’s death, it was received 
by his successor BJ Vorster in 1968. Vorster refused to dismantle the Oppenheimer Empire, 
making enemies within the Broederbond in the process and aligning himself more clearly 
with the more liberal, verligte camp that was then on the rise.  Cross suggests that Iscor’s 
refusal to partner with Anglo to form Highveld Steel reflects the continued dominance of 
ethnic concerns during this period, although bar the coincidental presence of Hoek in both 
organisations, he presents no definitive documentary evidence. It is difficult to draw any 
general conclusion about the influence of ethnicity here, considering that Iscor had a few 
years earlier partnered with Anglo-American in acquiring General Mining.   
Engineers, Tenacity and Nation-Building 
The tenacity of Iscor’s engineers played an important part in the ultimate development of the 
Grootgeluk coal mine. Accounts of tenacity by engineers are too ubiquitous to be attributed 
solely to the personality characteristics of the individuals in question. Tenacity appears to 
have been conditioned by a particular institutional culture within Iscor at the time that one of 
its engineers Joe Meyer attributed to the nature of Afrikaner nationalism during this period. 
Meyer was one of the founding engineers of the Grootgeluk coal mine and served as its 
manager for decades. He described the difficulties faced by Iscor’s engineers as follows: 
We had to make a difference at a time when a lot investment was done in the steel 
industry with always a shortage of funds. Engineering creativity was the order of the 
day. We could stretch a Rand a long way…We had challenges- we had huge challenges 
at Thabazimbi, and that made us persevere, vasbyt, in a way that you can’t believe so 
that the country could grow. Most of the development in the country was done on the 
iron ore from Thabazimbi mine through to steel at the Pretoria Steel Works. I mean in 
those days the people came from the farms after the Rinderpest, it was just after the 
121 Tim Cross, “Afrikaner Nationalism, Anglo American and Iscor: The Formation of the Highveld Steel & 
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second world war, people just wanted to improve their conditions again, to stabilize after 
a very challenging time where a lot of people lost everything they owned.”123  
The poverty of Afrikaners in the countryside in the first decades of the twentieth century, 
channelled into the relatively cohesive Afrikaner nationalism of the NP endowed those state 
organs responsible for economic development with a peculiar ethic of desperation. Fairly 
regular international relations shocks over the ensuing decades compounded this 
institutionally-embedded anxiety, fuelling the perpetual fear of the survival of the white race 
in the southernmost tip of the African continent. 
The implications of the changed international climate dominated parliamentary debates 
during this period. Fears of South Africa’s creeping isolation were apparent in talk of an 
alliance that was brewing between Arab oil producing states and certain African countries 
within the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Opposition Members of Parliament blamed 
apartheid’s racist policies for what they considered to be an unnecessary international 
animosity. The Minister of Economic Affairs reassured them that South Africa’s 
technological prowess would enable it to retain a position of strength despite the unpopularity 
of the apartheid regime.  
With South Africa’s vast uranium resources and advanced techniques, we are in a 
position to play a very important role in the development and establishment of new 
energy resources for the world, and let me assure you that the outside world is aware of 
this…But the making of contributions in the technical and scientific spheres is not 
limited to the exploitation of uranium in South Africa. Our advanced development has 
enabled us to co-operate with and grant assistance to numerous states in the technical 
and scientific spheres, states not only in Africa but also in Latin America and the Middle 
East.124  
Technical and economic self-sufficiency was intended to buffer South Africa against 
international hostility while ensuring the longevity of the apartheid regime.  
Iscor and the Engineers 
Iscor encouraged the development of white engineers and offered its employees numerous 
opportunities for their professional development. The corporation also offered university 
123 Interview with Joe Meyer, March 17, 2015, Onverwacht. 
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scholarships to aspirant engineers, thus to some degree overcoming class-based barriers to 
entry. An engineer employed by Iscor, Joe Meyer, recalled having to walk long distances 
each day barefoot between his primary farm school and the farm hostel in which he resided as 
a child. A shortage of classrooms at the school meant that the teaching for two of his classes 
was conducted in the open air, under the shelter of trees. After successfully completing his 
secondary schooling, he enrolled at the University of Pretoria to study civil engineering after 
working hours. The University of Pretoria had such a program at that time. But without the 
financial means to see his degree to completion, he approached Iscor for a bursary to fund his 
last two years. Iscor however, was only concerned with developing mining, electrical, 
mechanical, metallurgical, electronic, chemical and industrial engineers, who were the 
backbone of the mining and steel industry, and awarded bursaries accordingly. Despite 
queuing in an intimidating waiting room before the interview and watching applicants depart 
empty handed, Meyer insisted, that he preferred to study civil engineering during his bursary 
interview. Eventually, Iscor agreed to fund his third and fourth year of study in civil 
engineering. He later acquired a Mine Manager’s Certificate of Competency at the 
Department of Minerals and Energy. Meyer subsequently became the Mine Manager at the 
Thabazimbi Iron Ore Mine, roughly 140 kilometres south of Ellisras, and at the Tshikondeni 
Coal Mine before he was appointed to the position of General Manager at the Grootgeluk 
coal mine.  
Michael Deats’s parents were unable to afford university tuition fees when he completed high 
school. His mother was employed as a short hand typist and his step father a motor mechanic. 
Calling on the largesse of a wealthy uncle from Potgietersrus, his parents secured a loan for 
his first year of study at the University of the Witwatersrand. During his second year, the 
bursary he received from the diamond mining corporation, de Beers, determined his choice of 
mining engineering as the branch of engineering he would specialise in. As a newly-
graduated mining engineer he worked for de Beers for two years. He was subsequently 
transferred from de Beers’ Kimberley mine to its Premier mine close to the town of Cullinan. 
Distraught at the working conditions there - “they treated me very poorly, roughly, cruelly,” 
he said125 - he left de Beers to work at Iscor’s iron ore mine in Thabazimbi.  
While Iscor generally promoted Afrikaans-speaking staff in the interests of Afrikaner 
upliftment, Deats’s story demonstrates that being English-speaking was not an 
125 Interview with Michael Deats, September 2, 2013, Woodmead, Gauteng. 
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insurmountable obstacle to succeeding in the engineering ranks. When he first began work at 
the Thabazimbi iron ore mine, he was surprised at the thoroughly Afrikaans culture of the 
place and was forced to become adept at the language during the course of the seven years 
that he spent at the mine. Following his time at Thabazimbi, he worked at the Iscor-owned 
Durban Navigation Colliery where he implemented a mining technique known as longwall 
coal mining, during the early 1970s. An innovative technique in South Africa at the time, 
longwall coal mining encouraged the greater mechanisation of coal mines. This made his 
name within the organisation and by his own admission Deats became the “doyen of coal 
mining” in the country. He was later promoted to the position of Iscor’s head of mining, 
earning him a seat on its Management Board. Thus in some cases performance proved 
stronger than ethnicity in determining the movement of personnel through the ranks. 
Nation-Building during the 1960s 
The exploitation of the Waterberg coal field was part of Iscor’s government-approved 
expansion programme that began in 1969. As part of the plan, the industrial hub of the Van 
der Bijl Park Works was expanded and the Newcastle steelworks constructed. The expansion 
programme appeared to rest on a solid domestic demand for steel. Organised commerce 
complained of a shortage of steel in the 1970s. A letter from the Transvaal Chamber of 
Commerce in 1973 described the situation as dire, and the shortage of steel a structural 
problem that had last been brought up just three years earlier in 1970. The steel shortage was 
combined with a general labour shortage at the time, which rendered downscaling production 
difficult because workers could not easily be dismissed. As a result, production costs 
continued to mount while production plants idled.126  
As part of its grand expansion plan, Iscor intended to increase its steel manufacturing 
capacity not just to satisfy the demand of South African industrialists but also to increase its 
steel exports. A research report prepared by the Iscor Market Research Team in 1968 is 
instructive in its insight into the parastatal’s perception of the international steel market.127  
The report discussed the impact of the Kennedy Round negotiations held between 1964 and 
1967; a multilateral negotiating forum intended to foster international consensus on import 
protection and “free trade”. But the United States had disregarded its prior promises to limit 
its protectionist measures and import tariffs, giving rise to a chorus of protest from its trade 
126 Letter from IG Murray, Director of Transvaal Chamber of Commerce, to SL Muller, Minister of Economic 
Affairs, Aug 14, 1973; National Archives of South Africa (hereafter referred to as NASA), MES 242 H4/12/2. 
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partners in Western Europe and Japan. The American iron and steel industry was at the time 
in decline, explaining the country’s reluctance to reduce its own protectionist measures.128 
The global steel market was experiencing the beginning of an over-supply crisis that would 
reach its apogee in 1980.  The condition of over-supply had become apparent in 1964, 
leading to calls for greater international co-operation. South Africa was firmly positioned in 
the anti-communist bloc by its membership of the International Iron and Steel Institute, which 
was chaired by Dr Hans-Gunther Sohl, a prominent steel manufacturer under the Nazi 
regime.129 South Africa was a small fish in this pond and received little mention in accounts 
of the global steel industry.130 Nonetheless Iscor was determined to export its steel. 
According to the agreements reached during the Kennedy round negotiations, preferential 
treatment was afforded “developing countries”, which included South Africa. A report 
prepared by Iscor’s research division highlighted the need for industry to take advantage of 
these concessions by improving its export performance.131 The rapid expansion of steel 
exports was also thought to fit with the recommendations of the Reynders’ Commission of 
the early 1970s.132  
By satisfying the growing domestic demand for steel, Iscor also hoped to prevent the 
country’s dependence on steel imports. This would defend it against “dumping” by other steel 
manufacturing countries. Dumping was a particularly controversial trick. It has at times been 
dubbed “economic colonisation”, because those countries with surplus capacity exported 
steel at lower prices than the receiving country’s domestic steel market, so destroying its steel 
manufacturing capacity. Nancy Clark has demonstrated that one of Hendrik van Eck’s early 
victories during the foundational years of Iscor was to defend against the dumping of steel by 
European manufacturers. This momentum was established during the Second World War 
when the economies of Western Europe were inward-focused and South Africa had to rely on 
its own production capacity for manufactured goods. The parastatals, Iscor, in particular, rose 
to their full glory particularly because they over-powered the private sector and assumed their 
place as the driver of the South African steel industry. 
One of the most concrete ways in which parastatals enacted the government’s political aims 
was through the policy of industrial decentralisation. Industrial decentralisation was touted by 
128 Yves Mény, Vincent Wright, and Martin Rhodes, The Politics of Steel: Western Europe and the Steel 
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the government as a means of keeping whites on the land and preventing the depopulation of 
the countryside. When the Minister of Economic Affairs announced in parliament in 1969 
that the town of Newcastle in Natal would house Iscor’s new Steel Works operation, he stated 
that, in choosing the site, attention was paid to the “wider social and developmental 
requirements within the framework of the government’s policy.”133 The “government policy” 
he referred to was that of encouraging industrial development in rural areas. In Newcastle the 
presence of an established white community was an important motivating factor. Other 
factors were more self-evident, such as the availability of transport infrastructure, water, 
power and labour and the long term future of steel exports. But the most telling part of this 
arrangement was that political factors were one among many other economic and 
technological factors that Iscor had to consider in its operations.  
Saldanha Bay 
As part of government’s broader emphasis on diversifying mining exports, coal and iron ore 
became crucial raw materials for the export market. Iscor took charge of the development of 
the railway line from its Sishen iron ore mine in the Northern Cape to Saldanha Bay, the 
deepest natural port in the country. But by 1979, as Hansard records demonstrate, opposition 
party members in parliament were arguing that the investment in the Sishen-Saldanha railway 
line had been wasted and the Minister of Economic Affairs agreed.134 In defence, he 
explained that the railway line had seemed feasible in 1960s when analysts predicted high 
global demand for South Africa’s mineral exports. But these predictions were drastically 
undermined by the unexpected oil crisis of 1973, which curbed global demand for iron ore. 
The difficulties of predicting global demand for iron ore was echoed a decade later in a report 
by Iscor engineer Ben Alberts, one of the founding engineers of the Grootgeluk coal mine. 
Alberts argued that the South African iron ore export market was an instance of bad planning:  
The entire forecast process is risky, especially if an attempt is made to forecast a world 
demand that is subject to political and economic developments in different parts of the 
world … The history of the iron-ore market bears witness to the influence of over-
optimism, uncoordinated planning, the economic situation in the world, and 
133 Hansard, 16 May 1969, col 6133 
134 Hansard, June 19, 1979, col 9256-7. 
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consideration of only some of the factors that will influence the demand for iron and 
steel.135 
A brief discussion of Saldanha Bay is intended here to highlight the over-optimism embodied 
in the government and Iscor’s bid to expand its mineral exports.  
In 1970 excitement over the forecast for Japanese steel demand caused South African iron ore 
mines to expand their production for export. A large amount of political goodwill was built 
around the development of the Saldanha Bay area as an economic growth point. Letters from 
the Cape Midlands Development Association are instructive in this regard. In a memorandum 
the Association wrote that “one of the main reasons for the persistence of the Saldanha Bay 
scheme is that a new growth point must be established in the Saldanha Bay area to give work 
to the growing number of Coloured citizens in the future.”136 The Bantu Commissioner for 
the Eastern Province had decided that all ‘bantu” had to be removed from the Port Elizabeth 
and Uitenhage areas so as to make the region free for the exclusive habitation of coloureds. 
But the Association argued that labour was in short supply in the district for the motor 
industry in the region although the situation was alleviated by the migration of coloureds 
from rural areas and from the Western Cape. Protesting against the “synthetic” and forced 
nature of the arrangement, it stated that “this Association has sound knowledge of the 
Coloured people, and they cannot see them being attracted to the heavy work of steel 
making.”137 Thus Saldanha Bay development scheme was part of the government’s broader 
scheme of social engineering at a regional level. 
 South Africa was not the only iron ore producing country that geared its infrastructure to 
meet the Japanese iron-ore demand. News of its endeavours caused some consternation 
among Australian iron ore mines who were also hoping to profit.138 As early as 1971, the 
major Japanese steel manufacturers down-scaled their initial forecasts of iron ore demand. 
One of the factors cited in correspondence was the American devaluation of the dollar that 
had brought about a situation of “inactive production” at Japanese factories. This reduced 
their demand for South African raw materials. The Japanese soon made tentative moves to 
call off the deal with South African iron ore exporters. Japanese engineers, who had assessed 
135 Ben Alberts, “Presidential Address: Planning the Utilisation of South Africa’s Coal Reserves,” Journal of 
South African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy 87, no. 11 (November 1987): 388. 
136 Cape Midlands Development Association, Memorandum: Growth Points and the Siting of the Fourth Iscor, 
March 15 1972; NASA, MES 239 H4/12/2. 
137 ibid. 
138 JB Mills, South African ambassador in Pretoria to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, January 11, 1972; 
NASA, MES 239 H4/12/2 
49 
 
                                                 
the development of Saldanha Bay, thought it would cost R300-million more than was initially 
promised: a cost that was likely to be heaped onto the price of iron ore. The Japanese 
engineers also thought that Saldanha Bay would be completed later than its developers had 
initially promised.139 At the same time, the Japanese government issued blunt condemnations 
of the apartheid regime, creating the perception that the country was unwilling to do business 
with South Africa.140 Nonetheless the development of Saldanha Bay proceeded anyway: too 
much had been invested in the project for it to be abandoned. In 1972, a newspaper article 
with the headline “Saldanha ready - at almost any price” described the iron ore component of 
the project as controversial.  Hans Coetzee, the director and general manager of Iscor, had 
added a “semis” plant or a steel manufacturing plant to the Saldanha Bay development so that 
processed steel could be exported.141  
The money that Iscor spent on the Sishen-Saldanha railway line had a knock on effect on its 
other projects in the pipeline, including the Grootegeluk coal mine. In its annual report of 
1978, Iscor wrote of its dire debt situation, coupled with the fact that its revenue from iron 
ore exports was less than it first expected:  
Between 1971 and the completion of the expansion programme in 1976 the situation 
changed drastically. Loan funds from overseas became practically unobtainable, the 
tenure of foreign loans shortened dramatically from 20 years to one or at the most two 
years and interest rates rose sharply.142 
As a result, financing the Grootgeluk coal mine increasingly appeared to be an uncertain 
proposition. But as the next section demonstrates, rather than cancelling the project, Iscor’s 
management committed to funding the mine at all costs.  
Demand and Supply Forecasts 
Iscor was at the time attempting to implement models that would enable it to better deal with 
the volatility of supply and demand forecasts. During the same period that it opened the 
Grootgeluk coal mine, Iscor was also working to improve its forecasts of supply and demand. 
Improved forecasts were crucial for the Corporation to better survive market conditions. In 
explaining the development of the Grootgeluk coal mine, Ben Alberts wrote: “To assist Iscor 
139 Extract from Eastern Province Herald, ‘Japanese seek ore berth policy switch,’ March 10, 1972; NASA, 
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in the proper preparation of these plans, a sophisticated computer programme was developed 
by the Department of Planning and New Development that indicates the demand for raw 
materials for any given set of conditions and production rates.”143 At the same time, the 
World Bank offered Iscor its assistance with helping to develop its planning systems. In a 
memorandum dated June 1976, one of the Bank’s employees detailed Iscor’s undesirable 
financial position in which 70% of its long term capital was debt-funded. Persistent political 
pressure to keep the steel price low meant it could not meet the rising production costs by 
itself. And since Iscor was in the midst of its ambitious expansion programme the possibility 
of escape was limited.144 The World Bank proposed that Iscor adopt a system based on a 
linear programming mathematical model that optimised the combination of certain variables 
to predict the best course of action. Despite some reservations about the political 
repercussions that might occur in co-operating with apartheid South Africa, the World Bank 
argued that Iscor would provide a convenient test case and an important source of data for 
testing the model’s applicability in developing countries.145  
The model would determine the least cost combination of different activities in the sector, 
including for instance transportation and production. Where components were in competition, 
for instance the decision to import goods or produce them domestically, the system was 
designed to select the cheapest option. The World Bank representative in this case, Peter 
Glenshaw, envisioned a collation of otherwise available data, which he argued was often 
neglected by planners. While the model appeared heavily dependent on potentially unreliable 
data sources, Glenshaw reassured Iscor that:  
It has been our experience that the most of the required data is available – but often 
scattered among a number of related agencies. For example, rail transport data will 
reside with the railway authorities, truck transport data with private truckers, while 
production cost and operational data will be with the management of the individual 
plants.146  
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By January 1977 Glenshaw had realised some of the shortcomings of his earlier approach. He 
wrote to the South African ambassador in Washington that the future of the steel sector in 
South Africa was greater than the success of Iscor alone and that maximising Iscor’s 
operational efficiency was only part of the puzzle. Other routes included the potentially more 
cost effective role of the private sector in the national steel industry. In addition, it was 
important to consider national prerogatives such as foreign exchange earnings and broader 
fiscal plans.147 He volunteered to work with the grain, rather than against it, and with the 
South African government to install the model at Iscor’s headquarters. Thus a purely cost-
based calculation of demand and supply was not enough to accurately predict the “national 
interest” as the World Bank came to realise.  
Iscor and the Private Collieries 
Iscor’s official reason for exploiting the coal reserves of the Waterberg was that the country 
faced an imminent shortage of coking coal. But the predicted shortage was based on the costs 
of extraction rather than the actual amount of coking coal beneath the ground. During the 
1970s the possibilities of coal extraction soared as coal mines mechanised their operations. 
Motivated primarily by steadily rising labour costs, mechanisation meant that machines 
replaced low-skilled labour where this was possible.148 This was a sharp break from the 
general pattern established over the course of the twentieth century, under which South 
African coal enjoyed a competitive advantage on the global market due to the availability of 
cheap labour.149 The mechanisation of coal mines also allowed engineers to extract coal they 
had previously considered unreachable, thus increasing the country’s estimated coal reserves. 
The introduction of open cast mining methods for instance, a highly mechanised form of 
mining, improved the extractable coal reserve estimates from 26 billion to 61 billion 
tonnes.150 Iscor eventually opted to use open cast mining method at the Grootgeluk coal 
mine, which was less labour intensive but required more capital investment in machinery. As 
part of the mining method coal was scooped from the walls of the pit and hauled on the backs 
of gigantic trucks that crawled along the floor of the pit. 
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Labour 
Archival evidence suggests that labour disputes affected the reliability of the coking coal 
supply from private collieries. According to Timothy Mitchell, underground coal mines in 
nineteenth century Britain were particularly prone to labour unrest because the nature of 
mining operations created the material conditions of autonomy conducive to subversion.151  
Labour unrest in March 1973 at the Iscor-owned Durban Navigation Coal mine (DNC) in 
Natal further threatened the supply of coal. In correspondence between government and Iscor, 
officials blamed the disruptions on ongoing ethnic conflict. Xhosas and Pondo workers who 
were likely to have been migrant labourers from the Eastern Cape were alleged to be in 
conflict with Basotho workers. To resume mining operations the mine’s management fired 
“49 Xhosas” and “one Basoto”.152In March 1975, a letter from Iscor citing ongoing rioting at 
the Hlobane and Northfield coal mines in Natal called for the Minister to urgently intervene 
because the mines supplied 46% of Iscor’s coal requirements.153 The Minister of Mines, Piet 
Koornhof, acted quickly and decisively. To “normalise” operations he encouraged the 
development of open cast mining methods in Hlobane so that miners would not have to 
venture underground. 
Michael Deats was at the vanguard of the movement for coal mine mechanisation and 
oversaw the eventual mechanisation of DNC. He had been awarded a bursary from the 
mining equipment manufacturer Atlas Copco to spend two months in Sweden where, he said, 
“I learned more about sub level caving than I’d ever learnt about iron ore mining in my life.” 
Sub level caving was a method of large-scale mechanised mining in which the mineral-rich 
ore was blasted by explosives. But his innovations were not immediately embraced: 
 And then I tried to introduce some of what I’d learned in Thabazimbi but I wasn’t senior 
enough. I wasn’t at top-level management, I was middle-management and they weren’t 
going to listen. So when I was offered this opportunity to go to DNC which is close to 
Dannhauser, South of Newcastle, I introduced this method [longwall mining] and three 
years later I was a manager of the line. And in 1984 I was promoted to Iscor head office 
with the express purpose of opening up the Waterberg colliery.154  
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Longwall mining had evolved into its mechanised form among the collieries of England and 
was by that stage a commonly used method in Europe. It involved the underground extraction 
of coal in long wall-like sections of the coal face. 
The Grootgeluk coal mine was initially developed as an open-cast coal mine for supplying 
coking coal to the Iscor Steel Works.  Iscor also built the Tshikondeni coal mine in 1978, 
which was situated in the former Venda homeland east of the town of Mussina, as an 
underground coal mine from the outset to supply better quality coking coal. Thus the greater 
labour costs of the 1970s did not signify the end of underground coal mining. The peculiar 
nature of the coal deposits also determined whether the mine would be underground or open 
cast. According to Joe Meyer, Grootgeluk became an open cast coal mine because of the 
nature of the Waterberg coal deposit. The thin overburden above the coal meant that it was 
cheaper to use open cast than underground mining methods. In Mpumalanga by contrast the 
coal is much deeper, but the thick sandstone roof makes it easier to mine safely with less roof 
bolts. Meyer described the Waterberg coal deposit as follows:  
Inside those two faults you do open cast mining because the overburden is only between 
12-25 meters thick. So if you want to mine underground you need a solid roof. In 
Mpumalanga, they’ve got a thick sandstone layer which is above the coal. So you can go 
in, you can put roof bolts in and you bridge over the pillars.155  
Iscor’s official reason for developing the Waterberg coal fields, in its correspondence with 
the various Ministries, and in its media announcements, was that it was driven to the 
Waterberg coalfields by a national shortage of coking coal. As part of an earlier attempt to 
allay the supply crisis, Iscor purchased a 49% stake of the Moatize coal mine in the Tete 
province of Mozambique. But by 1974 its prospects there appeared increasingly uncertain as 
the voice of the anti-colonial movement resounded with ever more clarity.156 Iscor 
traditionally relied on collieries clustered in the Natal and the region surrounding Witbank in 
the Eastern Transvaal to supply its steel plants. Collieries in Natal had long been exporters of 
coal and in the early twentieth century supplied the infant colonial economies of East Africa 
and South East Asia.157 But these mines were fast approaching exhaustion with some 
155 Interview with Joe Meyer, March 17, 2015, Onverwacht. 
156 From TF Muller Chairman of Iscor to SL Muller Minister of Transport, May 16 1974; NASA, MPP 47 
A3/10/9 
157 Ruth Edgecombe and Bill Guest, “The Natal Coal Industry in the South African Economy, 1910-1985,” 
South African Journal of Economic History 2, no. 2 (1987): 52.  
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collieries having already closed down.158 Nonetheless, the description of a “shortage of 
coking coal” fails to explain why Iscor needed to own and manage its own coal mine when its 
chief concern was with producing steel. The answer lay in the tensions between Iscor and 
privately-owned collieries, and the newly introduced threat of the global export market.  
In May 1974 a memorandum to the Secretary of Trade from the managing director of Iscor 
detailed the Corporation’s stance on the country’s coking coal situation.159 He timidly 
reminded the government that Iscor had its own coking coal requirements despite the coal 
export boom. He predicted that Iscor would confront a coal crisis by the year 2000.  He wrote 
that Iscor’s management had “learned” that the government intended the railway network 
leading to Richards Bay to serve the coal producers in the Transvaal, particularly in their 
efforts to export coal to Japan. The memorandum urged the government to ring fence certain 
minerals for domestic consumption and so guard against the private sector’s export 
enthusiasm.  It was international best practice to protect domestic consumption from being 
eroded by the private sector’s enthusiasm for coal exports. In another memorandum, Iscor’s 
managers argued that a steel producer which did not directly control its raw material supplies 
was in a vulnerable position:                                                                               
The purpose is to manufacture steel at the lowest cost but if a smelter buys raw material 
from the private sector, he finds daily that he must pay excessive prices because there is 
worldwide a demand for the raw materials…This has once again been shown during the 
last eighteen months, in the massive increase of the coking coal price in Europe, from 
R30 per tonne to R70 per tonne, applying consequent pressure on the steel price. Iscor 
has made a mistake over the last three decades in not buying the appropriate coking coal 
mines because coking coal is now its greatest bottleneck. As a result of a shortage in 
coking coal, Iscor suffered a production loss of hundreds of thousands tonnes of steel per 
year, which resulted in a monetary loss for the country’s foreign currency.160  
Private collieries were therefore no longer entirely reliable sources of coking coal. This was 
in part due to natural exhaustion of the coal mines, but also due to their loss of loyalty to 
domestic clients.  
158 “Iscor’s Novel Blend in Search for Coking Coal,” Rand Daily Mail, January 3, 1978. 
159 From JP Coetzee, Besturende Direkteur to G Steyn, Sekretaris van Handel, ‘Steenkool Posisie in Suid-
Afrika- Yskor se Siening,’ May 13, 1974; NASA, MES 234 H4/12. 
160From Yskor to JC Henuis, Minister van Ekonomiese Sake, 'Yskor en die Private Nywerheid in die Republiek 
van Suid Afrika- Quo Vadis?,' March 17, 1975; NASA, MES 245 H4/12/3. 
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Importantly, Iscor’s management set on a path to deliberately avoid purchasing coal from the 
private sector. In 1978, the Rand Daily Mail reported that collieries in the Eastern Transvaal 
district of Witbank were in the process of gearing their coking coal production for the export 
market. The article noted that “the mines producing this coal are committed to selling it to the 
Japanese steel mills.”161 At an Iscor board meeting of July 1975, board members resolved 
that “management reduces its heavy dependence on the private sector for metallurgical coal 
and makes every effort to increase the proportion of coal … to be supplied from Iscor mines 
from the current 15% to at least 50% by 1980.”162 A year later, in July 1976,  the chairman of 
Iscor described the corporation as held to ransom by private coal mines that imposed 
excessive charges on the coal price for any capital they spent on expanding their operations to 
meet Iscor’s coal demand. Iscor had experimented with utilising imported coking coal from 
the United States but found this coal to be too expensive. The possibility of importing coal 
through Richards Bay was constrained by the limited rail capacity from Richards Bay to 
Iscor’s steelworks.163 While the costs of coal imports were lower than those of the heavy 
infrastructural requirements initially required to start the coal mine, the lower domestic price 
of coal was to Iscor’s advantage in the long term. 
The introduction of new blending technology also made it feasible to exploit the coking coal 
resources of the Waterberg since the coal in this region was of a generally lower coke quality. 
This blend technology was then being developed in America and Europe and allowed the low 
quality coal, which meant that it contained a lower content, to be more extensively used. 
While the coking coal from the collieries of Witbank and Natal were normally blended in 
equal amounts, the lower quality of the Waterberg coking coal meant that more of it could be 
used with the Natal coking coal so as to conserve the latter.164  As a result Iscor urged the 
government to protect coal with a low content from the export market, convinced that the 
Mining Rights Act of 1967 provided the requisite legislative muscle.165  
161 “Iscor’s Novel Blend in Search for Coking Coal,” Rand Daily Mail, January 3, 1978. 
162 Minutes of Board Meeting of the South African Iron and Steel Industrial Corporation Limited, July 23, 1975; 
NASA,  MPP 44 A3/10/9. 
163 Minutes of Board Meeting of the South African Iron and Steel Industrial Corporation Limited July 14, 1976; 
NASA, MPP 44 A3/10/9. 
164 “Iscor’s Novel Blend in Search for Coking Coal,” Rand Daily Mail, January 3, 1978. 
165 From JP Coetzee, Besturende Direkteur to G Steyn, Sekretaris van Handel, ‘Steenkool Posisie in Suid-
Afrika- Yskor se Siening,’ May 13, 1974; NASA, MES 234 H4/12. 
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The search for Coking Coal 
While the exploitation of the Waterberg coal fields was in the pipeline, Iscor had 
simultaneously prospected for coking coal in other areas of the Transvaal.  In May 1977, the 
chairperson of Iscor announced that “whereas the Corporation had only the Grootgeluk 
proposition in mind six months ago, there were now five coking coal propositions 
available.”166 One of these options, which eventually morphed into the Tshikondeni coal 
mine, lay at the northern edge of the Limpopo province and formed part of the Soutpansberg 
coalfields. The proposed mine site lay within the bounds of the former Venda homeland, 
which complicated the matter for the Department of Bantu Development. The Department’s 
officials argued that if the homeland acquired independence the ownership of the mineral 
rights would potentially be in dispute. To resolve the issue, plans were laid to have the land 
on which Iscor built its coal mine declared a white area. Thus even if Venda became 
independent, Iscor would still own the coal mine.167 
Though the various Ministries approved the idea of a coal mine within the bounds of a 
Bantustan, they refused to consider one within the wildlife conservation precinct of the 
Kruger National Park. The Tshikondeni coal mine was situated at the border of the Kruger 
National Park close to the Pafuri camp which is the northernmost camp of the Park and rich 
in biological diversity. But the government was intractable in its refusal to allow Iscor to 
exploit the coal in the Park, according to Deats: 
Tshikondeni was a big source – it’s closed now, it’s been worked out. Although I don’t 
believe it’s worked out. I believe the coal field extends under the Kruger National Park. 
Now I can remember talking to various cabinet ministers and various Parks Board 
people, when I worked at Iscor, about extending the mine underneath the border of the 
KNP. And they were horrified, absolutely horrified. And I said but we’re not going to 
affect the surface, not going to cave the surface or anything like that. We might have a 
ventilation shaft – that’s it. The pristine glory of that part of the park, and that part of the 
park is beautiful, will only be disturbed by a ventilation shaft, that’s it. No, you can go 
up to the fence but don’t cross it. But the coal doesn’t know about that fence…168 
166 Minutes of Board Meeting of the South African Iron and Steel Industrial Corporation, May 25 1977; NASA, 
MPP 49 A3/10/9 
167 Letter from JP Coetzee, Director of Iscor to JC Heunis, Minister of Economic Affairs, 23 March 1977; 
NASA, MPP 24 A3/10/2. 
168 Interview with Michael Deats, September 2, 2013, Woodmead, Gauteng. 
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According to an interviewee who was the head engineer of the Tshikondeni mine when it 
opened in 1982, the coal there was of higher grade coking coal than the sort found at the 
Grootgeluk coal mine.  But the mine’s chief drawback was that the coal deposits were 
situated at an awkward angle, which meant that entirely exhausting the coal deposits required 
expensive techniques. As he stated: “It was very difficult to mine because it was at an incline, 
an angle. You had to mine underground but at an angle of 22 degrees. Now that angle is 
slippery for machines to work…Most of the coal has been taken out. Obviously there are still 
some coal portions left which are more difficult to mine, and it’s not cost effective to take it 
out.”169  
While the prospecting work and excavation of mining shafts for the Grootgeluk coal mine 
had commenced in the early 1970s, in 1976 the project ground to a halt as funding dried up. 
In the aftermath of the 1973 oil crisis, Iscor confronted a dramatically altered foreign climate 
for loan funding. This unexpectedly straitened position threatened the financial sustainability 
of the Grootgeluk coal mine. But by January 1977, the alternative sources of coking coal 
were proving increasingly unpropitious. South African collieries had not stepped up to the 
plate and failed to reassure Iscor that they could satisfy its coking coal requirements. The 
minutes of an Iscor board meeting for that month reflect a consensus among board members 
that Iscor needed to exploit the Waterberg coal fields:  
Mr Duncker reported that the Corporation was continually stating its coking coal 
requirements to the private coal mining industry but to date no proposition has 
materialised which could serve as an alternative to the Grootgeluk project…During 
discussions on the merit of the Grootgeluk Project Board members were unanimous in 
their views that such a project was indispensable to the future provision of coking coal 
for the Corporation’s existing metallurgical capacity, but on present indications the 
Corporation lacked the funding to proceed with the projects on full scale.170 
Determined to proceed against the financial odds, board members reached a vague resolution 
to negotiate a financial arrangement with the Minister of Economic Affairs. Halting the 
project and cancelling the contracts Iscor had already signed would prove too expensive, 
169 Interview with engineer (anonymous), September 2014, Lephalale. 
170 Minutes of Board Meeting of the South African Iron and Steel Industrial Corporation, Jan 26 1977; NASA, 
MPP 49 A3/10/9.  
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considering that Iscor would still be faced with a coking coal shortage.171 Iscor requested 
R195-million from the government for Grootgeluk, a figure based on a “minimum expansion 
plan” that utilised “unorthodox” methods such as short term loans and lease financing. In 
February 1976 the state responded with the guarantee that it would provide R100-million and 
asked that Iscor gather the rest on the loan market.172 In 1978 Iscor’s management raised a 
further R295-million for the following year, stating that this was achieved “once again at the 
risk of funding Iscor by methods as would not, in all instances, reflect sound financial 
policies and principles.”173  
Searching for alternative sources of funding is a recurrent theme in the minutes of Iscor’s 
board meetings. The various options considered included requesting assistance from the 
government, fellow parastatals, private financiers and construction companies. By July 1976 
Iscor's capital expenditure had been drastically cut and its managers considered selling some 
of its assets. This included selling the Sishen-Saldanha railway line to the South African 
Railways and roping in the manganese public corporation, Samancor, to purchase the 
Grootgeluk coal mine and exploit the coal, although Samancor eventually declined the 
offer.174 Another fundraising option which proved too expensive in the end involved reaching 
“reasonable terms” with a financial entity called “Southern Life Association” to raise R100-
million in financing.175 But the idea was a novel one and the fund-raising necessitated 
computer assisted calculations “considering the vast amounts involved and the precedent 
setting nature of this type of financing.” In September 1977, one of the board members 
suggested that Iscor employ a special consultant with the sophisticated analytical expertise to 
calculate the proposed costs.176  
Eventually, in July 1977, Iscor’s management arrived at a new scheme: to sell the “non-
metallurgical” coal that the Grootgeluk coal mine produced to Eskom, thereby indirectly 
171 Minutes of Board Meeting of the South African Iron and Steel Industrial Corporation, July 16, 1976; NASA, 
MPP 44 A3/10/9. 
172 Minutes of Board Meeting of the South African Iron and Steel Industrial Corporation, February 25, 1976; 
NASA, MPP 44 A3/10/9. 
173 Minutes of Board Meeting of the South African Iron and Steel Industrial Corporation, April 26, 1978; 
NASA, MPP 50 A3/10/9  
174 "Vergadering no. 552", Undated; NASA, MPP 44 A3/10/9. 
175 Minutes of Board Meeting of the South African Iron and Steel Industrial Corporation, May 25, 1977; NASA,  
MPP 49 A3/10/9. 
176 Minutes of Board Meeting of the South African Iron and Steel Industrial Corporation, September 28, 1977; 
NASA, MPP 50/A3/10/9 
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sharing the mine’s operating costs.177 In August 1978 board members decided to prepare the 
tenders for Eskom to purchase its coal from Grootgeluk coal mine, and to arrange for minor 
modifications to be made to the water pipeline originally intended to lead from the Hans 
Strijdom Dam to the Grootgeluk coal mine, so that the dam could supply a power station with 
a generating capacity of 1200MW.178 By September 1977 Eskom had agreed to proceed with 
a dry cooled power station nearby Grootgeluk.179   
In Ellisras, all engineers felt the pressure of parsimony in their development of the Grooteluk 
coal mine. Joe Meyer described Iscor’s activities in Ellisras during the 1970s as severely 
constrained by the lack of funds. The managers of the Grootgeluk coal mine were constantly 
reminded by Iscor’s head office that money was in short supply. But Meyer was still expected 
to produce the necessary infrastructure for the mine and in the town. This included the 
development of the Mogol Club, a recreational hub with various sports facilities, intended to 
serve all staff and the community around it in the otherwise derelict portion of the Bushveld. 
To develop the mine and the supportive infrastructure closer to the town of Ellisras, Meyer 
said that his team was forced to find creative and cost-efficient solutions to challenges that 
arose. As Meyer related:  
The guys from the mine and contractors lent us pieces of equipment over weekends, 
maybe a piece of equipment during the week to clean out where the fairways was going 
for the golf course. The MD [Managing Director] of mining at the time came here and he 
said that the next apprentice athletic meeting, which was usually held at the Steel 
Centres, will next be held at the Mogol Club and that meant we had to build an athletic 
track. And he gave me two months to build an athletic track. Two months and we were 
ready. And the same with the rugby, he was a big rugby fan. He played for Northern 
Transvaal himself, so he said you better see that there are facilities. But he gave us 
limited funds and we had to be very creative to solve this challenge, but we did and the 
rugby was played.180 
177 Minutes of Board Meeting of the South African Iron and Steel Industrial Corporation, July 27, 1977; NASA, 
MPP 50 A3/10/9. 
178 Minutes of Board Meeting of the South African Iron and Steel Industrial Corporation, 30 Aug, 1978; NASA, 
MPP 50 A3/10/9. 
179 Minutes of Board Meeting of the South African Iron and Steel Industrial Corporation, September 28, 1977; 
NASA, MPP 50 A3/10/9.  
180 Interview with Joe Meyer, 17 March 2015, Onverwacht. 
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Minutes of the Iscor’s Board meetings reflect that second hand equipment was at times used. 
In one case Iscor shipped the equipment halfway across the world to reach Ellisras. In 1978, 
Deats gained the Boards’ approval to import second- hand “stackers”, which had first been 
used for the construction of the largest earth-filled dam in the world, the Tarbela Dam in 
Pakistan.181  
Eskom and Ellisras  
According to Deats, the relatively sparse settlement, consisting of a few struggling farmers in 
the area, meant that Iscor bought the farm “for a song.”182 Coking coal was known to exist in 
the Waterberg since 1922.183 In 1954, the government reserved the prospecting rights of 123 
farms in the Waterberg district for the sole use of Sasol and Iscor, and preserving these 
parastatals’ rights against any encroachment from the private sector. These rights were 
reserved with the understanding that the minerals would be used for chemical and 
metallurgical purposes within the country and it was only with the coming of the oil crisis in 
the 1970s that the private sector paid real attention to the supposed injustice of the system. 
The coking content of the coal meant that only Iscor could really make use of it and so Sasol 
did not rush to exploit the reserves.184 
The Waterberg coal reserves are thought to have been initially discovered by the settler 
farmers in the region who had drilled for water and stumbled across coal deposits relatively 
close to the surface.185 Despite the early discovery of the coal fields, Iscor’s engineers 
conducted the first large-scale exploitation of the coal fields in the 1970s. Deats related that:  
So when I got to the Waterberg, in 1974/5, there had been a bit of prospecting done, 
quite a lot of prospecting work, a couple of shafts had been sunk because at the bottom 
of the succession of coal there are some discrete seams which on their own are suitable 
for export.  So nobody was really thinking at that stage of a coking coal or a steam coal 
mine. So we went up there and we did various feasibility studies and said what we need 
181 Minutes of Board Meeting of the South African Iron and Steel Industrial Corporation, August 30, 1978; 
NASA, MPP 50 A3/10/9 
182 Interview with Michael Deats, September 2, 2013, Woodmead, Gauteng. 
183 P. E Hall, “A Preliminary Note on the Waterberg Coalfield as a Possible Source of Coking Coal,” Journal of 
the Chemical, Metallurgical and Mining Society of South Africa, October 1945, 124–32. 
184 Verslag van die Staatskonsultante oor die Privatiseering van Yskor Beperk, August 8, 1989; NASA, MPP 4 
1/3/1 
185 Interview with Joe Meyer, March 17, 2015, Onverwacht. 
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is 2-million tons of coking coal to meet Iscor’s requirements for coking coal to make 
coke, to make iron to make steel.186 
The development of the coal mine was too capital intensive to be undertaken lightly. Because 
the region had a crucial lack of infrastructure, an entire town with connecting networks to the 
country’s industrial hubs had to be built. According to Deats, gaining Eskom’s co-operation 
required some cajoling of government officials and representatives from Eskom: 
So we went up there and did a feasibility study and said without a power station we can 
forget about it. Now the kinds of power stations Eskom was building in those days were 
called six packs. Six discrete generating units. And the capacity of those power stations 
was just short of 4000 megawatts. Now to get Eskom to build a power station up in the 
Waterberg, they were about as interested as my cat is in running after dogs. So we first 
of all got every cabinet minister in the John Vorster regime to visit the site and we said 
listen, without a power station we can’t build a coking coal mine because what we did 
is we pushed all the run of mine, that’s the raw coal into a washing plant and had two 
products; steam coal for the power station and coking coal for Iscor.187  
Eventually the government and Eskom overcame their initial indifference and agreed to 
construct the power station in the water scarce region of the Waterberg. This will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter Three.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the peculiar combination of circumstances that enabled the 
difficult exploitation of the Waterberg coal fields, so setting the stage for the construction of 
the Medupi power station decades later. The material appeal of the Waterberg coal reserves 
was in turn created by a particular configuration of political and economic factors. In addition 
certain technological advancement made possible the exploitation of coal reserves previously 
considered untouchable, such as those of the Waterberg. The Grootgeluk coal mine began 
because of Iscor’s search for coking coal, which was of a lower quality than that found 
elsewhere in the country. A desperate drive to achieve national self-sufficiency encouraged 
Iscor’s engineers to overcome the obstacles that threatened to retard the development of the 
Grootgeluk coal mine. This created a peculiar network of parastatal and technological 
presence in unlikely locales across the country. In the case of the Waterberg, the parastatal 
186 Interview with Michael Deats, September 2, 2013, Woodmead, Gauteng 
187 ibid. 
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presence was primarily determined by the materiality of the underlying minerals. The appeal 
of the materials was in turn a product of the peculiar political conditions that rendered their 
exploitation possible. 
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 Chapter 2: Ellisras and the Entrance of Iscor 
 
The previous chapter detailed the forces driving Iscor’s engineers to exploit the derelict coal 
fields of the Waterberg. As bearers of infrastructural prowess and scientific progress, they 
also were conduits of state power to the embryonic municipality that was Ellisras in the 
1970s. But this peculiar configuration of political power operated outside of the normal 
administrative state bureaucracy, a phenomenon Gabrielle Hecht has termed 
“technopolitics.”1 Iscor’s engineers encountered resistance to their operations from 
recalcitrant white elites in Ellisras. The resistance proved insurmountable in some cases, 
manifesting in the development of an “Iscor town” situated only a few miles distant from the 
traditional business centre of Ellisras. Where Iscor gained the consent of white elites, this was 
because the latter recognised the infrastructural benefits Iscor’s engineers offered. These 
included a steady supply of water and electricity for farmers and residents of the town to use 
and the introduction of “orderly” urban development. Iscor thus supplied the infrastructural 
muscle to make orderly and co-ordinated urban planning possible in line with the 
government’s regulations for white towns. 
Introduction 
In his seminal history of the trajectory of European city-state development, Charles Tilly2 
considered the degree of territorial incorporation into the ambit of the state as a function of 
the interacting variables of “capital” and “coercion”. These variables were proxies for city 
elites and state power respectively. Drawing on Tilly, Jeffrey Herbst considered the extension 
of state power from the centre to the periphery in the African context.3 Although he excludes 
South Africa from his country sample, because it diverges from the experience of other 
African countries, his analysis is not entirely inapplicable to the South African context. 
Herbst provides a useful foil to the European experience; demonstrating that for many 
African countries state intervention was not intrusive, but welcomed, because of the 
development it promised. But in a departure from Tilly’s mode of analysis, Herbst’s 
1 Gabrielle Hecht, “Technology, Politics, and National Identity in France,” in Allen, M and Hecht, G (Eds). 
Technologies of Power: Essays in Honor of Thomas Parke Hughes and Agatha Chipley Hughes (2001, n.d.). 
2 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States: AD 990 - 1992, Revised edition (Cambridge, MA: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 1992). 
3 Herbst, States and Power in Africa, 2000. 
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conclusions are based on the geographical dispersion of population densities rather than a 
qualitative examination of the interaction between states and local economic elites. Herbst 
argues that the defence of national borders against foreign invaders incentivised European 
states to transmit their presence from the capital cities to the peripheral borderlands. But 
African states lacked this prerogative of border defence because of their uncontested national 
borders. This explains the persistence of customary authority in rural areas, and the failure of 
road building to extend from the capital to the periphery. Herbst suggests that internal 
challenges to central authority have posed a greater challenge to the integrity of the African 
state than external threats to its borders.4 Herbst’s conceptual linkage of military spending, 
border defence and the extension of state power is useful in explaining the South African 
government’s interest in Ellisras despite the fact that his account of the weakness of the 
African state is not applicable here. In South Africa the apartheid government prioritised 
border defence during the 1980s as the fear of insurgency from neighbouring African 
countries grew. The government stationed military posts at key nodal points along the border 
including at Ellisras, which lay near to the South African border with Botswana. Thus the 
development of large technical systems at Ellisras was enacted in the context of the state’s 
priority to defend the country’s borders. While there is little evidence to suggest that defence 
prerogatives drove Iscor’s entrance to the Waterberg, they still moulded the political 
environment in which its engineers operated.  
Catherine Boone has developed a typology for understanding the relationship between local 
elites and central state power in certain West African countries.5 She attributes regional 
variation in the nature of state control to the configurations of power at the local level and to 
the degree of state interest in incorporating the territory in question into its ambit of power. 
Boone argues that where local elites enjoy a significant degree of economic autonomy, the 
state will likely attempt to “usurp” and destroy the power of local elites. But where local 
elites rely on state largesse for their economic prosperity, the state tends to opt for power 
sharing at the local level.6 The latter scenario most closely fits the conditions in Ellisras 
during the 1970s where economic prosperity for white farmers arrived only with Iscor’s 
4 Herbst explicitly excludes South Africa from his country case studies, but the model is nonetheless still worthy 
of consideration. 
5 Catherine Boone, Political Topographies of the African State: Territorial authority and Institutional Choice, 
Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 
32. 
6 ibid, 36. 
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engineers. Iscor’s large-scale mining and infrastructural activities drew the concerted gaze of 
the state to the district’s economic and political fortunes.  
 The story I tell here complicates Boone’s model, which is rooted in the commercial 
agricultural heartlands of West Africa. In Ellisras, the power of state officials at the local 
level was conjoined with that of Iscor’s engineers. As the agents of infrastructure 
development, Iscor’s engineers were nominally autonomous from the officials of state. 
Despite the low population density of Ellisras, Iscor still had to negotiate and build 
relationships with local elites in order to gain some degree of consensus for its operations. 
Primarily concerned with the welfare of its coal mine, the mine’s managers had to deal with 
rumblings of discontent from long standing white residents.  By sharing its supply 
infrastructure with the residents of the town, primarily water and electricity, Iscor at once 
ensured a degree of buy-in of local elites and the successful functioning of its coal mine. But 
Iscor’s engineers and the Grootgeluk coal mine did not gain universal consensus, at least 
initially, and some white residents obstinately refused to co-operate.  
 Iscor’s activities also attracted the interest of officials concerned with enforcing racial 
segregation at both the provincial and national level. This ultimately resulted in the removal 
of black “squatters” from the farmlands surrounding the town. Forced removals occurred 
across the Transvaal at the same time and should thus be considered in light of the apartheid 
government’s broader policy of “homeland consolidation”. Prime Minister PW Botha’s 
response to the rising tide of African nationalism, which he feared would encourage popular 
revolts in South Africa, was to dilute nationalist aspirations through the homeland system. He 
attempted to hasten homeland independence by catalysing regional processes already afoot.7 
He also hoped that a “constellation” of homeland states would collectively act to defend the 
country’s borders against attack from its newly independent neighbours in Southern Africa. 
The homeland system operated on a pseudo-federal model, which to anti-apartheid activists 
was an inherently inequitable one. This was because the “independent” homelands had little 
chance of economic survival and would consequently remain dependent on white South 
Africa. But to the technocratic minds of the various ministers, the homelands’ lack of 
economic viability was not an insurmountable obstacle. Rather, as part of its “industrial 
7Robert Davies and Dan O’Meara, “Total Strategy in Southern Africa: An Analysis of South African Regional 
Policy Since 1978,” Journal of Southern African Studies 11, no. 2 (April 1, 1985): 183–211; “Blacks Hold the 
Key to ‘Constellation’, PM Told,” Rand Daily Mail, August 30, 1979. 
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decentralisation” policy, the government offered numerous economic incentives to 
corporations to situate their plants at the borders of the homelands.8 
Independent homelands were also intended as the culmination of a governmental policy that 
encouraged autonomous regional development.9 A government memorandum discovered in 
the National Archives of South Africa dated 1965, whose author was not identified, discussed 
its policy of regional development as it related to Ellisras district. The anonymous official 
noted that it was state policy to encourage autonomous regional development in line with 
what he alleged was the normative pattern in “Western democracies”. He advocated a more 
systematic effort to utilise natural resources in a “full and balanced” manner. The author 
considered regional development to be the best method of ensuring the “optimum 
development” of the region’s natural resources, including labour. Given that the state could 
not take complete responsibility for local development, an emphasis on regional development 
would allow the private sector to make a larger contribution.10  
But while this idea of regional development emphasised autonomy at the local level, in 
practice local government was constrained by an interminable process of bureaucratic 
consultation. Each of the interest bearing Ministries weighed in on these debates. In Ellisras, 
because of Iscor and Sasol’s forthcoming activities in the region and its raised economic 
prospects, the author of the memorandum argued that development had to be properly co-
ordinated to ensure its even implementation. The emphasis on coherent regional development 
led to the establishment of a local governance association for Ellisras composed of the 
respective representative bodies. The bottom up development espoused in the concept of 
regional development meant that the town of Ellisras would have to marshal its own 
resources for urban development. To achieve this end, it had to call on the assistance of the 
corporate entities interested in exploiting its mineral endowments. In this case, Iscor provided 
the financial assistance and technical know-how to supply the infrastructure necessary for 
urban development. These included the availability of water and electricity infrastructure and 
the proper housing of black labourers in line with municipal segregationist policies. In this 
way Iscor gained the consensus of the local elites and eased the incorporation of the territory 
into the orbit of state power. This preliminary urban development proved especially valuable 
for the state when border defence became an important state prerogative during the 1980s.  
8 Daryl Glaser, “The State, Capital and Industrial Decentralisation Policy in South Africa, 1932-1985.” (M.A, 
University of the Witwatersrand, 1988). 
9 Hansard, June 18, 1976, 9707.  
10‘Ellisras Ontwikkeling', September 10, 1965; NASA, RNH 105 NH5/55. 
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Ellisras in the Twentieth Century 
Early Town History 
For most of the twentieth century, the region that was to become known as Ellisras was 
untouched by state regulation, mainly due to its tiny white settler population. Arid 
environmental conditions made successful agriculture difficult and prevented dense 
residential settlement. It was only with Iscor’s arrival and the prospect of large-scale 
industrial development that state officials paid closer attention to the direction of the town’s 
development. Officials who visited the district during the 1960s found that the town’s 
material conditions offended the principles of apartheid. The scarcity of basic services meant 
that whites could not attain the standards of living necessary to set them apart from the 
surrounding African communities. Government insisted that for Ellisras to be formally 
declared a town, residents had to ensure that necessary service provision was in place. But 
this required a significant investment in urban infrastructure. Early private initiatives were 
shoddy and inadequate. It was only with Iscor’s financial muscle that the residents of Ellisras 
could fulfil the infrastructural requirements that were required for the government to afford 
the town municipal recognition.   
According to the official history of the town, Ellisras was named after two white settlers who 
settled on the farm of Waterkloof during the 1930s. These early settlers, Patric Ellis and Jan 
Erasmus, merged their last names to form the name “Ellisras”. The Waterkloof farm also 
included a railway stop for a line that passed from Vaalwater in the south to Stockpoort in the 
north. In line with Bill Freund’s description of African cities historically forming around the 
nodes of transport networks, the incipient town developed around the railway stop.11 Patric 
Ellis hailed from the Marico district, roughly 300 kilometres south - west of Ellisras. He was 
a member of the underclass of Afrikaner settlers who did not own land and worked as a 
tenant labourer or bywoner and fought in the Anglo-Boer war.12 Seeking a new beginning, he 
migrated to the inhospitable territory of the Waterberg.13 The town consisted of a 
rudimentary commercial centre and barter was a common form of exchange. Ponk Ellis, the 
grandson of Patric Ellis, described the bartering system of trade in existence when his 
grandfather settled in the district. White settlers hunted the bushveld game for their survival 
and exchanged dried meat for agricultural crops, such as grain and peanuts, with the nearby 
11 Bill Freund, The African City: A History (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 6. 
12 Hannes Engelbrecht, Ellisras: My Dorp, Ellisras Nuus Uitgewers (Printers), Undated. This local publication is 
held by the Lephalale Public Library. 
13Interview with Ponk Ellis, August 2013, Lephalale. 
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African chiefdoms. The town’s lone storekeeper served as the only contact with cash for the 
townsfolk. Ellis described farmers exchanging chicken, bones and “anything you could give 
him” for money or household supplies. It is not clear how the nature of commercial exchange 
changed over the decades but by the time Michael Deats arrived in Ellisras in the early 1970s, 
he found an unremarkable smattering of buildings: “There was a bottle store,” he said, “And 
there was a little kind of hotel and when I say little I mean little. And a few houses. And I 
think there was a magistrate…”14      
The Waterkloof farm was a natural magnet for residential settlement because of its proximity 
to the Mogol River. The Mogol River is a tributary of the Limpopo River to the north of 
Ellisras. Ellis described the settlement as follows: “Everybody [was] just behind the river 
because they got clean water from the river and they made a plan to get vegetables. That is 
why they’re always behind the river. And the whole world was open and they were hunting 
for meat.”15  
Before Iscor built the Hans Strijdom dam to supply water to its Grootgeluk coal mine in the 
1970s, the Mogol River served as a crucial water supply for farm dwellers. But the river was 
not an entirely reliable irrigation source, because of its slender and temperamental flow. A 
long-time resident of Ellisras, Willie Loots described the river’s precariousness as follows: 
 I was born here and I grew up here, and there have been times where this river was dry 
two or three years in a row. Where there was no water. Fortunately it has a very deep 
sand bed, where you could put in sand pipes and then you would suck the water from 
deep underneath the sand. But that was for household use only and maybe a little bit of 
cattle but all the irrigation farms basically started when the dam was built.16  
Until the arrival of Iscor there was little sustainable crop farming in the region. The Mogol 
Dam, which Iscor built in the 1970s was the first reliable and consistent irrigation source for 
farmers in the region. While under government ownership, Iscor maintained the dam and 
controlled the flow of water to the Grootgeluk coal mine, the town of Ellisras and to farmers 
on a quota basis. According to Loots: “If it wasn’t for that [the dam] I think you would have 
seen probably 70% less farming activities in this area.”17 Dam building had at the time 
proceeded across the country to encourage crop farming. William Beinart estimates that by 
14Interview with Michael Deats, September 2, 2013, Woodmead, Gauteng. 
15Interview with Ponk Ellis, August 2013, Lephalale. 
16Interview with Willie Loots, August 6, 2014, Lephalale. 
17ibid. 
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1970 the proportion of South Africa’s “channelled water” that was used for irrigation was 
among the highest in the world.18 
During the 1960s the growing unfeasibility of cattle farming compounded the dire economic 
state of agriculture in Ellisras. An inspector who visited the district in 1965 encountered a 
district that was far from prosperous.  A four-year drought from 1961 to 1964 had decimated 
cattle holdings, leaving farmers heavily indebted. The virulent spread of foot and mouth 
disease among cattle followed hot on the heels of the drought. Due to efforts to restrict the 
spread of the disease, presumably quarantine measures, farmers were unable to sell any cattle 
to repay their loans. The inspector discovered that the overgrazing of farmlands had 
encouraged soil erosion to levels that made recovery unlikely. To preserve their core herds, 
farmers had auctioned their cattle at a great speed, depressing livestock prices in the local 
market. Since farmers used the proceeds of these sales to pay their debts, they received no 
income from the transactions.19 The inspector also reported that the main obstacle to 
successful crop farming was the region’s low rainfall and the scarcity of man-made irrigation 
sources.  Some farmers had experimented with “mixed farming” – both cattle and crop 
farming – with some success. But the volatility of revenue from crop farming meant that 
cattle farming remained a prized occupation and during the drought only those farmers who 
possessed cattle herds were able to keep their heads above water financially.20   
Because commercial agriculture was not wholly viable, the region did not attract large 
numbers of white settlers. Low white settler density is one of the reasons that the white 
settlers failed to form a formidable front against the African communities residing in the 
district during the early part of the twentieth century. For Africans in the district, the story of 
the twentieth century is one of the gradual erosion of their economic autonomy. According to 
Sam Sekati, whose parents were born in the Ellisras district, the 1940s saw a discernible shift 
in the balance of power so that it tilted towards white settlers.21 This coincided with the NP’s 
assumption of power in 1948 and its concern to improve the lot of Afrikaners in the 
countryside, a constituency that had proven decisive in its electoral victory. The struggling 
white farmers of Ellisras received some material and legislative support for economic 
18William Beinart, Twentieth-Century South Africa (Oxford University Press, 2001), 207. 
19‘Potensial van Ellisras,' November 1964;  NASA, ACE 50 TS/18/18/1. 
20ibid.  
21Interview with Sam Sekati, August 4, 2014, Lephalale.  
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prosperity. For example, Ponk Ellis recalls that after 1948 the government assisted farmers by 
drilling boreholes on their land and parcelling out additional plots of land to encourage white 
settlement.  
Sekati described the abrupt manner in which rights to land utilisation were wrested from the 
resident African communities:      
Yes you must remember the government was for the whites. So they came here, they’re 
staying with you, you borrow [lend] them your cows to plough a portion and later on one 
morning when you wake up they will call all of them and tell them no, as from today I’m 
the owner of the farm … it’s up to you to stay with me or go and look for another place. 
And white people were scattered all over now. Wherever you go you see the white 
owner is the owner of that place.22   
White settlers won the land by dispossession through bureaucratisation. They demarcated the 
boundaries of plots of land through pegging its corners and then drawing up title deeds to 
serve as the ultimate proof of land ownership. Title deeds were backed by the legislative 
power of the state. This allowed white settlers to acquire economic power by gradually 
acquiring cattle from the African communities. African farmers had historically used the 
entire region to roam and graze their cattle, unconstrained by the demarcated property 
boundaries. Sam Sekati described the dispossession as a gradual process, where white 
farmers settled on the land in apparent parity with their African neighbours for a time before 
claiming ownership of the land and presenting a title deed as proof. Then in positions of 
authority they ordered individual Africans to reduce their cattle stock. As Sekati related: 
And then he will buy your cattle for far less, he will keep on reducing your cattle until 
you are left with nothing … until they kicked you out. But they don’t just kick you out – 
they make sure the conditions are so difficult for you to live there then at the end you say 
no I better go and not live here with all these conditions. And then you will go to another 
place. You have 100, 200 cattle and then you are left with only four or five. And their 
tactic was that if you refuse to buy your cattle and then you decide to move to another 
place, another farm, the farmers will communicate. They will say, if a black person is 
22 ibid. 
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coming to your farm, don’t allow him to bring so many cattle. So that was the strategy; 
that there is nowhere to run.23  
This is a familiar tale in the district, with one interviewee lamenting the fact while his 
father owned a large herd of cattle, he was left without even a chicken to his name.24  
Nonetheless, despite some initial victories, farmers failed to form an entirely victorious 
front. Along with various marginal and under-capitalised farmlands in the Transvaal, 
African settlement on white farmlands in Ellisras stretched into the 1970s. Elsewhere in 
the Transvaal and in the Free State, black tenancy had been largely eradicated by 1969.25 
Loots recalled the presence of African informal settlements on the farmlands surrounding 
Ellisras before forced removals occurred:  
If you drive on the road to Mokopane, you’ll see farms on both sides of the roads until 
you get to Shongoane. Now I can remember as a young boy, as you drove from here to 
Polokwane on the left hand side of the road, there were informal black settlements all 
along up to Shongoane. And that’s like 25, 30 kilometres.26    
While the exact nature of the economic activities African communities undertook on these 
farms is unclear, it is apparent that white farmers struggled to source farming labour. This 
is evident, for instance, in correspondence between government officials related to a 
group of “unlawful” squatters resident in the town in 1968. Some of the people in 
question had been working in the town for 18 years. One of the difficulties the responsible 
government officials faced was that the group was not ethnically homogenous and so 
could not be transplanted wholesale to a homeland. The group included “Hereros’” from 
South-West Africa (Namibia) who had migrated into the region in 1918 along with other 
“dorsland trekkers” or “desert migrants”. The Bantu Affairs Commissioner thought that 
removals had to be cautiously approached because the potential shortage of labour would 
have a detrimental effect on farmlands and commercial concerns in the town. Removing 
the workers to farms or to the homelands would mean they had no right to work in 
Ellisras.27 The same principle applied to the farmlands: enforcing racial segregation 
would have deprived white farmers of African labour. Thus Iscor’s engineers arrived at a 
23 ibid. 
24 Johannes Mfisa, as part of a group interview with Johannes Mfisa, Hellen Kekae, Hendrik Ndebele, April 
Selema and Kgantshi Makubela (translator), August 25, 2015, Marapong (Lephalale). 
25Beinart, Twentieth-Century South Africa, 210. 
26Interview with Willie Loots, August 6, 2014, Lephalale. 
27From Bantoesakekommisaris to Sekr van BA & O’, May 9, 1968; NASA, BAO 3182 C39/1839. 
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district whose residents lacked the economic and technical means to fully comply with 
apartheid’s urban regulations and segregationist legislation.  
Agriculture and Cattle Farming 
In Ellisras, as across the Transvaal, the government assisted farmers with improving their 
agricultural production, drawing them into the orbit of the country’s capitalist economy. The 
report of the government official who visited the Ellisras district in 1965 to describe its 
economic conditions is couched in a discourse of belief in the modernising power of large-
scale economic development.28 The inspector was concerned to implement scientific methods 
in a bid to sustain the region’s contribution to the national capitalist economy. Timothy 
Mitchell has remarked on this phenomenon in his historical study of Egyptian agriculture.29 
The inspector reported that the land had a “carrying capacity” of six morgen per large cattle 
which meant that a farm of the average size of 900 morgen could only hold 150 cattle. This 
was half the desirable quantity. He encouraged a greater use of scientific methods to improve 
the quality of the soil so that the area could realise its economic potential. In terms of cattle 
production Ellisras played a role of some national importance, with the bushveld of the North 
and North West Transvaal supplying 22% of the country’s meat. But over-grazing had 
exhausted the cattle feed in the district and any expansion of the cattle economy meant that an 
alternative source of feed had to be found.  
State financial assistance enabled some farmers to keep their heads above water during the 
1970s.  Johan Pistorius described the 1970s as a time of great strife for many of the farmers 
in the Ellisras district. As a member of the committee tasked with channelling government 
aid to struggling farmers, he traversed the district to investigate the state of the farmlands. He 
related that:  
We visited a lot of people, we met a guy, he told us with tears in his eyes, ‘I’m here for 
20 or 30 years and I never made a loss, every year there was a profit.’ But the profit 
couldn’t handle the inflation. So costs went up and they couldn’t survive.30   
28‘Potensial van Ellisras,' November 1964; NASA, ACE 50 TS/18/18/1. 
29 Mitchell, Rule of Experts. 
30 Interview with Johan Pistorius, March 2015, Lephalale. 
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Government aid took the form of “agricultural credit” with the first five years of the loan 
interest-free followed by a fixed interest rate of 2%. Pistorius recalled that this was successful 
in some cases in keeping farmers on the land. Preventing white depopulation of farms on the 
border was particularly important to the government. A strip of white populated farms along 
the banks of the Limpopo River was considered necessary to create a protective barrier 
against guerrilla attacks from the neighbouring countries of Botswana and Zimbabwe.31  
As cattle farming became increasingly economically unfeasible, farmers adopted game 
farming as a more profitable occupation. The transition to game farming is a characteristic 
feature across much of the South African countryside.32 For cattle farmers to regain their 
profitability, they had to increase the size of their farms to realise the benefits of economies 
of scale. Game farming did not require large properties depending instead on more expensive, 
but fewer, animals than cattle farming required. Game farming was thus to some extent an 
economic solution to the legal system of inheritance then prevalent in the Transvaal, where 
land was sub-divided among sons and the size of individual farm plots progressively 
diminished over the generations.33 Apart from the problem of overgrazing, cattle farmers 
were adversely affected by the growth of a persistent cattle-poisoning plant known by its 
Afrikaans name of gifblaar. The gifblaar was toxic to cattle and sheep but relatively harmless 
to game. Between the years 1930 and 1960, he said, the government subsidised the costs of 
fencing for farmers who sought to fence off the portions of their land containing the plants to 
prevent cattle poisoning.  
In 1974 Pistorius was one of the first farm owners to erect a game fence around his property. 
Fencing was an important step in the process of game farming because it endowed the game 
with a monetary value. As soon as a fence was erected around a property, the game within the 
fence boundary belonged to the property owner. As long as the land was unfenced, the game 
on the land was public property. Fortunately for the game farmers who invested in specialised 
and rare species, there was a strong foreign demand for hunting Southern African game. As 
Pistorius recounted, the first batch of hunters who frequented their farms were locals who 
considered hunting game cheaper than purchasing meat from the local butcher. Then around 
1980 some game farm owners advertised globally, particularly in the USA, to attract foreign 
31 ibid. 
32 Nqobile Zulu, “An Analysis of the Post 1980s Transition from Pastoral to Game Farming in South Africa: A 
Case Study of the Marico District” (PhD Thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 2015). 
33 Keegan, Rural Transformations in Industrializing South Africa: The Southern Highveld to 1914, 
(Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1986) 103. 
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hunters to their game farms to hunt more exotic, expensive animals. The region now holds 
world renowned game farms, attracting foreign hunters and tourists on safari. It has also 
attracted foreign land ownership. For example, one private game reserve is owned by Saudi 
Arabian investors.34 During the late 1980s, the state withdrew its enthusiastic support of 
white farmers, particularly small-scale farmers. But certain farmers adapted to the changing 
conditions of the free market, determined to retain the profitability of their operations. 
Development of the Town 
Ellisras’s quest to acquire municipal status was a long, drawn out process. In 1957, a property 
owner in Ellisras, John Oswald Whelpton, applied to the government for permission to 
establish a town in Ellisras. According to Dries de Ridder, who has served as the Ellisras 
town planner since 1989, Whelpton was a businessman who took advantage of the fact that 
the government had placed a bus stop near his property:  
To provide basic goods to the people of Ellisras the South African Government instituted 
a once a week bus delivery service from Nylstroom, now Modimolle, to Ellisras. The 
bus stop, which was directly in front of Whelpton’s house became a gathering point for 
the people of the area where they waited for the bus to arrive. Whelpton realized the 
business potential which was created by the bus stop and opened a small shop which he 
operated from his house.35 
As the population of the small Ellisras town increased in density, the Reformed Church 
and the Dutch Reformed Church set up their operational structures approximately 700 
meters away from each other.36 Each Church wanted to be the center of the incipient, 
official town. Whelpton belonged to the Reformed Church and made his land available 
for the township development. In November 1957 a delegation of representatives of the 
Towns Board visited the town, as well as the Senior Health Inspector of Nylstroom, an 
urban planner and Mr Whelpton. They found that the proposed town was miniscule, 
containing three residential houses all with outbuildings, a post office, shop and a police 
station.37 Whelpton’s chief rationale for establishing the Ellisras town, which he 
constantly reiterated in his correspondence with government officials was that the main 
towns of the northern Transvaal were too far away to effectively service the white farmers 
34 Interview with Johan Pistorius, March 2015, Lephalale. 
35 Interview with Dries de Ridder, April 2015, Lephalale. 
36 ibid. 
37From the Secretary of the Township Board to J. Whelpton', January 6, 1958; NASA, CDB 3209 
PB4/2/2/1794..  
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of Ellisras. His application met the tepid bureaucratic hostility of the Towns Board. While 
the Towns Board approved the application in principle in 1958, this approval was subject 
to the existence of certain urban amenities that Whelpton was responsible for providing.38  
Whelpton had to convince the Towns Board that the town had a suitable water supply source. 
This meant proving to a civil engineer that there was enough water to meet the town’s 
household requirements. Regulations also demanded that there be enough water for “fire 
fighting” purposes. While borehole water could potentially supply some of the town’s 
households, the plots of land were too small to ensure that septic tanks for sewage treatment 
were placed a suitable distance from the boreholes, so raising the risk of underground water 
pollution. In addition, Whelpton had made no provision for dumping grounds, a cemetery and 
a working sewage system.39 The Department of Native Affairs insisted that any emergent 
town had to demarcate an area to establish a black location. But Whelpton was able to bypass 
this regulation by making a cash payment to the Department in place of setting aside a piece 
of land for a black township.  
Visiting government officials bemoaned the directionless way that the town had developed. 
On 9 June 1959, the Commissioner for Urban Areas (Stadsgebiede) visited Ellisras to 
consider its municipal feasibility. When he arrived at the few desolate buildings that together 
constituted the centre of town, he found that no one was aware of his visit. Following his 
enquiries, the magistrate of the town Nylstroom alerted a representative from the Ellisras 
Farmers’ Association to his presence who then appeared after 12 hours. The Commissioner’s 
annoyance coloured his subsequent report. He criticised the haphazard “toadstool 
development” of the few buildings in the town, which he thought would result in irreversible 
urban zoning mistakes, such as a church where a factory should have been and houses in 
commercial districts. He argued that the fundamental fault lay in the absence of a local co-
ordinating arm, which in other urban areas ensured that buildings developed in line with state 
regulations.40   
In 1960 government proclamation declared Ellisras a “township”, situated on the farm 
Waterkloof. Whelpton still had to fulfil certain conditions of service provision and local 
38ibid.  
39 From HJ Combrink, Senior health inspector to the Head regional health official, October 30, 1957; NASA, 
CDB 3209 PB4/2/2/1974. 
40 From Stadsgebiedekommisaris to die Ondersekretaris, Native Affairs Department, Verslag: Dorp Ellisras: 
Distrik Waterberg, June 19, 1959; NASA, NTS 4572 1219/313. 
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administration.41 He remained consistently at odds with the government. In 1964 he launched 
legal action in the Transvaal Provincial court against restrictive urban zoning regulations 
which, he argued, meant that businesses could not be situated where he wished. Eventually in 
June 1965 the government announced the establishment of the Ellisras District Development 
Association, which consisted of representatives of state departments and local residents. This 
was in line with the principle of co-ordinated and representative regional development which, 
as discussed earlier, was the government attitude to regional development at the time. Urban 
management in Ellisras later fell under the ambit of the Peri-Urban Areas Board. This was a 
provincial governance structure that administered small towns. It did not delegate urban 
governance to local authorities completely and allowed for a loose government oversight. It 
was only in 1986 that Ellisras gained full municipal recognition from the government. This 
was largely due to the rapid population growth of the 1980s as a result of Iscor and Eskom’s 
activities in the district.42  
The initial development of the town was not only haphazard, but also fraught with conflict.43 
In 1971, members of the Dutch Reformed Church attempted to proclaim a township on their 
land. These competing claims for the development of the town created a situation of 
fragmented urban development. According to de Ridder, the lack of coordination in the early 
development of town was clear when he arrived in Ellisras. The main commercial roads were 
structured in a peculiar “strip” manner rather than the conventional grid-like street system. De 
Ridder described the early settlement as follows:  
Only in 1971 two members of the Dutch Reformed Church eventually, namely Maans 
Oberholzer and Naas Fourie, made their land available for township development 
whereby Ellisras Extension 2 was created.  As there was other land between the 
properties of Whelpton and that of Oberholzer and Fourie and the fact that they were not 
on a good footing with each other and did not get on well the three townships was 
separated from each other, no link between the three townships was planned for, exists 
or was created. Shortly after my arrival in Ellisras I created the first link by way of a 
high order road – J Louis Botha Drive – between the three townships. Even in 1989 the 
creation of this link was not easy as some of the land owners and residents were not in 
favor thereof. Even today the uncoordinated planning of the past (because of “factions” 
41 Proclamation’, The Province of Transvaal Official Gazette, December 7, 1960; NASA, CDB 3209 PB 
4/2/2/1794. 
42 Interview with Dries de Ridder, April 2015, Lephalale. 
43 ibid. 
77 
 
                                                 
in Ellisras) influence Ellisras. However, over time and with proper planning this will 
disappear.44 
Water 
The uneven private provision of water prompted complaints from residents about its high 
prices and shoddy service. But despite efforts by the Peri-Urban Areas Board to supply water 
to the town, its ambition was only realised in the mid-1970s with Iscor’s help. Whelpton left 
Ellisras shortly after his legal struggles with the government and headed over the border to 
settle in Botswana. He sold his farm to a private company called the Joubo Development 
Corporation (JDC) and left the company to represent his interests in the town. But residents 
of the town complained of shoddy service and irregular water provision. In November 1965, 
a resident of Ellisras, Mr LW Botha complained to the Department of Local Areas that water 
shortages forced him to travel a distance of four miles, sometimes twice a day, to fetch 
water.45 After investigating the matter, the head of the Department of Local Areas reported 
that the JDC appeared to be looking out for their own interests and not that of the residents, 
charging residents the excessively high price of 82c per litre. His report recommended that 
the main local authority, the Peri-Urban Areas Board take over the land and water scheme 
already in place. But the pump system and water source was situated on a section of a farm 
owned by the JDC.46 This continually provided the pretext for the Corporation’s insistence on 
its capacity to supply water to the town.  
The scattered and unreliable water provision to the town was discussed at a Peri-Urban Areas 
Board meeting in July 1967. During the rainy season at the start of that year, the pump had 
been submerged in a flood of water from the Mogol River resulting in a long period of 
disrupted water supply. Apart from the erratic supply, the pump equipment was so defective 
that even when water was available, it was too cloudy for normal consumption.47 No lasting 
solution to the poor quality and unreliable water supply appeared until the year 1976. Michael 
Deats, acting for Iscor, promised to provide the town with a portion of the water and 
44 ibid. 
45'From LJ Botha to Direkteur van Plaaslike Bestuur,' November 1965; NASA, CDB 3209 PB4/2/2/1974.. 
46 Summary of Problems in Ellisras Town in Connection with Water, Cemeteries, Land Fill Ground and 
Location Ground,' April 4, 1966; NASA, TRB 2/4/57 G31/13/0. 
47Ellisrasse Plaaslike Gebiedskomitee,' July 26, 1967; NASA, TRB 2/4/57 G31/13/0. 
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electricity that Iscor intended to channel to the Grootgeluk coal mine from the Hans Strijdom 
Dam and from Eskom respectively.48 The dam was at the time still in its construction phase. 
By August 1976, the PeriUrban Areas Board had received a number of different applications 
for the establishment of a town by various residents which it rejected because one of the 
conditions for town establishment was that the board had to ensure the town could be 
supplied with water within three years. The board refused permission for private parties to 
provide water to the town. But the completion of the Hans Strijdom Dam took longer than 
Iscor initially promised and applicants grew angry over the delay.49 One of these applicants 
was the JDC which had by then formed a consortium with a company called the Transmogol 
Belggings Beperk (Transmogol Investment Company). The consortium was anxious to 
undertake the town establishment or dorpstigting on an extension of the original Ellisras 
town.50 They planned to source water from the Mogol River which they felt could supply 
their proposed town with enough water to satisfy the board.51 The board argued that since it 
had already assigned the role of water provision to Iscor, it was in no position to delegate the 
role. It also thought it wasteful and a duplication of efforts if the local authority organised its 
own electricity supply when Eskom was already working to supply electricity to Iscor’s coal 
mine. Thus Iscor and Eskom overpowered private efforts to provide water and electricity to 
the town, asserting the infrastructural power of the centralised network. The extent to which 
private producers could have produced a reliable water and electricity supply is not clear. 
However, Iscor’s assumption of the role cemented the dependence of the town’s 
administration on their infrastructure for municipal service provision.   
Iscor and Onverwacht 
From the outset long-standing residents of Ellisras were suspicious of Iscor’s intentions. 
Michael Deats stated that Iscor bought the farms it required for the Grootgeluk coal mine “for 
a song” because of the relatively sparse population settlement. But this is not entirely 
accurate. While the sparse settlement probably made acquiring land in Ellisras less 
complicated than in other parts of the Transvaal, farm owners still were reluctant to part with 
48From MJ Deats, Konsult Mynbou-Ingenieur Yskor to die Sekrataris, Transvaalse Raad vir die Ontwikkeling 
van Buitestedelike Gebiede (Transvaal Board for the Development of Peri-Urban Areas), October 29, 1976; 
NASA, TRB 2/1/174 61/1/480. 
49'From ID Potgieter to the Konsult Mynbou-Ingenieur, Yskor', 16 Aug 1976; NASA, TRB 2/1/177  61/1/480. 
50From Louis Botha & Potgieter to the Hoof: Plaaslike Gebiede(Head of the Department of Local Areas),’ April 
7, 1977; NASA, TRB 2/1/177  61/1/480. 
51From Hoof: Plaaslike Gebiede (Head of the Department of Local Areas) to Louis Botha en Potgieter’, April 
25, 1977, TRB 2/1/174 61/1/480. 
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their land. According to Joe Meyer, who was more intimately involved in the day to day 
operations of the Grootgeluk coal mine, the residents of Ellisras responded with some 
hostility at first:  
We weren’t welcomed with open arms here at first. I was one of the team who came here 
with the lawyers to start the new developments here. The Ellisras people didn’t 
necessarily want us here. They didn’t want to sell us any land at Ellisras. The plots at 
Ellisras were very narrow and ran for kilometres from the river so as to have water rights 
to make farming possible. We were interested in some of these properties to create a 
township for our staff. They weren’t happy to sell these plots to us. At that time there 
were a stigma attached to miners and they were scared we would disturb their peaceful 
life.52 
 In 1987, the issue arose of the newly proposed town establishment scheme by the Peri-Urban 
Areas Board, and deliberations there are useful in understanding the nature of land ownership 
on the Waterkloof farm.53 Through processes of settlement and sub-division over the course 
of the twentieth century, the farm had fragmented into many small but long plots of land by 
1970. Because the farm consisted of numerous small plots of land this meant that Iscor had to 
negotiate with and gain consensus from many different landowners.    
Nonetheless Iscor found a willing seller in the owner of a massive farm called Onverwacht, 
which lay to the north of Waterkloof. Iscor used the land on its property Onverwacht to build 
the Grootgeluk coal mine, the African township, residential housing for its own staff and a 
business district which in more recent times has come to hold an open air shopping mall.  In 
determining the site of its proposed town, Iscor was concerned with the designated flood line 
and the need to avoid building activity on potential mining ground. The nature of the flood 
line meant that Iscor could only build its town five kilometres away from the original Ellisras 
town.54 This spatial division defied the government’s policy of integrated town planning 
which mandated that new developments in urban areas build on pre-existing urban centres.55 
52 Interview with Joe Meyer, March 17, 2015, Onverwacht. 
53'Die voorgestelde besigheidsentrum te Onverwacht, Ellisras, Ellisras Plaaslik Gebiedskomitee,' December 15, 
1980; NASA, TRB 2/1/174  61/1/436. 
54'Ellisras Vergadering', July 3, 1975; NASA, TRB 2/4/57 G31/13/0. 
55 Interview with Dries de Ridder, April 2015, Lephalale. 
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To proceed with the construction of a separate “town” Iscor successfully sought special 
permission from the Department of Local Areas to develop Onverwacht.56  
At a meeting held in Ellisras in July 1975 where residents of the town discussed the 
fragmented urban development, one of the committee members suggested that the 
restaurants, schools and the farming community would not readily give up frequenting the 
traditional business district of Ellisras. He argued that the mining towns of Evander and 
Kinross, both situated in the Eastern Transvaal or Mpumalanga, were representative of this 
since the farming communities there continued to support the original business centre, which 
functioned as a focal point for the towns’ outward expansion.57 But Iscor’s developments 
split Ellisras’ commercial life in half- resulting in two separate and antagonistic Chambers of 
Commerce, each representing the different central business districts.58 As a businessman of 
the old, traditional business area of Ellisras, Loots and a business partner decided to develop 
a shopping centre with relatively low cost stores, geared to service an African clientele. But 
businesspeople in Onverwacht had also erected a shopping centre there and this created some 
competition between the two commercial centres. By 1980 the concerted involvement of 
Iscor and Eskom and their stimulating effect on the local economy had become apparent. In 
December 1980, the Peri-Urban Areas Board discussed the need to expand Ellisras’ trading 
capacity considering the town’s projected population increase. The Board hoped that Ellisras 
and Onverwacht would eventually merge to form a “single geographical unit.59 This vision 
has yet to be realised.  
As time wore on, long standing residents of Ellisras voiced their discontent over what they 
considered to be Iscor’s intrusive presence. Residents complained over Iscor’s proposed 
developments, which included building a new road to connect the two urban commercial 
centres.  While it is unclear how much sway these complaints held, they are useful in gauging 
the opinions of local residents. One resident complained that the proposed road building 
would fragment his property and destroy his valuable agricultural installations. This included 
a sprinkle irrigation system whose pipes would fall under the tarred road, and make it no 
longer possible to irrigate his ground. In addition, a third road would ensure he was estranged 
from his adjoining plots of land situated further out in the bushveld. He proclaimed that “we” 
56'Iscor’s Rights in Onverwacht,' 1975, TRB 2/1/174  61/1/480. 
57'Heil die Leser! Departement van Plaaslike Bestuur', May 25, 1978; NASA, TRB 2/1/174  61/1/480. 
58 Interview with Johan and Theo Pistorius, September 2014, Lephalale. 
59‘Die voorgestelde besigheidsentrum te Onverwacht,’ Ellisras Plaaslik Gebiedskomitee,' December 15, 1980; 
NASA, TRB 2/1/174  61/1/436.” 
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(presumably meaning himself and other longstanding land owners) held no interest in the 
proposed town, and were unimpressed by the so-called “boom” that Iscor promised. He 
asserted that they wanted to be left alone with their own problems. Rejecting the idea of a 
shared regional prosperity, he wrote that Iscor should develop where it liked and leave the old 
town and property owners to their own devices, even if this meant that Ellisras became a 
“ghost town”.60 Thus Iscor was forced to contend with local elites in the interests of co-
ordinated urban planning, at times conceding to and at other times ignoring their demands.  
Forced Removals 
Once Iscor arrived, the black families living in informal settlements on white owned 
farmlands surrounding the town of Ellisras were banished to the Lebowa homeland. An 
informal black location had formed at the outskirts of town, referred to as the Pahama 
location. Government officials also targeted this location for forced removals. There are two 
apparent possible reasons for this. The first is Iscor’s need for mining labour. Soon after 
Africans were forcibly removed from the white owned farms, Iscor constructed its hostel for 
single males. Thus the migrant labour system in existence almost everywhere else in the 
country was finally extended to its north western border. The second is the threat of an 
insurgency from the neighbouring African countries. Certain municipal and government 
officials thought that an African settlement within the town could easily be infiltrated by 
terrorists, posing a security risk to the white town.  
The removal was a traumatic one for many. In 1979, the Sunday Express detailed the mass 
removals of an estimated 20 000 Africans from small towns in the Northern Transvaal, 
including those residing in black townships and locations.61 Apart from Ellisras, the Northern 
Transvaal towns of Naboomspruit, Nylstroom, Vaalwater and Louis Trichardt were also 
affected. The removals were therefore part of the broader segregationist plans, which 
involved re-locating Africans out of white urban areas and into the homelands. This was 
necessary to bolster the viability of formally established black local authorities. 
In addition, correspondence over “black spot” removal in Ellisras reveals the Commissioner 
for Bantu Affairs’ frustration at the fact that he held no authority over Africans who were 
resident on white owned farms. The chief director of the Northern Transvaal Administration 
Board based in Pietersburg reiterated this point to reporters from the Rand Daily Mail. When 
60 From die Voorsitter, Dorperaad, ‘Ellisras dorpsbeplanningskema,’ April 7, 1987; NASA; CDB 9987 PB4/9/2, 
p3.  
61“20 000 Are Banished to Dumping Grounds,” Sunday Express, July 29, 1979. 
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these reporters visited Ellisras to report on the forced removals there, they struggled to locate 
the site of the informal location: “We had difficulty in finding the site of the former Ellisras 
location, two kilometres outside the town. At last we realised we had driven past it – it had 
been bulldozed flat, the ground surrounded by a two metre game fence. A few ostriches were 
stalking among the ruins.”62  
The newly erected hostel, painted a “vivid pink” was situated 20 kilometres out of town, 
close to the Grootgeluk coal mine and described as already populated with black single men. 
Their wives and children lived in Stelloop, which was in the Lebowa homeland and provided 
little employment opportunities. The government subsidised the cost of four-bedroomed 
houses but according to Sekati, living conditions remained unbearable. As a result, those who 
were financially able departed as soon as the dissolution of the apartheid regime rendered 
residential restrictions obsolete.63  
Part of government’s rationale for forced removals was that African settlements posed a 
health risk and encouraged the spread of disease in white areas. During the early 1970s 
officials from the Department of Health periodically voiced their concerns over the 
unsanitary conditions of the African informal settlements in the Ellisras district. The Health 
Department played a particularly prominent role in local governance. The first permanent 
official tasked solely with the town’s administration in 1966 was officially titled a health 
official. Since the Ellisras local authority could only afford the salary of one official, it opted 
for a health official. He oversaw disease prevention through smallpox vaccinations, polio 
immunisation and measures to control TB, malaria and bilharzia. Apart from ensuring the 
requirements of the Department of Health were met, he also functioned as a building 
inspector and a Bantu Administrator Affairs official.64 He thus had to maintain the sanitation 
infrastructure such as drainage and rubbish collection.65  
The Ellisras Local Areas committee agreed to assume payment of the official’s salary without 
assistance from the Department of Health because he was tasked with various other facets of 
the town’s welfare. The initial agreement it reached with the government stipulated that the 
official’s salary be funded by a government subsidy and the residential rates it would start 
62 ibid. 
63 Interview with Sam Sekati, August 4, 2014, Lephalale. 
64 Stationing a Permanent Health Inspector: Ellisras Plaaslike Gebiedskomitee', April 1, 1966; NASA, TRB 
2/4/57 G31/13/0. 
65 From the Head Medical Health Official to the Ellisras Local Areas Committee,' September 10, 1965; NASA, 
TRB 2/4/57 G31/13/0. 
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collecting from July 1966. This arrangement was to persist until a “Bantu” local authorities 
system was established, which would then contribute to the official’s salary in a proportionate 
manner. The town’s administration contained a meagre staff contingent. In 1970 the 
administration’s only black employee was responsible for the constant supervision of the 
engines for the water pump station. In addition, he kept the streets of Ellisras clean, oversaw 
the spraying of mosquito repellent and assisted the health inspector with various office duties; 
a load so heavy that he was unable to visit his family who resided in the homeland.66  
  
Ellisras officially fell under the ambit of the Group Areas Board in 1966 and the unregulated 
presence of informal settlements on white owned land then swam into the government’s 
focus. An inspector from the Group Areas Board who visited the town in 1966 found to his 
dismay that African families were spread all over the general district of the town. Many of 
the “squatters” occupied farmlands with the consent of the owners in tenancy arrangements. 
He insisted on proceeding with the establishment of a black township and began discussions 
with the Ellisras Area Committee to demarcate land.67 Despite some consensus, the 
committee remained irresolute on the matter, much to the inspector’s annoyance.   
   
While local officials dragged their feet, by the early 1970s the arrival of Iscor was no longer 
in doubt, and the need for ordered urban development in response to the coming 
industrialisation became more urgent. Government officials cast renewed attention on the 
black families scattered in the general vicinity of the town. In 1975 the Commissioner for 
Bantu Affairs reported on the presence of black squatters on the farm owned by Mr Loots, 
which did not contain the necessary amenities for their residence. Loots was at the time in the 
midst of evicting the squatters from his land and the Commissioner feared that further 
evictions would hasten a desperate labour shortage for the town and its surrounding 
farmlands. Chastising the Peri-Urban Areas health inspector, he reiterated the need for the 
speedy development of a black township so as to effectively commence with the removals.68 
The Peri-Urban Areas Board responded that a member of the Northern Transvaal provincial 
government had promised in November 1974 that the building of the township would 
66‘Aanstelling van 'n addisionele Bantoe in diens van die Raad: Plaaslike Gebiedskomitee van Ellisras,' February 
1970; NASA, TRB 2/4/57 G31/13/0. 
67'Ellisras: Instelling van Groepsgebiede,' October 14, 1966; NASA, GMO 1/177 4. 
68 Commissioner for Bantu Affairs to the Health Inspector for the Peri-Urban Areas Board, October 24, 1975; 
NASA, TRB 2/4/57 G31/13/0. 
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commence in April 1975. Thus the forced removals required to realise the vision embedded 
within the country’s segregationist legislation could only be brought about once the 
infrastructure of a township was available.  
There is a clear link between the industrialisation thought to follow from Iscor’s activities and 
the intense concern over health and hygiene in the town. On the 8 March 1976 the Health 
Inspector reported that generally unhygienic conditions prevailed in the African squatter 
camp, and daily generated complaints from the Ellisras white “public”. The “squatter camp” 
in question was the informal settlement known as the “Pahama” location. In addition, he 
wrote, the arrival of Iscor heralded a more chaotic residential situation and was likely to 
create the perfect conditions for the spread of infectious disease such as polio, chicken pox, 
TB and diphtheria. The Health Inspector also visited the farms of two farm owners on which 
Africans lived – Mr van Rensburg and Mr Horn – and reported that while the immediate 
surroundings of the “Bantu” huts were clean, the “Bantus” on Horn’s farm dumped their 
rubbish over the border fence. In addition, African residents drew their drinking water from 
the Mogol River and suffered from a general lack of sanitary services. He hoped the 
Commissioner of Bantu Affairs would co-operate in providing latrines and proper water 
supply. But more importantly, as the final solution for the sanitary problems associated with 
black informal dwellings, the health inspector sought assurance that plans for the black 
township had been finalised.69  
While health officials continually expressed their concern, the Commissioner of Bantu 
Affairs for the Northern Transvaal succeeded in expediting the forced removals. This was in 
line with a broader national move to eradicate “black spots”. His concern lay particularly in 
the fact that the office of the Commissioner for Bantu Affairs could not control the Africans 
living on white owned land and had no authority to dictate their treatment to the white farm 
owners. Again local officials in Ellisras responded that the fundamental obstacle to forced 
removals was the absence of alternative housing, which meant that forcibly removing the 
black families from the land would cause shortage of African labour in the town. At that time 
the Bantu Trust was about to purchase land in the vicinity of the town of Marken, roughly 70 
kilometres away from Ellisras, for the construction of a black township. This proposed site 
would eventually become Stelloop. Since it was situated inside the Lebowa homeland, 
69From Hoofmediese Gesondheidsbeampte to Hoofbantoesakekommissarie, March 20, 1976; NASA, TRB 
2/4/57 G31/13/0. 
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government officials intended it to house the families of single males otherwise resident in 
the town’s hostel.70    
In 1976, Iscor promised that it would construct a hostel for single males on the Grootestryd 
farm and to build accommodation for 3% of African employees on a family basis. In the 
meantime the Pahama location was declared a temporary location and its residents earmarked 
for later relocation to the homeland.71 The Northern Transvaal Bantu Affairs Administration 
Board applied to purchase a tiny section of the Grootestryd farm from Iscor to be used for a 
hostel that would house 600 single men who were ordinarily employed in the town.72 Iscor 
retained 502 hectares of the property on which to situate a hostel that would provide 
temporary housing for workers employed by Iscor’s sub-contractors.73 The Board intended to 
move black families out of the Pahama camp because it hadn’t provided them with suitable 
housing facilities and bus services. Thus the necessity for a black township remained, only to 
be resolved in the 1980s. 
Homeland consolidation  
At the same time the government urged the development and financial autonomy of local 
black authorities. This was in line with national attempts to increase the country’s tax revenue 
during a time of panic over the spiralling inflation rate. In a bid to curb government spending, 
the Treasury urged the decrease of spending in the homelands through increasing the tax 
revenue of the homeland authorities. As a result government urged the local authorities to 
ensure that African workers paid taxes to the relevant local authorities. African workers in 
white areas posed a particular challenge because there was no systematic method in existence 
of collecting taxes from their wages.74 This effort to improve the viability of the homelands 
was termed homeland consolidation by the government. The state had successfully purchased 
land to the value of R350 174 445 and added it to the various homelands of the country. The 
declared intention of the homeland consolidation was to promote national development of the 
“black states”. Sticking firm to the principle of racial nationalism, the Prime Minister in 1979 
announced in parliament that:  
70 Head Bantu Commissioner for Native Affairs to the Head Medical Health official of the Transvaal, Peri-
Urban Areas Board, September 22, 1976; NASA,  TRB 2/4/57 G31/13/0. 
71 Memorandum: Aanonafgehandelde sake, May 4, 1976; NASA, TRB 2/4/57 G31/13/0. 
72 'From NA Lombard, Streekverteenwoordiger', May 8, 1977; NASA, GMO 1/177 5. 
73 'Memo: To the Hoofdirekteur Bantoesake Administrasie', February 9, 1977; NASA, BAO 3/4074 
A12/2/6/E10/15.  
74 'Gesamentlike aksieprogram teen inflasie: Invordering van bantoebelasting,' October 7, 1976; NASA, TRB 
2/4/57 G31/13/0. 
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The attempt to unman the Afrikaner and make of him something that floats between 
heaven and earth will not succeed in the case of the Black man either. One can only 
make progress if one upholds and respects his cultural possessions, traditions and his 
own ideals.”75 He was not “prepared to tamper with the right to self-determination” of 
different people (black and white), and condemned the so-called liberalism of the United 
States where despite the repeal of discriminatory legislation, “35% of the Negro 
population are living below the breadline…76 
To bolster the fortunes of the African homelands, government commenced with a wave of 
“black spot” removals, which elicited protests not only from the affected communities, but 
also from the homeland leadership of Lebowa. In a speech delivered in 1987, the Chief 
Minister of Lebowa, Nelson Ramodike, described his predecessor Cedric Phatudi as a 
liberation hero who had likened homeland “independence” to “self-strangulation” 77 
Ramodike called for the Legislative Assembly to reject the notion of independence as part of 
the constitution of the Lebowa homeland. Lebowa was not an ethnically exclusive homeland, 
he argued, and would house people of different tongues within its borders. Despite the 
dissent, business proceeded as usual, and the government continued to consider Lebowa a 
homeland for “Northern Sotho’s”. In 1985 members of the Seleka community, who resided in 
a village near Ellisras, launched legal action against the Minister of Justice of the Lebowa 
homeland. They protested his declaration of the Seleka “tribal” land of Beauty, in the vicinity 
of Ellisras, as part of Lebowa in 1969. In addition the Seleka resented their official 
incorporation into a Northern Sotho homeland because they argued that as Tswana speakers, 
they did not fit in on an ethnic basis. 
 
Government officials were also concerned at the time to protect the country’s borders against 
guerrilla incursions from neighbouring African countries. Ellisras was an important strategic 
focus for border defence. Before the arrival of Iscor, Ellisras had already held a military 
airport housing fighter planes and other defence aircraft.78 Nonetheless, the evidence that 
government officials urged the construction of Eskom’s power station because of border 
defence considerations is not conclusive. In addition the extent of government’s influence on 
Eskom’s decision making is not entirely clear. As I discuss in Chapter Three, security 
75 Hansard, February 7, 1979, col 245. 
76 ibid, col 246 
77‘Address by the new chief minister of Lebowa: The honorable MN Ramodike’; Lebowa legislative assembly: 
Lebowakgomo, October 21, 1987; NASA, MSB 706 3/5/10/3/8. 
78 Interview with Michael Deats, September 2, 2013, Woodmead, Gauteng. 
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concerns were a disincentive to Eskom’s engineers to building a power station in Ellisras 
because of the threat of sabotage and destruction. However, Iscor and Eskom’s activities in 
the region assisted with bolstering the border presence of white South Africa and preventing 
the rapid depopulation of the farmlands.  
 
 The apartheid government at the time was concerned about the depopulation of the border 
areas. Following Mozambican independence and the coming of black majority rule in 
Zimbabwe, by 1982 the north-eastern Transvaal border areas were considered white 
“outposts.”79 The fact that the agricultural conditions of these farms were not particularly 
propitious did not help. The government gave concerted attention to the problem of securing 
the border areas, a persistent concern from the late 1970s to the 1980s. In 1978, the 
newspaper Die Transvaler, quoting figures from the District Agricultural Union, showed that 
60% of the farms in the Ellisras district had no white farmers on them. In the nearby town of 
Thabazimbi, the percentage was higher, at 75%.80 While these figures may have been 
exaggerated, the report would still have stoked fears of depopulation. The Johannesburg- 
based newspaper, The Citizen, reported that 10 000 square kilometres of farms in Ellisras had 
been sold or abandoned by white farmers resulting in high levels of depopulation. 
Apparently, the Civil Defence Unit had ensured that farmers could access medical supplies, 
food, fuel and ammunition in a secret location in case of an invasion. The District 
Agricultural Union had applied to the Minister of Agriculture, Hendrik Schoeman, for 
government loans at reduced interest rates so that the remaining farmers could purchase two-
way radios and erect security fences around their farms.81  
 
The security threat was not groundless. Newspaper articles from the 1980s detailed incidents 
of bombings. In one case police shot and killed a suspected “terrorist” after he allegedly 
attempted to throw a hand grenade at them.82 In 1986, a land mine in a farm in the Stockpoort 
district exploded and killed an elderly couple. The chairman of the Ellisras Farmers’ 
Association told the Star that unoccupied farms in the district provided a safe haven for 
“illegal immigrants” and were breeding grounds for terrorist activity.83 In 1984 the Ministry 
of Constitutional Development and Planning approved R34-million in expenditure over two 
79 “Tvl Border Areas Now A ‘white Border Post,’” Pretoria News, February 4, 1982. 
80 “Grensplase Ontvolk [Depopulation of Border Farms],” Die Transvaler, May 26, 1978.   
81 “Massive Exodus from Border Farmlands,” The Citizen, August 21, 1978. 
82 “Police Kill a Suspected Terrorist,” The Star, August 7, 1984.  
83 “Idle Farms Get Blame for Mines,” The Star, January 7, 1986.  
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years to “stabilise” the border region of the North Western Transvaal by improving its “agro-
economic conditions”. These improvements included infrastructural development such as the 
electrification of the district and road building schemes. 84 
 
But apart from the incidents described above, there is little to indicate an impending 
insurrection. A newspaper article that farms on the Botswana-South Africa border farms as 
being on the “frontier” stated that it was “difficult to find two white-occupied farms in a row. 
One white ranch manager told me he did not have a white neighbour for 20 kilometres.” 
Nonetheless the main interviewee in the article, seventy year old Piet Pretorius denied feeling 
under any threat, downplaying the paranoia of the “townspeople” and describing his friendly 
relationship with the chief across the river.85 According to Pistorius, landmines were at times 
encountered on farms that lay on the border:  
 
There are a lot of farmers in our area who were lost at that stage. In 1980 especially, de 
Beer, I was on his farm with the credit committee investigation and we travelled the farm 
and had a good look and then said we’re going back. And then the next morning his 
father in law and his wife were driving on the farm and drove over a landmine and they 
were killed. And that was the same road we drove on the previous day. So that was a big 
problem, especially the landmines. There were a lot of landmines that they picked up.86  
 
This fear of terrorism shored up support for the NP during a time of severe fragmentation of 
the Afrikaner nationalist project. The NP held campaign rallies across the Transvaal to 
reassure the embittered electorate that the party held their interests at heart. In one of these, 
held in Ellisras in November 1978, the Prime Minister PW Botha appealed to NP members 
for unity in the face of mounting claims from his own camp that a split would be an essential 
component of the party’s “purification” process. He nonetheless defended the need for policy 
changes.87 The Northern Transvaal was a notorious site of support for the emergent 
Conservative Party (CP), which broke away from the Nationalist Party in 1982, who opposed 
the compromise the latter appeared to make to racial segregationist policies and its 
concessions to big capital. The NP had to particularly defend its parliamentary concessions, 
84 “Government Approves Plan to Boost Border Security,” The Citizen, December 12, 1984; “R34 Budgeted to 
Stabilise Transvaal Border Areas,” The Star, December 13, 1984. 
85 “SA’s Frontline Dwindles,” Sunday Tribune, January 20, 1980. 
86 Interview with Johan Pistorius, March 2015, Lephalale.  
87 “PW and the Gamble That Failed,” Sunday Express, November 26, 1978. 
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which allowed blacks a greater participatory role. The policy of homeland consolidation was 
also controversial, because of the perception among some rural Afrikaners that their land was 
being expropriated for the purpose of enlarging the homelands.   
Conclusion 
While chiefly concerned with the successful operation of the Grootgeluk coal mine, Iscor’s 
engineers had to acquire the consent from local elites to construct the infrastructure network 
that the mine required. This was won in part by Iscor’s engineering and financial prowess 
which promised tangible economic benefits for the white townsfolk and farmers in the town. 
Iscor’s infrastructural network overpowered the efforts of private producers to develop 
municipal service delivery infrastructure. While forced removals of black informal 
settlements coincided with Iscor’s arrival in the town, Iscor was not the driving force of the 
removals. Iscor’s presence made industrialisation a more urgent threat, forcing local officials 
to pay more attention to urban and municipal regulation. Government officials intended 
stringent urban regulation to ward off the perils of industrialisation, such as the spread of 
infectious disease and environmental pollution. Forced removals were also in line with the 
government’s prerogative to improve the fiscal viability of the homelands. Iscor’s arrival 
hastened the process already afoot to bolster black local authorities across the country. This 
meant, in particular, the removal of so-called “black spots” in areas legally demarcated for 
white habitation across the countryside. Thus the extension of state power was mediated by 
the parastatals, whose engineers enjoyed a significant degree of autonomy in their activities at 
the local level. They consequently became one among various other power players in the 
Ellisras district.
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Chapter 3: Eskom and the Matimba Power Station 
 
Introduction 
This chapter describes the development of the Matimba power station in the Ellisras district, 
a power station that set the stage for the construction of the Medupi power station in the 
region twenty years later. The exceptionally hot and water-scare environmental conditions of 
the Waterberg posed a particular challenge to Eskom’s power station development. The 
Matimba power station, built during the 1980s, was a high-risk proposition using special 
technology that Eskom had little experience in handling. While this did not represent a major 
compromise on Eskom’s part, the fact that Eskom’s engineers had a high tolerance for risk 
made the construction of the power station possible. As described in Chapter One, in the case 
of Iscor and the Grootgeluk coal mine, Eskom easily tolerated this risk because it was in the 
interests of national development. The Matimba power station was the fifth of six new power 
stations that Eskom built during the 1970s and 1980s. This massive expansion of its power 
generation capacity was occasioned by Eskom’s need to meet the massive increase in 
national electricity demand that it had forecast. But the load forecast, which rested largely on 
the fickle fortunes of the country’s gold mines, eventually proved inaccurate because it had 
over-estimated future demand. While critics later argued that Eskom lacked accountability to 
the public during this period, they were primarily concerned with the need to achieve 
economic self-sufficiency. Thus techno-politics were enacted under conditions of a 
heightened appetite for risk-taking. Eskom’s engineers also played a techno-political role in 
Ellisras to mould the town in accordance with their vision of a prosperous and stable 
workforce. In the late 1980s, Eskom’s engineers considered apartheid’s segregationist 
dictates to be inimical to the development of a suitable black workforce. They thus initiated 
the development of family housing for African workers in the Marapong township with 
special permission from President FW de Klerk in 1989. This marked the start of racial 
transformation and efforts at social integration, which will be discussed further in the 
following chapter.  
In Thomas Hughes’ comparative study of metropolitan electrification he describes the reverse 
salient as a method of dealing with uncertainty. 1 The reverse salient is a term generally used 
1 Thomas Parke Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930 (John Hopkins 
University Press, 1993), 79. 
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in the military, to describe bottlenecks in the advance march of military soldiers. The 
bottleneck slows the progress of the entire cavalry, forcing those at the front to halt and 
correct the disturbance. In the context of large technical systems the reverse salient refers in a 
similar way to the processes of revision by engineers. Rather than a seamless configuration of 
parts, the large technical system is an incrementally formed patchwork requiring constant 
negotiation among the key players. Hughes describes systems buildings in post-war America 
as initially driven by the insatiable military appetite for new defence technology, and later 
appropriated by more “politically and environmentally sensitive” engineers after the 1960s.2 
The complexity of systems building, which incorporated both social and technical factors, 
gave rise to unforeseen challenges. American engineers were particularly concerned with the 
need to control technology. This was not to prevent an apocalyptic future of machine 
domination but to align the technology more closely with the ends that its designers intended 
it to fulfil. The collectivism of systems-builders differed fundamentally from the pattern of 
technological development generally described for the nineteenth century.3   
In the case of the Matimba power station, I argue that the dire effects of uncertainty were 
cushioned by the high levels of co-operation among corporations within the South African 
power station construction industry. This situation contrasts with the construction of the 
Medupi power station twenty years later, which did not enjoy the same level of coordination 
among industrial corporations. Also in contrast with the Medupi power station, demand for 
power stations globally was low at the time that Matimba was built. As a result Eskom 
enjoyed a better bargaining position in its relationship with the foreign engineering 
companies responsible for the provision of specialized engineering power station equipment.  
This coordination in industry was also a product of the focus on nation-building. For 
countries around the world, national infrastructure development had to contend with the 
interests of European or American-based specialised engineering contractors and the price 
volatility of the global market. The parastatals resisted being drawn into the orbit of global 
engineering dependency. The role of autarky in determining technological design is not 
particular to South Africa. Gabrielle Hecht has demonstrated, for instance, in her study of 
nuclear power in France that French nationalist sentiment was too weak to determine the 
2 Thomas P. Hughes, Rescuing Prometheus: Four Monumental Projects That Changed Our World (New York: 
Vintage, 2011), 26. 
3 See the Introduction to this thesis for a more detailed discussion of this transformation in technological 
development.  
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country’s ultimate choice of nuclear reactor.4 The water-reactor system, for which French 
corporations required a license from the American-based firm Westinghouse, won the day 
despite heated resistance from trade unions and other civil society organisations that claimed 
the deal would strike a blow to French autarky. In South Africa however, it is possible that 
the drive for national self-sufficiency, buoyed by growing international hostility to the 
apartheid regime, encouraged the collaboration and co-operation among corporations. Eskom 
in particular was compelled by the government to channel supply contracts to South African 
manufacturers where the capacity existed. 
This chapter also describes the development of the Matimba power station in the context of 
the development of a national centralised electricity grid. Centralisation meant that Eskom’s 
electricity generation network assumed responsibility for electricity generation over that of 
the various regional bodies. While it is tempting to consider the mode of electricity 
centralisation as a mechanism through which the state enabled the transmission of state 
power throughout the country, there is no evidence to suggest that the government assumed 
the driving role. Rather Eskom initiated centralisation to realise economies of scale in 
response to the changed international climate for investor funding. The autonomy of Eskom’s 
engineers is further demonstrated in their technological choice for the Matimba power 
station. Rather than being deterred by the potential security risk of the region, they adapted 
the power station design to meet it. Thus the politically tenuous context was not enough to 
inhibit Eskom’s power generation expansion. In his parliamentary announcements, the 
Minister of Economic Affairs defended Eskom’s decision to centralise electricity provision 
on a national grid. He cited the Borckenhagen Report, made available in 1968,5 whose 
authors argued that electricity provision by a single entity contained numerous cost 
advantages particularly with the possibilities opened up by long distance electricity 
transmission.6 As will be discussed below, Eskom’s decision to construct Matimba in the 
Ellisras district was conditioned by a whole range of technical and environmental factors, 
many of which Eskom’s engineers failed to anticipate during the initial planning stages. 
4 Hecht and Callon, The Radiance of France. 
5 White Paper on the Reports of the Committee of Enquiry into the Financial Relations Between the Central 
Government, the Provinces and the Local Authorities: The Borckenhagen Reports (Pretoria: Republic of South 
Africa, 1971). 
6 Hansard, June 3, 1968, col 6411 
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Eskom and the CGU 
The Matimba power station was built against the backdrop of Eskom’s implementation of a 
centralised national electricity grid. Before this, regional authorities had been responsible for 
generating and distributing electricity. But the Sharpeville massacre of 1960 had laid bare the 
brutal reality of apartheid and Eskom’s risk profile increased as foreign investors viewed 
South African utilities with greater trepidation.7 Ian McRae, who oversaw the development of 
Central Generation Undertaking (CGU), described the creation of the national electricity grid 
as a strategy to attract foreign funding.8 The CGU assisted in improving investor confidence 
by creating greater economies of scale through the separation of electricity generation from 
its distribution. The inter-connected grid allowed electricity to travel in an even manner, from 
the areas of electricity generation to the regions where demand was highest, even if the 
geographical region where the power station was situated did not coincide with the region in 
which its electricity was consumed. The centralised network also required less electricity in 
reserves than the cumulative requirement of each individual regional undertaking. It thus 
allowed Eskom to expand its electricity generation by building new power stations despite 
the hostile international financial context.  
Raising Capital  
To spurn dependence on volatile inflows of financial capital, Eskom sought to harness the 
power of domestic revenue sources. The Capital Development Fund (CDF) functioned as a 
“sort of capital savings scheme”9 into which Eskom deposited amounts of up to 3% of its 
outstanding debts. Electricity consumers – households and businesses – paid higher 
electricity tariffs to fund these tariffs. Eskom had justified higher electricity tariffs on the 
basis that consumers would in future benefit from lower electricity tariffs, which did not 
carry the burden of funding heavy capital expenditure. Because Eskom was officially a non-
profit body, it had to gain parliamentary approval to create the CDF. Approval was duly 
granted in 1971, under the auspices of the Electricity Amendment Act of 1971.  In 1972, the 
first year of the Fund’s operation, a 7.3% hike in electricity tariffs, added R1- million to the 
fund. This tariff increase was followed by a spectacular 20% increase in each year for the 
7StephenR. Conradie and L. J. M. Messerschmidt, A Symphony of Power: The Eskom Story (Johannesburg: C. 
van Rensburg Publications, 2000), 141. 
8 Ian McRae, The Test of Leadership: 50 Years in the Electricity Supply Industry of South Africa (Muldersdrift: 
EE Publishers, 2006), 31. 
9 Conradie and Messerschmidt, A Symphony of Power, 142. 
94 
 
                                                 
next five years.10 While the CDF was a significant source of capital income for the expansion 
plan, the increased electricity tariffs were the beginning of public consternation at Eskom’s 
seemingly all-powerful place in the national economy.11 Grove Steyn dates Eskom’s 
unpopularity with the general public to this period; an unpopularity that reached its apogee 
with the de Villiers Commission of Inquiry into the Supply of Electricity in South Africa of 
1984. As Steyn writes, Eskom’s ability to harness domestic sources of revenue for its 
expansion programme, and reduce its dependence on foreign loans, created the financial 
conditions for its risky investment decisions, and for its “further unchecked growth”.12  
By 1973 Eskom had successfully centralised electricity provision on the national grid. The 
year was also a turning point for Eskom’s operational efficiency as the utility adopted 
electronically driven management systems particularly for planning and coordination 
purposes. On the back of these efforts at fund raising and operational improvement, Eskom 
embarked on a large-scale expansion drive. The newly-commissioned power stations were 
collectively dubbed the “six-pack,” because they were built at the same time or within a short 
space of each other. The simultaneous construction allowed Eskom to enjoy the benefits of 
bulk purchasing which meant that the power stations boasted equipment of a similar design. 
With the exception of Matimba, the new power stations were built amid the coal fields of the 
Eastern Highveld,  known today as Mpumalanga. Most of the collieries in the region, which 
were also Eskom’s coal suppliers, were owned by Anglo American as part of their decades-
long monopoly of the national coal industry.  
Load Forecast 
The vacillations of the commodity prices played a crucial role in the relentless drive of 
Eskom’s engineers to achieve national self-sufficiency. This historic importance of the gold 
mines for South Africa’s economy and their demand for electricity has lent credence to the 
idea of the Minerals-Energy Complex. Ben Fine later reflecting on the main conceptual 
influences of the MEC wrote the following:  
 
10 ibid. 
11 Anton Eberhard, “The Political Economy of Power Sector Reform in South Africa” (Programme on Energy 
and Sustainable Development, April 2004). In The Political Economy of Power Sector Reform: The Experiences 
of Five Major Developing Countries (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
12 Grove Steyn, “Governance, Finance and Investment : Decision Making and Risk in the Electric Power 
Sector.” (Ph.D thesis, University of Sussex, 2001), 96, 
http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.390926. 
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…The first two things more or less that came my way in terms of reading were a 
Government Report on ESKOM, de Villiers (1984), and Duncan Innes’ (1983) book on 
Anglo-American. From these, it was inescapable that there was an integral partnership 
between state and private capital, and an equally integral connection between a core set 
of activities around mining and energy, straddling the public/private divide.13  
 
Eskom’s expansion project during the 1970s and 1980s, which necessitated the construction 
of the six new power stations, was based on its own estimates of the country’s electricity 
demand. The electricity demand of the gold mines formed a large component of these 
calculations. During the 1970s the country’s electricity demand was the highest it had been 
since the immediate post-war period. This was largely due to the South African government’s 
intensified efforts to encourage mineral exports and the infrastructure projects that were 
expected to facilitate them. Eskom promised a slew of new power stations in response and 
cast an eye out for alternate sources of energy, contemplating the electricity-producing 
potential of neighbouring Southern African countries. One of these, which subsequently 
proved a reliable source of electricity for South African consumers, was the hydro-electric 
Cabora Bassa dam in Mozambique.14 But Eskom’s demand forecast proved to be a serious 
miscalculation, when it became clear at the end of the 1980s that Eskom had too much 
electricity generating capacity. One of the newly constructed power stations, the Majuba 
power station, had to be mothballed because Eskom had enough electricity generating 
capacity to satisfy the country’s demand. Thus electricity supply had overshot demand. 
 
Eskom’s failure to effectively predict demand was not for lack of trying. Revisions of the 
load forecast were a recurring point of discussion in its correspondence and memorandums 
from the period. The report of the de Villiers Commission, released in 1984, blamed the 
erroneous load forecasting on Eskom’s use of econometric forecasting methods. Econometric 
forecasting is a method that relies on past patterns to predict future behaviour and the report 
criticised the model for not accounting for the discontinuity of the unprecedented oil crisis of 
1973. But this is not an entirely fair critique.15 Archival records demonstrate that Eskom also 
conducted a qualitative analysis of the economy’s electricity needs. Calculations were also 
13 Ben Fine, The Minerals-Energy Complex Is Dead: Long Live the MEC, 2008, Unpublished paper 
https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/5617/1/MineralEnergyComplex.pdf. 
14 Conradie and Messerschmidt, A Symphony of Power. 
15 Willem Johannes De Villiers, “Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Supply of Electricity in the 
Republic of South Africa” (Government Printer, 1984). 
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based on a collation of each regional administration’s assessment of the needs of the industry 
and of the populace within its territory. In 1978 Eskom’s management board decided that its 
previous estimates of future demand had been too low. This was because of the electricity 
requirements of Swawek, Eskom’s electricity generating equivalent in South West Africa, 
which had previously been discounted, and of new uranium enrichment projects that were 
then in their infancy. The Board thus laid to rest debates over whether or not to downscale 
Eskom’s expansion project and reduce the number of power stations in the pipeline, resolving 
instead to see the power stations to completion.16  
Apart from uncertainties surrounding electricity demand in the country, Eskom was also 
concerned about the reliability of its electricity supply. The departure of the Portuguese 
colonial authorities from neighbouring Mozambique following its independence in 1975 had 
cast a shadow of uncertainty over South Africa’s access to the electricity generated by the 
Cabora Bassa dam. The construction and design of the dam, which Eskom had contributed 
towards, began while the country was still under Portuguese rule. The receptiveness of the 
Frelimo-led government to apartheid South Africa’s continued presence was then unclear. In 
addition some of Eskom’s own power stations, including the newly built Koeberg nuclear 
power station, were experiencing technical and licensing difficulties which adversely affected 
their ability to generate electricity.17  
The South African mining industry was a major source of uncertainty. In 1989, Mike Davis, 
then Eskom’s General Manager for Finance told the Financial Mail that the sudden and 
unexpected collapse of commodity prices threw Eskom’s load forecasts into disarray. This 
situation became apparent in 1985. In response to the drop in commodity prices, mines across 
the country had reduced their output and their electricity requirements declined. Since the 
mines as an industry constituted Eskom’s single largest electricity consumer, their decreased 
electricity demand hit Eskom’s customer base hard.18 The gold price played a particularly 
destructive role in promoting uncertainty. As a gold-producing country, South Africa had 
previously benefitted from the relative stability of the gold price, which had bolstered 
investor confidence in infrastructural investment. Once the USA, under the Presidency of 
Richard Nixon, opted to unpeg the dollar from the price of gold in 1971, the gold price 
became subject to the same price cycles as any other commodity. Nonetheless, by 1980 gold 
16“Memorandum: Updated Programme for Expanding Eskom’s Generating Capacity,” April 24, 1978; Eskom 
Corporate Archives, 2L-10 KS 258. 
17 ibid. 
18“Eskom’s Tap-Dance,” Financial Mail, August 18, 1989. 
97 
 
                                                 
mines had not noticeably decreased their production. In 1980 Eskom again revised its load 
forecast upward and its assessors stated that the main areas of uncertainty were in the 
regional calculations of the Rand and the Orange Free State, both of which were centres of 
gold mining activity. 19 The argument in favour of an upward revision was that gold mining 
productions was not likely to see a significant decline in output in the near future. In a 
memorandum detailing the load forecast and the economic fortunes of the gold mines, its 
authors asserted that:  
 The present uncertain conditions on the gold market made long term growth predictions 
frivolous. He was not unduly perturbed by the possible decline of total gold production 
because most mines would probably mine at greater depths and would thus have bigger 
pumping loads. A sharp decline in gold production was simply not envisaged, not even 
for the next decade, provided the price of gold remained on a sufficiently high level. If 
the price of gold was high enough productions costs would also increase proportionally, 
which in turn would change the total pattern. Thus, the bigger the working profit, the 
higher the surges on prices.20 
Thus Eskom continued to display confidence in the fortunes of the gold mines. This was a 
large part of the reason for its overly optimistic predictions of electricity demand and the 
unnecessary capital expenditure on new power stations. 
About Matimba 
Matimba was a landmark power station for its time, using innovative design to survive the 
hot, arid conditions of the Waterberg. The use of innovative technology was however a high 
risk and costly endeavour. Thus Eskom’s ability to construct a power station among the 
Waterberg coal fields was conditioned by its organisational appetite for high risk-taking. In 
his study of the institutional context of risk taking within Eskom, Grove Steyn demonstrates 
that its engineers at the time enjoyed significant scope for autonomous decision making in 
designing the power stations:  
19Minutes of meeting of Electricity Supply Commission, 5 March 1980, Eskom Heritage Department Archives, 
Minute book no. 18. 
20 ibid. 
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The stations Eskom ordered in the early 1980s employed a range of new, and in many 
cases only partly proven technologies. Alex Ham explained that in many ways Eskom 
engineers were given "incredible freedom to do what you [they] wanted.21 
The Matimba power station was originally named Ilanga and intended to lie among the coal 
fields of the Eastern Transvaal. Eskom was forced to change its location following firm 
protestations from the chief air pollution officer of the Department of Health. The Eastern 
Transvaal was historically the region that Eskom preferred for its power stations and as a 
result had high levels of air pollution. To better survive the arid conditions of the Waterberg, 
Eskom decided to construct Matimba using dry-cooled technology. A dry cooling system 
required substantially less water than Eskom’s traditional wet-cooled power stations and so 
was a convenient choice for water-scare contexts. As with the development of the Grootgeluk 
coal mine a decade earlier, the Matimba power station was beset with obstacles. Apart from 
protestations from the air pollution officer, the drying up of funds at the end of 1976 stalled 
its development. The prospects for raising finance on the international loan market fell 
suddenly and Eskom had to curtail R235-million of spending for 1977 and defer its power 
station projects in the pipeline.22  
Air Pollution  
Despite its organisational autonomy the limits of Eskom’s power was exposed when the air 
pollution officer objected to the number of power stations it constructed in the Eastern 
Transvaal. Eskom’s grand plans to construct the power station six-pack were unexpectedly 
scuppered by the Chief Air Pollution Officer of the time, whose portfolio fell under the ambit 
of the Department of Health. The Air Pollution Officer was concerned about the 
concentration of sulphur dioxide in the Eastern Transvaal, a gas emitted by the coal 
combustion processes of Eskom’s power stations. Sulphur dioxide caused acid rain when 
mixed with the water in the atmosphere. White farmers, an influential political constituency 
for the NP, complained about the destructive effects of acid rain on the quality of the soil on 
their farms and thus on their agricultural produce. Eskom challenged the Officer’s 
estimations of the air pollution levels in the Eastern Transvaal but, despite lengthy 
negotiations, the Air Pollution Officer refused to grant Eskom permission to build the power 
station there. 
21 Steyn, “Governance, Finance and Investment,” 82.  
22 Minutes of meeting of Electricity Supply Commission, November 23, 1976; Eskom Corporate Archives, 2L-
10 KS 257.  
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At an international level, systems-builders were generally annoyed by environmental 
organisations, as demonstrated in a report from Eskom’s Chief Engineer in Systems Planning 
in which he detailed his visit to a meeting of the International Council on Large Electric 
Systems in Paris (Cigre).23 Cigre was founded in 1921 as a forum for large-scale electricity 
producers from across over the world.24 His report on the conference proceedings details a 
distinct suspicion of environmental organisations, as well as trade unions, because they 
threatened the efficacy of long-term planning. His report stated that: “It is clear from the 
experience in America and Australia that great care should be taken in South Africa to avoid 
the environmentalists becoming a major factor in planning. Possibly this can best be achieved 
by taking all reasonable steps to preserve the environment so that opposition was reduced to a 
minimum.”  
According to the report, a delegate to the conference had said “that engineers must rebel 
against uneconomic and impractical standards.” Faced with a similar situation of heavy 
industrial demand, the Australian electricity utility was prevented from building a new power 
station where it had planned on the grounds that it would “wastefully use water”. Trade 
unions prevented their construction of a natural gas power station and public opposition to a 
nuclear power station meant that the utility had to rely chiefly on hydro-powered electricity.25 
Thus to systems planners, who relied on long term planning stability, the pressure from 
protest groups was a hazard. As I demonstrate in later chapters, Eskom and its large technical 
systems had to incorporate these pressures into its strategic planning.  
In February 1977 the Air Pollution Officer ruled against the proposed site of the Eastern 
Transvaal. 26  Unconvinced by his calculations, Eskom argued that because of the scarcity of 
water and coal sources elsewhere in the country it would struggle to find a replacement site 
outside of the Eastern Transvaal. However, it decided against formally appealing the decision 
or requesting Cabinet to repeal the legislation in its favour.27 By September 1977, Eskom 
remained determined to appease the Air Pollution Officer, or at least discount his 
conclusions, and began investigations of its own into the sulphur content of the coal that 
23Minutes of meeting of Electricity Supply Commission, October 12, 1976; Eskom Corporate Archives, 2L-10 
KS 257. 
24http://www.cigre.org/What-is-CIGRE 
25Minutes of meeting of Electricity Supply Commission, October 12, 1976; Eskom Corporate Archives, 2L-10 
KS 257. 
26Minutes of meeting of Electricity Supply Commission, February 15, 1977; Eskom Corporate Archives, 2L-10 
KS 257. 
27Minutes of meeting of Electricity Supply Commission, February 15, 1977. 
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would supply Ilanga.28 Eskom’s engineers also interrogated his methodology, leading to his 
admission that his calculations were not entirely conclusive. In defence he argued that his 
own requirements were lenient when considered against the global norm. He was nonetheless 
convinced that the proposed power station would raise the level of air pollution in the Eastern 
Transvaal to more than double the limit set by the World Health Organisation. 29 The 
indeterminacy was partly due to the fact that only the sulphur content of the coal was 
measured and not the sulphur dioxide emitted during the actual coal combustion. Reaching 
the required level of certainty would have meant constructing 40 testing stations at a cost of 
R60 000 each. 30  Eventually, in June 1978, Eskom’s own investigations concluded that the 
air pollution levels would indeed be intolerable if Ilanga were to be situated in the Eastern 
Transvaal, and it was forced to concede.31  
Government’s concerns over environmental damage prevented Eskom from developing the 
power station in the Eastern Transvaal. Thus it is not entirely accurate to attribute Eskom’s 
decision to enter the Waterberg primarily to government prodding in this direction. Eskom 
vehemently protested the Air Pollution Officer’s decision until it had no option but to 
comply. To coincide with its site change from Eastern Transvaal to the Waterberg, Eskom’s 
engineers changed the name of the power station from Ilanga to Matimba. As the Tsonga 
word for “power”, they considered the name Matimba a more appropriate social fit for the 
languages spoken in the Waterberg.32  
Diversification of Fuel 
A power station built outside of Eskom’s traditional stronghold of the Eastern Transvaal 
would likely utilise a novel source of coal. Thus Eskom’s Board considered the feasibility of 
“diversification of coal use”, which in effect meant purchasing coal from companies other 
than Anglo-American. At a board meeting in January 1978, board members recognised that 
alternative and secure coal supplies were an urgent necessity but thought it best that Eskom 
not take the lead in exploiting new coal supplies. The costs of coal mine exploitation would 
28Minutes of meeting of Electricity Supply Commission, September  27, 1977, Eskom Corporate Archives, 2L-
10 KS 258 . 
29Minutes of meeting of Electricity Supply Commission, October 25, 1977, Eskom Corporate Archives, 2L-10 
KS 258. 
30ibid. 
31Minutes of meeting of Electricity Supply Commission, June 13, 1978; Eskom Corporate Archives, 2L-10, KS 
259. 
32Minutes of meeting of Electricity Supply Commission, April 22, 1980; Eskom Corporate Archives, Micro-
films. 
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ultimately be heaped onto electricity tariffs and board members thought best avoidable.33 
Coal in the Eastern Transvaal was plentiful and relatively cheap, and the region well 
equipped with the necessary transport infrastructure.  By contrast, if Eskom were to exploit 
virgin coal fields, it would have to carry the heavy costs associated with establishing 
connecting infrastructure such as roads, rail and telecommunications. In the particular case of 
the Waterberg, the fact that the coal fields were “unproven”, or the depths of the coal reserves 
and the ease of mining were uncertain, mitigated against confident planning.  
During deliberations of Iscor’s offer of the poor quality Grootgeluk coal, some of Eskom’s 
board members suggested that Eskom was obliged to assist Iscor to serve the national 
interests. In this case, parastatal collaboration would ensure that Iscor could sustain a steady 
supply of steel and keep prices low. Thus to some extent the Waterberg coal fields were an 
attractive proposition because Eskom could share the costs of coal exploitation with its fellow 
parastatal Iscor.  However, the hot, arid and water-scarce conditions of the Waterberg meant 
that Eskom’s traditional wet-cooled power station design would not have sufficed. Rather 
Eskom would have to construct a dry-cooled power station, which utilised less water. But 
Eskom had only an experimental familiarity with dry-cooled systems at the time and the 
move was fraught with danger. Another concern expressed at the meeting was that Iscor 
might prove unreliable and fail to see the development of the Grootgeluk coal mine to 
completion. However, this fear was somewhat alleviated by the fact that Iscor had already 
invested a significant amount in the colliery. Finally, the threat of terrorist attack threatened 
viability of a power station in Ellisras. The Department of Defence had earmarked the region 
as a security risk because of its proximity to the Botswana border.  As a dangerous region, 
Eskom would struggle to attract suitably skilled staff because they would have to live in a 
“confined environment in the power station township.”34 Thus defence considerations made a 
power station in the Waterberg less attractive rather than more, so rendering unlikely the 
supposition that Eskom was driven to the region by the apartheid government’s concern for 
the defence of its borders.  
In August 1979 Eskom accepted Iscor’s offer to supply it with coal from the Grootegluk coal 
mine. But the Waterberg coal contained different material characteristics to the coal found in 
the Eastern Transvaal. This introduced novel concerns for the power station’s designers, 
33Minutes of meeting of Electricity Supply Commission, January 24, 1978; Eskom Corporate Archives, 2L-10 
KS 258. 
34Minutes of special tender board meeting, August 23, 1979; Eskom Corporate Archives, O9 KS 242.  
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particularly in the boiler equipment. As will be discussed in more detail in the following 
chapter, the boilers were a subject of recurring consternation throughout Matimba’s early 
years of operation. An Eskom memorandum discussing the relative merits of different 
tenderers for the supply of boilers for the Matimba power station highlighted the peculiar 
nature of the coal in Ellisras that was to be used: “The coal which will be fired in Matimba 
boilers will be highly abrasive and often difficult to manage, both from aspects of physical 
consistency and combustion behaviour, therefore it is essential that the boiler plant which is 
selected is the one best suited to ensure a maximum of availability coupled with maintenance 
requirements which will be neither intensive nor demanding sophisticated skills.”35  
Coal Price Agreements  
The coal purchase agreements between Matimba and the Grootgeluk coal mine were initially 
drawn up as long term coal contracts, in line with Eskom’s traditional contractual methods. In 
his study of the historical development of South Africa’s coal and energy policy, Andrew 
Marquard draws on Fine and Rustomjee to explain the political function of long term coal 
contracts as an instrument through which the NP’s vision of transferring private capital into 
Afrikaner hands was realised. Fine and Rustomjee mark the 1970s as the decade that 
Afrikaner capitalists successfully made inroads into the traditionally English-dominated 
private sector. This assertion is tied to their broader argument that the coherent linkage 
between national economic and political capital allowed the government to realise its 
economic developmental objectives. Afrikaner capital accumulation in the mining sector was 
a largely successful endeavour, and by the 1970s, the Afrikaner mining capital firm Genmin, 
formed by Federale Mynbou, controlled the single largest coal-producing company in the 
country, TNC.36 Eskom’s official explanation for drawing up long term contracts with its 
coal suppliers was based on simple financial logic: that long-term coal contracts protected the 
domestic coal price from radical increases in the global coal price. In the case of the 
contractual relationship between the Grootgeluk coal mine and the Matimba power station, 
the underlying rationale of coal contracts as providing the opportunity for Afrikaner capital to 
gain a foothold in the economy because both parties were parastatatals and concerned to 
protect what they considered the “national interest”. Thus capital accumulation was not their 
chief priority at this stage.  
35‘Report on Tenders for Matimba Power Station', June 5, 1981; Eskom Corporate Archives, O9 KS243. 27. 
36Andrew Marquard, “The Origins and Development of South African Energy Policy” (PhD Thesis, University 
of Cape Town, 2006), 159, 
http://webdav.uct.ac.za/depts/erc/Research/publications/06Marquard%20PhD%20Thesis.pdf. 
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The nature of the coal contracts differed from power station to power station, as Eskom 
assumed varying degrees of responsibility for the operational costs of the supplier collieries. 
Anton Eberhard describes the difference between cost-plus or fixed coal contracts.  
In the cost-plus contracts,” he writes, “Eskom and the coal supplier jointly provide 
capital for the establishment of the colliery. Eskom pays all the costs of operation of the 
colliery and the supplier is paid a net income by Eskom on the basis of a return on the 
capital invested (ROI) by the coal supplier in the colliery. …In the fixed price contract, 
coal is supplied at a predetermined price (i.e a base price which is escalated by means of 
an agreed escalation formula).37 
At the Grootgeluk coal mine, Iscor assumed the capital costs of operating the coal mine, and 
Eskom drew up a fixed cost coal contract for the coal supply. The archival records 
demonstrate that Eskom assumed some responsibility for very particular coal mine 
equipment. In addition, components of the mine’s operational costs were heaped onto the 
coal price in the coal contracts, the extent of which Eskom and Iscor hammered out on the 
negotiating table.  The relationship between the two parastatals was intimate because the 
changes that Iscor introduced to its coal mine operations affected the quality and price of the 
coal that Eskom received. Because Eskom had no other source of coal, its only option was to 
negotiate with Iscor’s managers to achieve its desired product at a reasonable price.  
Despite their tussling over the price of coal, Eskom paid a relatively low price for the 
Grootgeluk coal. As Joe Meyer related, “Those prices that they are paying with the clauses in 
the contract that we set up for them, I can tell you that Matimba is the lowest cost producer of 
electricity in the world.”38 This low price continues to the present day. In March 2004 the 
Business Day reported that Eskom’s statistics showed the Matimba had the lowest operating 
cost of all its power stations. This was largely due to the low price it paid for coal.39 Kumba 
Mines, which by that stage owned the Grootgeluk coal mine, hoped Eskom would expand its 
power generation in the Waterberg for that reason. As I will discuss in more detail in Chapter 
Four, the relationship between Iscor and Eskom was consistently tenuous with each side 
looking to protect their financial interests. Eskom negotiated a low coal price during the early 
1990s, a time when its concern with commercial efficiency was a pressing one.   
37 Eberhard, “The Political Economy of Power Sector Reform in South Africa.” 
38 Interview with Joe Meyer, March 17, 2015, Onverwacht. 
39 “Kumba sees big potential in the Waterberg”, Business Day, November 23, 2004.  
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Equipment and Contractors  
In contrast to the buoyant global market that Eskom encountered during the construction of 
the Medupi power station, Matimba benefitted from a depressed global demand for power 
station equipment during the 1980s. Amid a handful of corporations vying for control of the 
market, West German corporations played a particularly prominent role in the South African 
market. This was partly due to their government’s decision to back export credit guarantees 
to South Africa. Export credit guarantees are a form of insurance policy in which a country’s 
export promotion entity carries the risk of payment default from the importer. Bonn had 
introduced the incentive to stimulate employment in the German engineering sector.40 For the 
Matimba power station in particular, Bonn had guaranteed R341-million worth of turbine and 
generator sales to South Africa. West Germany’s renewed amenability to South Africa was 
driven by a depressed engineering sector which had been hard hit by the postponement of 
German nuclear power stations. German engineering companies have historically held a large 
presence in the South African engineering industry, from its inception, even in the early days 
of the parastatals, where even a cursory overview reveals the strength of the German linkage, 
importantly through training many of the prominent parastatal engineers at German 
universities.41  
Matimba utilised specialised high-tech innovative technology, which Eskom had little 
experience in handling. The specific power station model its engineers chose was determined 
by the region’s environmental constraints as well as security considerations. A special edition 
of the magazine Engineering Week appeared in November 1987 commemorating the 
engineering feats of the Matimba power station. For the early construction period of 
Matimba, this section utilises the insights gleaned from the publication which highlighted 
Matimba as the “Project of the Year ’87”.42 The special edition featured interviews with 
some of the leading engineers responsible for the construction of the power station. As a 
commemoration of the technical feats performed by Eskom’s engineers, the articles lack any 
critical engagement with their opinions or activities. The publication nonetheless provides 
valuable historical insight into the design and construction of the power station. Alec Ham, 
Eskom’s general manager of engineering who oversaw the completion of Matimba, stated 
that the power station’s world class technological features made it “yet another ‘world first’ 
40“Bonn Guarantees R341-m for Second SA Power Scheme,” The Star, October 8, 1981. 
41 G. R. Bozzoli, Forging Ahead : South Africa’s Pioneering Engineers (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand 
University Press, 1997), 172. 
42 “Matimba: Project of the Year ’87,” Engineering Week, November 1987. 
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for South Africa.”43 Once operational, he said, the power station would have a 4000 MW 
power generation capacity, rendering it the largest power station in the Southern Hemisphere. 
Ham described the engineering team at Matimba as pathbreakers, because they had 
“converted an untried concept into what has become a world leader in dry cooling for power 
generation.”44  
Cooling systems were necessary features of a power station design to control the massive 
quantities of heat required to generate electricity. In the normal electricity generation process 
of a power station, the heat generated during the coal combustion process heated the water in 
the boilers. The steam from the evaporation process was then forced through the boiler pipes 
to drive the turbines, which in turn generated electrical energy. The cooling system 
condensed the steam and the water formed through condensation was recycled and returned 
to the boilers. According to Ham, without a cooling mechanism, the waste heat emitted from 
the combustion process was comparable in quantity to that emitted by a massive forest fire. 
Wet-cooled condensers, Eskom’s traditional choice, were cheaper than dry cooled systems 
but this technology only in conditions where water was plentiful. A dry-cooled system 
operated through fan-like structures and used a portion of the electricity generated by the 
power station to drive the system. While it was attractive for its water saving qualities, its 
novelty rendered it a risky option.45  
Eskom had no operational experience with a dry-cooled power station with Matimba’s 
envisioned generating capacity. Nowhere in the world was one in existence. The closest 
comparable power station- with a generating capacity not nearly as large as Matimba’s 
projected capacity- was a 375 MW direct dry-cooled unit that formed part of the Wyodak 
power station in Wyoming, USA. Other examples of dry-cooled power stations using forced 
mechanical draughts included the van Eck power station in Namibia (then called South West 
Africa) and the Utrillas power station in Spain. These power stations had been constructed by 
the German-based firm of GEA. Eskom had conducted its own experiments into the 
feasibility of dry-cooling technology in power stations with a limited generating capacity. 
One of these, the Grootvlei power station was situated near the small town of Balfour in the 
Eastern Transvaal, and boasted two 200MW units which used the “natural” or “indirect” 
method of dry-cooling. In the indirect dry-cooled system, the steam is cooled by a natural 
43 ibid, 1. 
44 ibid. 
45Minutes of meeting of Electricity Supply Commission, April 1, 1980; Eskom Heritage archives. 
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draught of air that is formed within a large cooling tower. These cooling towers were 
necessarily high to effectively cool the steam, relying on the principle that the warm, moist 
air would necessarily rise, thereby creating a constant draught. This differed from a “direct” 
dry-cooled system in which large motor-driven fans generate a draught large enough to cool 
the hot steam passed over from the turbines. This system was at the time in operation at the 
van Eck power station in Namibia. The successful operation of the dry-cooled units at 
Grootvlei inspired Eskom’s engineers to expand the generating capacity of its dry cooled 
power stations.46 In April 1980 Eskom’s engineers detailed the findings of new experiments 
undertaken by the overseas turbine manufacturers, and stated their conviction that the 
construction of a 600MW dry-cooled unit was feasible. It would however be an estimated 7% 
more expensive than a wet-cooled unit.47  
In 1982, Eskom settled on a direct dry-cooled system for the Matimba power station. In 
financial terms, the direct cooling system offered lower capital but higher operating costs. 
The cost of coal made up a large proportion of the operating cost estimates. Eskom’s decision 
to opt for a direct dry-cooled system was thus one that favoured higher operating costs over 
capital costs. This was possibly rendered feasible by the low cost of Waterberg coal, although 
this is not explicitly stated in the records. Defence considerations played an important role in 
Eskom’s choice between an indirect and direct cooling system. An indirect dry-cooled system 
required extraordinarily large cooling towers to be built at the power station site. Because of 
their gigantic proportions, the cooling towers were likely to be easy targets for terrorist 
activity in the stark bushveld and reconstruction of a damaged tower would entail 
unnecessary cost and time delays. Smaller cooling towers were more desirable, but these 
were more expensive.48 A direct dry-cooled system however did not require the construction 
of tall cooling towers. Thus the region’s security threat, a product of the apartheid 
government’s system of racist exploitation, was not enough to deter Eskom from its relentless 
path of generation expansion. Instead, Eskom tailored its technological choices to counter the 
security threat and ensure the longevity of the power station.  
46JL Rothman, Memorandum: Dry cooling of turbines with reference to future Eskom applications from Senior 
Manager (New works) to General Manager, January 17, 1980; Eskom Corporate Archives, Micro-films. 
47Minutes of meeting of Electricity Supply Commission, April 22, 1980; Eskom Heritage Archives. 
48 Minutes of meeting of Electricity Supply Commission, April 1, 1984; Eskom Heritage Archives, Minute 
Book 19.  
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Turbine Design 
Since the delegation was comprised of engineers, the team had a substantial grip on the 
technical requirements and the performance expected of the parts. Helped by a downturn in 
the global market for power stations, Eskom had significant leverage. This situation differed 
from the instances of exploitation by foreign firms  described in the case of the Inga hydro-
electric scheme in the Congo under the Presidency of Mobutu sese Seko. There, consortia of 
foreign companies acted in a largely autonomous fashion without rigorous technical 
accountability to government entities concerned with protecting the “national interest”.49 In 
the case of the Inga scheme, the project floundered because of extended construction work 
which surpassed initial forecasts and resulted in escalated costs that the government could ill 
afford. 
The turbine design of the dry-cooled power station posed a particular challenge for the 
Matimba power station. The turbine featured rows of blades which rotated as the fast moving 
steam passed over it. Since wet-cooled power stations were more commonly used globally, 
engineering firms tended to specialise in turbine design best suited to it. The turbine posed 
the most serious technical challenge to the effective design of the dry cooled power station. 
The blades in the back row of the turbine were required to withstand a higher back pressure 
than in a wet cooled system, where low back pressures were ordinarily desirable. Few 
engineering companies had a proven track record in supplying reliable turbines for dry-
cooled power stations. The tender evaluation records detailed the investigations of Eskom’s 
engineers. The following section excerpt shows the careful consideration Eskom’s engineers 
applied to selecting the appropriate contractors for the power station:  
Engineers from the Turbine Plant Group (New Works Department) undertook a three-
week tour of turbine manufacturers in October 1979 to understand the developments in 
creating turbines with high back pressure, including Brown Boveri (Swiss), KWU and 
MAN (Germany), GEC (UK), Toshiba, Hitachi and Mitsubishi (Japan). All the 
companies said they could create high back pressure turbines, as expected, but with the 
exception of MAN could not show that they have proven their design under actual 
running conditions. It is generally agreed that the critical component is the last stage low 
49 Young, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State. 
108 
 
                                                 
pressure blade; this is where the development work for dry-cooling applications must be 
concentrated.50  
The fact that the efficacy of the system had yet to be proven made the undertaking an 
intensely risky one, given Matimba’s envisioned electricity output.  
The tender for turbine manufacture was eventually awarded to a consortium made up of the 
German company MAN, and the French Alsthom.51 MAN was attractive because it had some 
experience with the South African design and construction industry. The company had 
supplied two turbo-generators to the Grootvlei power station. It had also, in partnership with 
the Swiss electrical engineering company Brown Boveri, formed an engineering equipment 
company, which could satisfy the supply requirements for Matimba’s turbo generators. To 
enable coordinated planning between the corporations, MAN had initiated talks with the 
company that was contracted to supply boilers to Matimba, with the view to designing an all-
encompassing control and instrumentation system that integrated the boiler and turbine 
generator operation. Communication between the two companies was however helped by the 
fact that MAN partly owned EVT, the boiler contracting company.52 Thus the greater 
integration of corporations functioned to mitigate risk, which made the contractor appear 
more attractive to Eskom.  
Local Manufacturers 
Matimba was built during a time of a booming South African construction industry. In the 
1980s the threat of sanctions against South Africa had become a reality and local 
manufacturers picked up the pace, benefitting from the windfall of global isolation. The 
severe depreciation of the rand from 1985 provided additional economic impetus to domestic 
manufacturers. Since the weak rand made imported products expensive, South African 
manufacturers stepped up to the plate with the creation of massive industrial projects all 
across the country. Some of these were encouraged by President PW Botha, such as the oil 
from gas project Mossgas. The power station construction industry was similarly filled with 
obliging suppliers. An engineer who preferred to withhold his name, and worked at the 
Matimba power station construction site during the 1980s, described the decade as the 
50 JL Rothman, Memorandum: Dry cooling of turbines with reference to future Eskom applications from Senior 
Manager (New works) to General Manager; Eskom Corporate Archives, Micro-films. 
51Minutes of meeting of Electricity Supply Commission, August 27, 1981, Eskom Corporate archives, Micro-
films. 
52 Minutes of meeting of Electricity Supply Commission, October 7, 1981, Eskom Corporate archives, Micro-
films.  
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“golden age of power generation.”53 His colleague, who also preferred to remain anonymous, 
echoed this sentiment: “I think if you go back to the time when Matimba was being built, the 
boiler industry in South Africa was really at its peak. We had four boiler companies that had 
their own facilities where things were getting done. The industry was really at its height.”54   
Local manufacturing also benefitted from Eskom contracts. The government compelled 
Eskom to support local manufacturers by awarding them equipment supply contracts. Thus 
international contractors were compelled to incorporate local suppliers into their supply 
chain, often to their chagrin. On 5 May 1982 Eskom board members reported a downturn in 
the electricity generation market during the 1980s and that competition was high among 
engineering contractors for turbo generators and boilers. 55  
Boilers  
The local subsidiaries of the global companies who were responsible for supplying the power 
station’s specialised engineering equipment were represented by a company called Industrial 
Machinery Supplies (IMS). IMS had long experience as a supplier to Eskom’s power 
stations, having first supplied the steam turbines for the Komati power station in 1961. The 
role of the company, as stated in its own advertising, was the “fusion of proven technology 
with local manufacturing, contracts management, and quality assurance services.” In 1989, 
the Financial Mail detailed IMS’s spectacular rise in fortunes. Over the preceding five years, 
its annual turnover had increased from R30-million to R150-million.56 The depreciation of 
the rand had encouraged the company to improve its local manufacturing capacity. 
The boiler contracts were eventually awarded to a consortium of Steinmuller and EVT, both 
German engineering firms. The resultant consortium was called Sieva, and IMS held a 6% 
stake in its operations. The fact that the consortium had included a South African company 
made it more appealing to Eskom. The inclusion of local manufacturers was an explicit 
component of Eskom’s tender specifications and Sieva’s promotion of local industry 
improved its overall appeal. By August 1981, the consortium had improved its offer and 
made an effort to establish a better local presence. As reported in a management committee 
53 Interview (anonymous), Johannesburg Country Club, 25 June 2015. 
54 ibid. 
55 Minutes of meeting of Electricity Supply Commission, May 5, 1982; Eskom Heritage Archives, Minute Book 
19. 
56 “In the Pound Seats,” Financial Mail, May 14, 1989. 
110 
 
                                                 
meeting: “Stein/EVT had taken active steps to establish themselves locally and had formed a 
local company SIEVA in conjunction with Industrial Machinery Supplies.”57  
Sieva assumed overall responsibility for the boiler installation and coordinated the main 
subcontractors responsible for the mechanical and civil works.  While Sieva was a 
consortium of largely foreign firms, it gradually adopted a more local staff complexion by 
incorporating South African engineers into its ranks. During the boiler design phase, the 
consortium had appointed a project supervisor to coordinate the different companies. This 
supervisor was based in France until 1986 when Sieva’s personnel assumed the role in South 
Africa. It boasted that one of its main contributions to local manufacturing was the creation of 
the Boiler Component Manufacturers of South Africa (BCM) in 1982, chiefly to manufacture 
boiler pressure parts. But this model of creating separate companies for certain project 
components was not always desirable.58 Were all the erection work conducted on an in-house 
basis, or at least by the main contractor, the work would not be passed on to South African 
corporations. Thus only where in the absence of existing capacity elsewhere in the country 
for certain components of the project, then only the creation of an entirely new company to 
perform that function was justifiable. As such, the remainder of the erection work was sub-
contracted to various specialist companies, including LTA for the civil works, Genrec for 
steelwork, and Steinmuller for the erection of boiler pressure parts and pipework.59  
Matimba and Ellisras 
Siting of Matimba Power Station 
This section considers the choice of site for the Matimba power station in the Ellisras district. 
The main sources are an article published in the The Civil Engineer describing the process of 
site selection and a memorandum considering the site selection in the context of the 
placement of an African township. 60 These analyses provides useful insight into the cost-
benefit approach Eskom’s engineers used where priorities were evaluated through a series of 
trade-offs and eliminations. 
To determine the site of the power station, Eskom drew up a matrix of factors during the 
1980s. The main considerations for the initial site were that: the power station should not be 
57 Minutes of meeting of Electricity Supply Commission, August 5, 1981; Eskom Corporate Archives, Micro-
films.  
58 ‘Local boilers for Matimba’ in “Matimba: Project of the Year ’87,” Engineering Week, November 1987, 19. 
59 ‘Local boilers for Matimba’ in “Matimba: Project of the Year ’87,” Engineering Week, November 1987, 19. 
60 “Matimba Power Station Site Selection,” Civil Engineering 29 (1987). 
111 
 
                                                 
located atop coal deposits, the effects of air pollution had to be minimised; and the power 
station be situated as close as possible to its sources of supply, particularly its coal supply. 
Seven potential sites were identified, each of which fulfilled some requirements but fell short 
on others. Eventually the choice was narrowed down to include a site, H1, located on the 
farm Grootestryd, which was however disadvantaged by its “marginally higher air pollution 
and of a more costly and vulnerable coal conveyer system” and site A1, which was the only 
site located atop a coal deposit. Site H1 was estimated to cost R9.51-million more than site 
A1. Site A1 offered the lowest operating costs, because it required the least expenditure on 
conveyor systems and coal transportation. Apart from being more expensive, longer supply 
lines also from the coal mine were vulnerable to terrorist attacks and thus posed a security 
risk. The remaining sites under consideration were located off coal deposits and were south 
of the coal fault. Their distance from the coal mine meant that longer supply lines had to be 
constructed.  
Nonetheless Eskom discounted site A1 in acquiescence to the Government Mining Engineer 
who railed against the so-called “immobilisation” or “sterilisation” of the coal deposits. In 
this case 36-million tons of coal would have been rendered untouchable were Matimba to be 
built at the site. In the end, the cost differential between site H1 and site A1, which were 
largely due to the extra 3km of conveyer line that would have to be built to transport coal an 
extra distance, was too marginal to warrant building the power station above the coal 
reserves. The air pollution output at H1 was slightly higher than at another possible site B1, 
but because air pollution in the district was far from saturation point, the consideration was 
not too pressing.  Environmental aspects were discussed in the government memorandum. 
Ellisras was more than 50 kilometres away from another Eskom power station, and was thus 
outside of the “SO² embargo area.” Pollution from the chimneys was related to the direction 
of the wind, which usually arrived from the North East and thus was not likely to blow the 
smog into the residential district.  
Hospital  
Eskom’s involvement in Ellisras surpassed the bounds of the power station. To ensure its 
workforce had access to suitable social amenities, it was forced to contribute to the 
development of these facilities in the town. There was a sore need for the development of a 
hospital in the vicinity to service its staff contingent, which was expected to sizably increase 
the town’s population and thus increase the strain on municipal service provision. Eskom and 
Iscor grudgingly accepted the responsibility following the intransigence of the Transvaal 
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provincial administration to construct suitable hospital facilities for both whites and blacks. 
Eskom was not permitted by law to operate the hospital because it was not a core part of its 
operations, but it agreed to contribute to its construction.61 Iscor and Eskom would share the 
estimated cost of R1.7-million. Eskom, however, agreed to finance its portion on condition 
that the provincial administration assumed responsibility for the operation of the hospital, 
preferably on a lease agreement so that Eskom could gradually recover its capital 
expenditure.62  
Development of Marapong 
During the construction of the Matimba power station, Eskom’s executive management had 
begun to consider the possibility of encouraging mixed-race neighbourhoods in the vicinity of 
its power stations. In 1980 a memorandum written by its personnel manager described as 
urgent the need to provide housing for married African workers.63 While it carried cost 
implications for Eskom, he thought that the costs could be offset by a “stable and content” 
workforce. He also emphasised the importance of Eskom’s decision to review its housing 
policy in view of the recommendations of the Riekert Commission of Inquiry of 1979. 
According to the memorandum: 
 Aspects which have an impact on the current situation are Eskom’s policy of 
elimination of racial discrimination and the recommendations of the Riekert Commission 
of Inquiry, which, inter alia, provides for the greater mobility of the black labour force 
on the condition that the worker has employment and suitable accommodation.64  
The Riekert Commission encouraged the development of permanent African residential 
neighbourhoods in urban areas and the development of an African middle class. Critics of 
the Riekert Commission’s recommendations argued that it created a fenced-off minority 
of prosperous Africans in nominally white urban areas. Sheena Duncan, writing in the 
South African Labour Bulletin, argued that this group would effectively function as a 
“buffer” against unrest from the impoverished residents of the homelands.65 The 
Commission’s recommendations, which animated Eskom’s policy of racial transformation 
61 Minutes of meeting of Electricity Supply Commission, July 7, 1981; Eskom Corporate Archives, Microfilms  
62 Minutes of meeting of Electricity Supply Commission, July 14, 1981; Eskom Corporate Archives, Microfilms 
63 From Personnel Manager to the Senior General Manager, Eskom housing for non-white employees, September 
24, 1980; Eskom Corporate Archives, Microfilms.  
64 ibid. 
65The Recommendations of the Riekert Commission are Tabled, South African History Online, 
http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/recommendations-riekert-commission-investigate-employment-
conditions-black-workers-are-t, accessed November 12, 2016.   
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contained echoes of the “stabilisation” policy Fred Cooper has described.  British colonial 
officials encouraged “stabilisation” in response to waves of worker unrest that swept 
across the major commercial centres of their colonies during the 1930s. Cooper describes 
“stabilisation” as essentially a system of “separation”66 serving to distinguish between the 
rural poor and the urbanised African working class. 
In Ellisras, the Matimba power station manager estimated that 1 100 permanent black 
workers were required to service the power station when it came into operation and 5 000 
temporary workers during the construction period.67 Matimba’s white workforce amounted to 
600 families that were to be housed in Onverwacht alongside Iscor’s white labour contingent. 
But a different housing situation prevailed for African workers, who by government 
regulation were not allowed to reside in family quarters. In accordance with the prevailing 
migrant labour system, only single males were accommodated in the Ellisras district while 
their families remained in the homeland. During the construction of the Matimba power 
station, the law stipulated that only 3% of married blacks could be housed in the region of the 
power station. The main black township, Mokerong, which was situated 50 kilometres away 
from Ellisras within the borders of the Lebowa homeland, made daily transport to and from 
the town economically unfeasible. Eskom argued for the need to instate a black township 
because it expected to employ 1200 black workers by the year 1991. 68 By the dictates of then 
current legislation, the power station could only accommodate 20 workers on a family basis 
in the vicinity of the Matimba power station. Stelloop, the settlement where the victims of 
forced removals had been relocated, was an impractical location. It was 120 kilometres away 
from Ellisras which meant there were high transport costs. In addition, the paucity of 
infrastructure at Stelloop made it an unappealing site for the continued accommodation of its 
workforce.  
Iscor was at first reluctant to support Eskom’s bid to establish a black township. JP Deetleefs, 
Iscor’s general manager of open cast mines objected on the grounds that the proclamation of 
a black township was not in the immediate interests of the coal mine. He also stated that Iscor 
was not willing to break the government legislation on housing segregation.69 In addition, 
66 Cooper, Africa since 1940, 34. 
67 From JGG Strydom to die Sekrataris, Ellisras Distrikontwikkelingsvereniging, November 20, 1986; NASA, 
RLA 745 20/5/E36/1.  
68ibid..  
69 From JP Deetleefs to Mynbestuurder, Grootgeluk Steenkoolmyn, September 4, 1986; NASA, RLA 745 
20/5/E36/1.  
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Iscor would have to carry a significant portion of the capital costs for family housing when, 
Deetleefs argued, Iscor owned enough houses, property and facilities to service its own 
labour force. Importantly, the development of a black township defied the sentiment of the 
townsfolk and risked alienating influential white members of the Ellisras town. Nonetheless 
Iscor eventually acquiesced and agreed to jointly fund the development of the black township 
with Eskom. Together they sought the consent of the chief stakeholders in Ellisras. Eskom 
owned two farms at that stage, which it had purchased earlier in the event that it had to 
construct a second power station in the region. Since these plans had not materialised, Eskom 
could situate the township on the property. The availability of land was convenient because 
there was no need to incorporate land ordinarily intended for agricultural use. One option 
which Eskom considered was to situate the township on a plot at the southern side of Ellisras, 
thereby bypassing the current site of the Marapong township, which was then an informal 
township. This option entailed significant extra costs because the site would have to be 
developed as a township from scratch. Eskom’s engineers worried that the site of the 
Marapong township was directly behind the Matimba power station, posing a security risk to 
the power station. In addition the township was situated at the northern side of Ellisras and 
was thus closer to the Botswana border. In discussions over the location of the black 
township, Colonel Vorster, the Head of Security, mandated that the township be placed two 
kilometres away from the power station, and that the security guards who would be placed to 
provide an air of intimidation should not be themselves housed in the township.  
Local residents however protested the creation of a black township in Ellisras. On 18 
September 1987, community newspaper Die Kwevoel detailed the conflict between the 
various constituencies of Ellisras.70 The main body representing famers in the district, the 
Distrik Landbou Unie (DLU) or the District Agricultural Union, had begun a petition that 
was signed by its own members and various town residents that were against the development 
of the township. The DLU expressed its concerns over the availability of water in Ellisras to 
service the needs of the township dwellers. It also argued that land consolidation in the 
homelands was enacted in part to prevent the need for a black township in Ellisras.71 Half the 
town’s registered voters had signed the petition that was due to be handed to the Minister of 
Agriculture. While the HNP and KP had already voiced their protest the DLU was 
particularly proud that their petition represented the voices of residents across political party 
70‘Ellisras Kommentaar’, Die Kwevoel, September 18, 1987; NASA, CDB 2138 PB3/13/2/152. 
71From WA Lewis, Secretary of the Distrik Landbou, Memorandum insake swartdorp te Ellisras, (undated); 
NASA, RLA 745 20/5/E36/1. 
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lines. Dr AB Treurnicht, the Waterberg representative in parliament also set out his clear 
opposition to the project in a memorandum to government.72  Finally, the Mogol 
Kommando73, which was the decades-old quasi-military body staffed by white residents of 
Ellisras, refuted the feasibility of a permanent black labour force. It argued that migrant 
labour was a commonly-used labour system across the world. Creating a permanent black 
population in white urban areas would only worsen the labour shortages in rural districts by 
improving the mobility of African labour. They argued that efforts at reform should focus on 
improving the bus system from the various homelands to Ellisras.  
At the time that the DLU submitted the petition, Iscor, Eskom, the town council and the two 
Chambers of Commerce in Ellisras had already agreed in principle to proceed with the black 
township. Eventually President FW de Klerk granted approval in 1987. He wrote to Chris 
Heunis, the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning that after thorough 
consultation between members of parliament and his office, they came to a unanimous 
decision to approve the creation of the black township. Thus following special permission 
from the President, Eskom and Iscor proceeded with its development.74  
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated the relative cohesion of engineering forces during the period 
of high apartheid. As discussed in Chapter One, underlying Eskom’s power station 
construction spree was a desperate drive by parastatals to achieve national economic self-
sufficiency. Eskom’s engineers were concerned to promote the country’s national self-
sufficiency and they resisted a complete submission to the orbit of global technological 
expertise. In this context of desperation, Eskom’s engineers leapt over the hurdles that would 
otherwise have scuppered the construction of the Matimba power station. These hurdles 
included the definitive opposition from the Air Pollution Officer, concerned over the high 
levels of acid rain in the Eastern Transvaal, and the water-scarce conditions of the Waterberg 
where the power station was relocated. The environmental constraints of the Waterberg 
compelled Eskom to adopt risky technological systems in its power station design. Risk and 
uncertainty were however offset by a favourable global market for power station and 
development and by a remarkable degree of coordination among key suppliers of the South 
African construction industry. As such, Eskom functioned as a parallel but autonomous body 
72From AB Treurnicht to Minister JC Heunis, December 4, 1987; NASA, RLA 745 20/5/E36/1.  
73Mogol Kommando, Memorandum: Voorgestelde swartdorp in die Marapong area (undated); NASA, RLA 
745 20/5/E36/1. 
74From FW de Klerk to Minister JC Heunis, July 15, 1987; NASA, RLA 745 20/5/E36/1. 
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of government. This was reflected in its bid to develop an African township in Ellisras in 
defiance of the majority of the white townsfolk and of segregationist residential legislation 
current at the time.  
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 Chapter 4: Privatisation and Democratisation  
Introduction 
This chapter describes the changing nature of the parastatals in the 1990s; an era in which the 
twin prerogatives of economic liberalisation and democratisation loomed large. The most 
obvious portents of “neo-liberalism” were the increasing power of “commercial” reformers, 
and the serious attention that government paid to parastatal privatisation. Once the 
construction of the Matimba power station ended in the late 1980s and it began electricity 
production, its managers faced the pressure of maintaining the equipment in a cost-efficient 
manner. In this context, technological innovation was a manner of achieving greater technical 
efficiency and attaining improved output through the least cost possible.  Eskom was also 
concerned with the imperatives of racial integration driven by its executive management, at 
Megawatt Park and across its fleet of power stations.  
 During the late 1980s the impetus for privatisation arose from the apartheid government’s 
severely straitened finances. Lacking a deep ideological commitment to the privatisation of 
the parastatals, the government prioritised operational efficiency over an actual transfer of 
ownership. Privatisation during this period was a curious process, driven primarily by 
domestic influences, rather than foreign imposition. It also coincided with an ethic of 
commercial efficiency embedded within the reformed, verligte Afrikaner nationalist 
movement. This was in stark contrast to the period of privatisation during the late 1990s 
under the presidency of Thabo Mbeki. During the later period, the government demonstrated 
an ideological commitment to the principle of privatisation and the privatisation of Eskom in 
particular. The main question then became of the transition from the nationalised system of 
state provided infrastructure to a privatised one purely based on a user-pay principle. But this 
proved unworkable in the context of the post-apartheid state’s developmental priorities in 
which low cost electricity had to be provided to poor households. Thus the network remained 
intact albeit through having absorbed the prerogatives of cost-cutting and of racial 
transformation into its inner workings.1  
1 M. Anne Pitcher, Transforming Mozambique: The Politics of Privatization, 1975-2000, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 5. Anne Pitcher has similarly highlighted the manner in which domestic 
agents negotiated the terms of privatisation in Mozambique during the 1980s so that it became an essentially 
political process. 
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Patrick Bond argues that the political transition of 1994 saw an actual transition in economic 
and political elites through the modalities of the neo-liberal economy.2 But rather than being 
a purely macro-economic change, I highlight the way in which neo-liberal principles affected 
the modus operandi of the Matimba power station and of Eskom. The transition had a deep-
reaching operational impact on organisations such as Eskom. The previous chapter described 
Eskom’s engineers heightened appetite for risk taking that ultimately enabled the 
construction of the Matimba power station with its peculiar structural features. But a heavy 
capital investment accompanied this ethic of courageous decision making, and by the mid-
1980s Eskom confronted a hostile public concerned that the investment had been excessive 
and unnecessary. Public distress was bolstered by the fact that Eskom charged higher 
electricity tariffs to fund the capital expenditure. This compelled Eskom to demonstrate a 
commitment to organisational reform in a manner that would improve its cost efficiency. 
Thus the respected position the network had held for decades before, elevated for its role as 
the bearer of modernisation, changed as the pressures for public accountability grew. While 
complete privatisation never occurred, Eskom’s engineers worked to absorb the prerogatives 
of social development and political inclusivity into the normal operations of the network. As 
part of its promise for reform, and having avoided outright privatisation, Eskom adopted a 
more commercial, business-oriented stance. At the Matimba power station, this change came 
in 1992 with the appointment of a new power station manager, Clive le Roux. He was tasked 
with implementing a decentralised cost-revenue balance sheet model and overseeing racial 
transformation at the power station.  
This period initiated the beginning of a neo-liberal governmental style at the power station in 
the sense described by Michel Foucault.3 He suggests that the neo-liberal era encouraged 
greater instances of judicial interventions and processes of litigation because of its emphasis 
on competition and the multiplication of corporations.4 Matimba experienced extended 
litigation processes during the 1990s. As part of its commercial reform, Eskom encouraged 
its power stations to curb their spending. This had a particular bearing on the repair and 
maintenance of power station equipment. Uncertainty over the causes of technical failure led 
to uncertainty over whether Eskom or the contractor would bear the cost of the repair. These 
were matters for the courts to resolve. In the following chapter I discuss the gradual erosion 
of the system of paternalism and dependency that underpinned labour relations at the power 
2 Patrick Bond, Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neo-Liberalism in South Africa, (Pluto Press, 2001)  
3 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics. 
4 ibid, 176. 
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station. It was replaced by the principles of the free market, premised on the idea of the 
subject as a consumer. 
Debt Crisis of 1985 
The concerted attention to privatisation occurred in the context of the debt crisis that hit 
South Africa in 1985. The decade as a whole had seen a sea change in the nature of foreign 
loans to the country. Startled by the 1976 Soweto uprising, international creditors had 
curtailed their loans but a gold price boom between 1978 and 1980 brought in sufficient 
foreign exchange earnings to tide the country over and allow it to continue purchasing oil and 
arms. When the gold price fell, causing a drastic decline in export earnings, short-term loans 
financed imports between 1981 and 1982.5 The diminished generosity of foreign creditors 
made a world of difference to the nature of capital investment in South Africa. While the 
abundance of foreign long-term loans in the 1970s had encouraged infrastructural and 
technological investment, the short-term loans of the 1980s were more suited to fund 
operations in a patchwork manner and served largely to plug the hole in the country’s 
growing balance of payments deficit.6  
But the downturn in investor confidence and generosity did not discourage South African 
corporations from seeking foreign loans. From late 1981 members of the South African 
public and private sector went on what Vishnu Padayachee terms “an orgy of borrowing from 
private international banks directly and from the international capital market via bond 
issues”7. While South Africa’s credit rating had since improved following the 1976 Soweto 
uprising, banks in the United States began to watch the country nervously from 1984 as mass 
unrest in South Africa gathered force. This frenzy of borrowing and then renewed uncertainty 
led to the debt crisis of 1985. On 1 August of that year, the New York-based Chase 
Manhattan Bank placed a moratorium on all further credit extension to South Africa. Its 
decision precipitated the cessation of loans from other US-based banks. The South African 
government responded to the show of no-confidence by declaring its inability to repay its 
outstanding debts until March 1986. While the withdrawal of funds from US banks had a 
significant impact, South Africa also relied heavily on the loans of a cluster of West German 
and Swiss banks. By 1985, even these once reliable funders had isolated South Africa. Eskom 
was not immune to the debt crisis. In July 1985, it confronted a crushing lack of foreign 
5 Padayachee, V ‘International Financial Relations’ in Gelb, South Africa’s Economic Crisis, 101. 
6 ibid.. 
7 Vishnu Padayachee, “Private International Banks, the Debt Crisis and the Apartheid State, 1982-1985,” 
African Affairs 87, no. 348 (July 1, 1988): 363. 
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investor enthusiasm for a bond issue. This was in stark contrast with the unruffled investor 
confidence it had enjoyed only a year earlier.  During 1984 Eskom, in the midst of its power 
station building spree, had become the country’s largest borrower of medium-term funds. In 
1984 it secured a R50-million loan without the guarantee of the South African government, a 
rare achievement for its time.8  
While the financial crisis provided the incentive for parastatal privatisation, privatisation was 
not an inevitable outcome. Ben Fine has described the debt crisis of 1985 as the beginning of 
the end for state owned corporations. The sale of state assets would enable the apartheid 
government to rescue itself from imminent ruin by allowing it some liquidity to continue its 
strategic expenditure. Fine describes the process of privatisation as one of “selling-off the 
family silver in order to finance the funding of the apartheid regime.”9 While it is 
undoubtedly true that the financing crisis prompted the government to pay attention to the 
commercial efficiency of the parastatals, privatisation was not the inevitable outcome of the 
reform process. Fine’s description of the turn to privatisation as essentially an austerity 
measure, driven by desperate, utilitarian motives, does not adequately account for the long 
years of debate and hesitation on the question of privatisation in government circles. Records 
of parliamentary debates demonstrate that it was a careful, measured process. Politicians 
debated the need for privatisation in parliament with remarkable regularity over five years, 
from 1987 to 1992. Parliamentary debates do not reveal a desperate urgency for privatisation. 
Negotiations and investigations over privatisation continued until 1992 when South Africa 
was largely out of the red. If nothing else, the urgency associated with “selling off the family 
assets” would have necessitated a speedier resolution.  
While the drying up of foreign loans created a context of crisis that was most conducive to 
fundamental reform, Fine does not describe the actual link between crisis and reform. In 
many other African counties for instance, austerity measures were part of the World Bank’s 
loan conditionality leading to its controversial structural adjustment policy. There is little to 
suggest that the World Bank played a similar role in South Africa.10 It is also not clear that 
the government was compelled to adopt privatisation measures to appease their foreign 
creditors. Most accounts of Western leaders’ interventions in South Africa during this period 
describe their abhorrence for apartheid and pressure on the NP to institute democratic 
8 ibid, 367. 
9 Ben Fine, “Privatisation and the RDP: A critical assessment,” Transformation, no. 27 (1995): 9.  
10Anton Eberhard, “From State to Market and Back Again: South Africa’s Power Sector Reforms,” Economic 
and Political Weekly 40, no. 50 (December 10, 2005): 5309–17. 
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reforms. While Margaret Thatcher promoted privatisation in the United Kingdom, it is not 
clear that she imposed the concept on the South African government. She had come to be a 
reliable, though often chiding international ally for the NP, and held off imposing sanctions 
against South Africa for as long as she could.11  If Thatcher encouraged greater private sector 
involvement in the economy, it is clear that she left the details of this process up to the South 
African government.  
In 1987, the government released its White Paper on Privatisation and Deregulation12 which 
criticised the high levels of public spending in the South African economy over the preceding 
decades. Public spending had substantially increased since 1975 to constitute the bulk of 
national spending.13 Much of this government spending had funded its reformist initiatives, 
such as increasing services to black townships and encouraging industrial decentralisation. 
The underlying rationale of privatisation was to correct this imbalance and allow the 
commercial restructuring of the state corporations. In May 1990, The Minister of Public 
Enterprises announced in parliament that the government was not concerned with the 
privatisation of state-owned parastatals as an end in itself. Rather, he emphasised the 
managerial efficiency that would flow from “commercialisation” as opposed to the transfer of 
ownership. He announced that: “The full benefit of these advantages such as greater 
efficiencies in the market and new entrepreneurial opportunities – will flow from the broad 
commercialisation process and not necessarily from the event of transfer of ownership 
alone."14 Thus privatisation was not the only response to the financial crisis of the late 1980s. 
The South African government was concerned to resolve its revenue dilemma and it was 
prepared to do so through means other than the sale of state assets where this was possible.  
Wim de Villiers and Commercial Reform  
Rather than a foreign imposition, it is useful to consider the domestic roots of the turn to 
commercial restructuring and privatisation. Reining in the parastatals reflected a turn in the 
nature of Afrikaner nationalism, which had by that stage embraced the principles of 
capitalism and the free market. The Nationalist Party embodied this ethic in a split in which 
its core ridded itself of the verkrampte Afrikaner elements then calling for a return to the 
11Dan O’Meara, Forty Lost Years: The Apartheid State and the Politics of the National Party, 1948-1994 
(Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1996), 399. O’Meara writes that Thatcher warned FW de Klerk that “she would 
not be able to sustain her anti-sanctions stance forever.” 
12“White Paper on Privatisation and Deregulation in the Republic of South Africa” (Government Printer, South 
Africa, 1987). 
13ibid, 4. 
14Hansard,  May 10, 1990, col 8623.  
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unity and communitarianism of the Afrikaners (volkseenheid). Fitting in with the 
international pattern, the parastatals – Iscor and Eskom in particular - confronted a hostile 
public that was concerned about excessive expenditure. Electricity consumers felt the effect 
of higher tariffs during the 1980s to fund Eskom’s power station construction spree. As 
Grove Steyn writes, “For as long as the drive of Eskom engineers to build ever larger power 
plants financed by cheap loans, was successful in reaping economies of scale, and this 
coincided with an insatiable demand for power in the economy, the system worked. When 
financing constraints threatened this trajectory in the early 1970s Eskom was successful in 
getting its governing statutes changed to allow it to build up internal reserves in the Capital 
Development Fund.”15  
To look into the feasibility and practicalities of privatisation the government created a 
Ministerial Committee for Privatisation and Deregulation, headed by a critic of the state 
corporation model, Wim de Villiers. Having long proclaimed his disdain for the low-wage 
paternalist system which dominated the South African economy of the twentieth century, he 
was particularly critical of the global post-war Keynesian ideology that informed the creation 
of the parastatals. In an interview with the Business Day, he described what he considered the 
peculiar structural foundation of the parastatals: “A strange sort of organisation has 
emerged,” he said. “It is a functional organisation that does not divide into business units, 
demands no profits and delegates no powers. Its blind concentration on function has led its 
management to spend freely on the most technically advanced equipment, irrespective of the 
capital cost or the resultant output.”16  
An engineer by training, de Williers served as manager of Anglo-American’s Rokahana 
copper mine in Zambia during the 1950s. He returned to South Africa in 1961 and 
subsequently became renowned for his role as the chief executive of General Mining Union 
Corporation (Gencor) during the 1970s and credited with its transformation into a centrepiece 
for Afrikaner large-scale capitalism and commercial efficiency.17 He also served as the 
director of the defence equipment manufacturing corporation Atlas where he was reputedly 
successful in “reinforcing realistic manufacturing capabilities there.”18 On the back of his 
15Grove Steyn, “Governance, Finance and Investment : Decision Making and Risk in the Electric Power Sector.” 
(Ph.D thesis, University of Sussex, 2001), 96. 
16“De Villiers Wants to Make Capital Work,” Business Day, March 14, 1989.  
17“The Man from Gencor,” Rand Daily Mail, June 17, 1982.  
18“De Villiers Wants to Make Capital Work.” 
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proven record of commercial restructuring, de Villiers was charged with improving the 
efficiency and profitability of the parastatals.  
In the report of the commission of inquiry released on 25 May 1988, de Villiers detailed his 
views on the privatisation of Eskom, the South African transport services, and the Post and 
Telecommunication Services.19 He was above all concerned to prevent “natural monopolies”. 
A distinguishing feature of a natural monopoly is its exceptional reliance on technological 
prowess. The requisite capital intensive investment and economies of scale is so high as to 
bar entry to new arrivals. De Villiers warned that a privatised parastatal could continue to 
dominate the market and thus constitute a private monopoly. One of his main criteria for the 
advisability of privatisation was the potential for competition in the sector in which the 
parastatals were to be privatised. Because of the parastatals’ decades-long dominance of their 
respective sectors, and accumulation of capital and expertise over the years, new competitors 
had little chance of survival. This view was not without its critics.  Frank Verhies, a lecturer 
in business economics at the University of the Witwatersrand opined in the Financial Times 
in November 1990 that: “Wim de Villiers is a big fan of ‘natural monopolies’. He used this 
hoary old myth last year to recommend against allowing competition for the telephone 
network. So we’re stuck with bad service, scratchy lines and outrageously high overseas 
charges.”20 Verhies argued that it is impossible to pre-determine whether or not a privatised 
corporation would become a natural monopoly.  
De Villiers drew widely and exclusively on the British experience with privatisation as a 
basis for comparison. He argued that the South African energy market differed fundamentally 
from its British counterpart because there were no pre-existing electricity providers that could 
offer consumers an alternative to the national electricity utility. Eskom was thus likely to 
constitute a natural monopoly once it was privatised. The fact that the electricity network was 
already established meant that any attempt at duplication by private investors would prove 
economically unfeasible. In 1989, he told the Business Day that: “In Britain we are looking at 
industries that used to compete but were subsequently nationalised. In this country we are 
looking at monopolies.”  
19Wim de Villiers, “Privatisation of Eskom, SA Vervoerdienste, Pos En Telekommunikasie,” May 25, 1988; 
NASA, MPP 2  1/3/1. 
20“Debunking the Eskom myth,” Financial Times, November 2, 1990.  
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White paper on Privatisation  
On the question of the reform of Eskom in particular, de Villiers’ report was published in 
1984.21 His recommendations were implemented without any apparent opposition, although 
they were not dramatic enough to arouse any real indignation. He recommended not the 
privatisation of Eskom, but the creation of a two-tiered management board to oversee 
Eskom’s commercial restructuring. De Villiers had concluded, during his time in Zambia, 
that Africa’s growth was constrained by a shortage of management skills and capacity. On 
further investigation, he came across an executive management model then operative in 
certain European companies, particularly West Germany, which adopted a two-tier 
management structure. One of the tiers allowed for a non-executive board and allowed for the 
direct consultation of “consumer-interest directors.”22 De Villiers’ report also argued that 
Eskom’s use of econometric load forecasting models was to blame for its failure to predict 
the country’s electricity demand accurately. But this is not an entirely fair diagnosis. Eskom’s 
management used to regularly re-assess its load forecast and did not solely rely on an 
econometric load forecasting model. As discussed in more detail in the previous chapter, one 
of the key obstacles to gaining certainty around the projected load demand was the uncertain 
prospects of the country’s gold mines, which as a sector constituted Eskom’s largest 
customer.  
In May 1990 the Minister of Public Enterprises announced in parliament that while the 
privatisation of Eskom was still under review, the government was not at that stage 
convinced of its necessity. He praised the improved efficiency wrought by Eskom’s reform 
efforts. This was brought about by placing Eskom under a “strong policy forming and 
supervisory council” staffed with businessmen experienced in management.23 The Minister 
described the valuable role that Eskom played in bringing together the warring parties of 
Renamo and Frelimo in Mozambique. Eskom had also extended its electricity grid beyond 
into the neighbouring Southern African countries, making possible a network “which will 
stretch from the equator right down to the Cape.”24 Thus Eskom avoided outright 
privatisation because the benefits of remaining a state corporation had overcome the benefits 
of privatisation. Government valued its techno-political role too seriously to sanction its 
organisational dissociation. Eskom had also improved its financial fortunes, largely through 
21Villiers, “Report of the Commission of Inquiry Into the Supply of Electricity in the Republic of South Africa.” 
22“De Villiers Wants to Make Capital Work.” 
23Hansard, Assembly debates, 10 May 1990, col 8626.  
24ibid, col 8685 
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its reduced capital expenditure in the late 1980s. This lack of capital investment continued 
into the ensuing decade and in the period 1992-1997 Eskom’s revenue exceeded its capital 
requirements.25 Anton Eberhard argues that the absence of large-scale capital investment 
during this period allowed Eskom to stabilise its debt burden. Lower electricity tariffs he 
suggests were more a product of the lack of large capital investment than greater operational 
efficiency.26  
The debate over the privatisation of Eskom faded into the background thereafter, with no 
definitive pronouncement on its final fate. Wim de Villiers passed away in 1990 leaving an 
organisational lacuna. By 1992 Eskom had suitably demonstrated its commitment to 
organisational restructuring and preventing increases in electricity tariffs, which assisted the 
embattled government with its efforts at inflation reduction.27 While the expected inflation 
rate for 1992 was 14%, Eskom announced a lower increase in electricity prices of 9%. Thus 
Eskom managed to quell the hostile public sentiment targeted at high electricity tariffs. The 
impending political transition of the early 1990s influenced the outcome of the privatisation 
efforts. Eberhard has provided another explanation for the government’s eventual reluctance 
to privatise Eskom. Following PW Botha’s exit from office in 1989, FW de Klerk began 
negotiations with the ANC in exile, which took the question of privatising Eskom off the 
table.28 Newspaper reports from the period expressed the view that Eskom’s privatisation 
would be viewed as an act of bad faith during political negotiations with the ANC and 
Cosatu, both of which called for Eskom to remain in public hands.29 If the latter was the true 
determinant of the decision not to privatise then this would mean that timing played an 
important role in the decision. Eskom thus escaped privatisation because government had not 
come to a decision on its fate by the early 1990s.  
On the other hand, Iscor was wholly privatised. It is difficult to glean the exact reason for the 
privatisation of Iscor from debates in parliament and from the various reports of de Villiers’ 
investigations into its feasibility. Nonetheless, it was privatised in the late 1980s and its 
shares were made public on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Unbundling functioned partly 
25Grove Steyn, Investment and Uncertainty: Historical experience with power sector investment in South Africa 
and its implications for current challenges, March 15, 2006, Working Paper prepared for the Management 
Programme in Infrastructure Reform and Regulation at the Graduate School of Business, University of Cape 
Town, 41. 
26Eberhard, “The Political Economy of Power Sector Reform in South Africa,” 16. 
27Hansard, May 6, 1992, col 6328 
28Eberhard, “The Political Economy of Power Sector Reform in South Africa,” 8. 
29Drew Forrest, “SA Unions Set for Big Battle with Privatisation,” The Star, March 29, 1990. 
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as a mechanism to release value, by separating the loss-making steel manufacturing plants 
from the more profitable mining operations. In Ellisras while the Grootgeluk coal mine fell 
under the management of private corporations, first Kumba and then Exxaro Resources, the 
effect of privatisation on the normal operational functioning of the coal mine is not 
immediately apparent. The Grootgeluk coal mine continued to invest in housing and social 
amenities for its workers even after it fell into private hands.30 The privatisation of Iscor was 
undoubtedly more complex than stated above. However, this thesis focuses mainly on the 
transformation of Eskom and the Matimba power station and does not detail the 
transformation of Iscor in more depth. 
The Privatisation Debate of the 1990s 
The question of privatising Eskom fell under the spotlight again during the presidency of 
Thabo Mbeki, who succeeded Nelson Mandela as President of the country in 1999. This 
period is associated with the ANC’s abrupt turn from its Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP) as long-term policy for economic development to its Employment and 
Redistribution (Gear), heralding what is widely considered to be the ruling party’s neo-liberal 
embrace.31 In contrast to the  concerns of commercial inefficiency that drove the privatisation 
process of the late 1980s, this resurgent attention to privatisation emanated from a small 
group of technocrats within Cabinet who were influenced by neo-liberal ideologues. These 
advocates of privatisation, as Anton Eberhard writes, were “observing international trends in 
power sector reform, and were beginning to be concerned with the potential problems of 
monopoly power.”32 They also encouraged economic liberalisation to open space for the 
entrance of emergent businessmen.  
While the decision over whether or not to privatise Eskom was pending, government 
discouraged the utility from any further capital investment in generating new electricity 
capacity. This decision was primarily to blame for Eskom’s supply crisis a decade later.33 In 
2007 Mbeki apologised for the country’s electricity supply crisis and the consequent load 
shedding at an ANC fundraising dinner in Bloemfontein, declaring that “Eskom was right and 
government was wrong.”34 The government had been occupied with diluting Eskom’s 
monopoly control of the energy market. In 1998 the government released its white paper on 
30Interview with Joe Meyer, March 17, 2015, Onverwacht. 
31Patrick Bond, Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neoliberalism in South Africa (London: Pluto Press, 2000). 
32Eberhard, “From State to Market and Back Again,” 5314. 
33William Mervin Gumede, Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC (Zebra, 2007), 119. 
34“Mbeki Apologises for SA Power Cuts,” Independent Online, December 12, 2007.  
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the supply of electricity in the country,35 which argued that a departure from the supply-
heavy preoccupation of past energy policy was needed. It emphasised the importance of 
focusing on the demand side aspects of the energy in the country in a bid to follow the 
international pattern of increased competition and commercialisation.36 Apart from the need 
to dilute monopoly control, the White Paper was also concerned with reviewing the country’s 
energy policy to better fit the dictates of governance in a democratic society. The authors of 
the White Paper noted that democracy meant that the demands of a large number of 
stakeholders had come to the fore, and these warranted inclusion. In part this meant gearing 
electricity supply to more effectively service the majority of households in the country, 
especially poor households, and away from its traditional focus on the mines and heavy 
industry.  
Following the government’s turn to privatisation, certain senior managers at Eskom were 
tasked with investigating the viability of an entirely privatised Eskom.37 Clive le Roux, an 
employee of Eskom who had served as the Power Station Manager at Matimba in the early 
1990s was part of a team that investigated the then current European Union (EU) rules on 
competitive industries. Le Roux had visited Germany in the immediate aftermath of the 
Berlin Wall. He described the stark difference between East and West Berlin:  
I was privileged to move from West Germany to East Germany one week on a visit ... 
And it was the October just before Christmas so they’d put up all the Christmas 
decorations in West Berlin – everything was green, gold and red. All the windows were 
bright sparkly, shiny colours of green and red for Christmas and it was bright tinsels and 
excesses. Germany was very rich then. And I went to visit an East German plant so I 
crossed over the Brandenburg gate under those Prussian guards, and as I crossed the gate 
it was like walking over a line on the earth where there were forests and greenery and 
birds singing and suddenly there was death and broken tree stumps and grey –no colour. 
And as you crossed over there was nothing in any shop window, no decorations, nothing 
other than old concrete colour with black marks on it from not having being cleaned and 
having that pollution on it. 
35“White Paper on the Energy Policy of the Republic of South Africa.” Pretoria: Department of Minerals and 
Energy, December 1998.” (Pretoria: Department of Minerals and Energy, December 1998). 
36ibid, 7. 
37Interview with Clive le Roux, February 18, 2015, Megawatt Park, Gauteng. 
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These commercial prescriptions dictated that a market was deemed competitive on the basis 
of the market share held by each corporate entity within it. The more entities there were, the 
lower the market share of each, and the more competitive was the market in its entirety. The 
team discovered that for a privatised Eskom to conform to these requirements it had to 
fragment its various functions and split into seven different business entities, each of which 
would constitute a company in itself.  This effort to create a viable privatised electricity 
sector was ultimately unsuccessful, largely because no investor was willing to buy the utility, 
or at least portions of it, and then produce electricity at the low tariffs required to hasten mass 
electrification of households in the country. According to le Roux: “The price was too low, 
nobody would buy them and the whole thing was scrapped.”38  
In August 2001 the government passed the Eskom Conversion Bill which ensured that Eskom 
fell under the provisions of the Companies Act of 1973.39 This transformed Eskom into a 
public company with share capital that was wholly held by the state. Cosatu had voiced its 
objection to the Conversion Act, arguing that it paved the way for the privatisation of Eskom. 
In his submissions to the Parliamentary Monitoring Group against the passage of the Eskom 
conversion Bill, Cosatu’s assistant general secretary argued that privatisation would increase 
the costs of electricity and that “it was Cosatu's great concern that the question of 
electrification should remain in the hands of the electorate and be governed by it.”40  Eskom 
was not taken further down the road to privatisation thereafter. Eberhard has suggested that 
the failure to implement effective liberalisation was in part due to the fact that there was 
never any strong political will to unbundle Eskom and proceed with actual privatisation and 
that the initial impetus was provided by a small group of analysts.41 In addition, strong 
resistance to the idea came from Cosatu, a member of the governing tripartite alliance, which 
vehemently resisted the removal of Eskom from public hands.   
Matimba 
Commercialised Power Station Structures 
The 1990s and the arrival of Clive le Roux signalled a new era for the Matimba power 
station. As the new power station manager he arrived with a mandate from Eskom’s head of 
generation to bring Matimba in line with a commercial model that had been introduced 
38 ibid. 
39 Eskom Conversion Act [No 13 of 2001], Government Gazette, August 3, 2001. 
40 Parliamentary Monitoring Group, “Eskom Conversion Bill: Cosatu Input; Department Briefing on Additional 
Amendments,” June 12, 2001, https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/596/. 
41 Eberhard, “From State to Market and Back Again.” 
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everywhere else in Eskom. Eskom’s executive management ingested the de Villiers’ 
Commissions’ recommendations for commercialisation, and put in place mechanisms to 
ensure cost saving and production efficiency. In 1985 John Maree replaced Jan Smith as the 
Chairman of Eskom. In a break from the traditional qualifications of Eskom’s chairmen, 
Maree was not an engineer by training but held a degree in Commerce from the University of 
the Witwatersrand. As le Roux argues, Eskom changed from an “engineering organisation” to 
a “business”.42 
As part of its renewed commercial orientation, Eskom introduced a decentralised cost-
revenue accounting method across its power stations. In line with this model, power stations 
were treated as business units and had to report their annual costs and revenue. Revenue was 
calculated on the basis of the volume of electricity sold multiplied by the price of transfer. 
The model was an attractive cost-saver because it allowed the power station manager to zero 
in on the sites of wastage and Le Roux appreciated the cost control it allowed. By contrast, a 
centralised budget sheet, where Eskom’s head office paid all the costs, encouraged excessive 
spending. In the particular case of equipment maintenance and repair, he said: “…The 
centralists didn’t know how to control it because they don’t make the decision on whether to 
fix, repair or buy a new part when something fails. The first line supervisor makes those 
decisions, the technician, and if he doesn’t have a business focus, his job is easier if he just 
replaces it and throws away the one that’s got a little scratch on it. But if he has an account on 
the budget and a financial result and his performance contract depends on it and his bonus 
depends on it he will consider twice whether he can’t just fix that part rather than throw it 
away or if he can’t just buy a new part. Now he doesn’t care –he just buys a new part –who 
cares?”43 As such the commercially-oriented model cast a new light on the nature of 
maintenance at the power station.  
Contractors and Technical Faults 
Le Roux was appointed by senior managers at Eskom’s head office in Megawatt Park with a 
directive to correct mechanical faults that were impeding the power stations’ productivity. 
While Matimba was one of the newest power stations in Eskom’s fleet, utilising cutting-edge 
technology for its time, its actual performance was below par, and senior managers at Eskom 
thought that the contractors required tougher management. Together with Matimba’s head of 
engineering, le Roux oversaw the replacement of various failing components of the power 
42 Interview with Clive le Roux, February 18, 2015, Megawatt Park, Gauteng. 
43 ibid. 
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station. This often involved halting the power station’s operations by taking the plant offline 
so that the necessary repairs could be made. In some cases, where serious and costly repair 
were required, the contractors dug in their heels on accepting responsibility, instead 
forwarding competing interpretations of the reasons for technical failure. Following years of 
litigation, le Roux concluded that conflict with contractors almost always ended with both 
parties sharing the blame and carrying half of the cost of repair or replacement. This was 
because the cases rested on competing versions of expert analysis which was often beyond 
the courts’ ability to resolve on a strictly legal basis. 
The crackdown on the power station’s costs directly impacted on its technical functioning 
and the scope for risky decision narrowed considerably. Once the Matimba power station was 
operational, unpredicted technical failure came to the fore as the various components of the 
power station adjusted to their new operating environment. This meant that Eskom couldn’t 
easily shoulder the costs of repair. But neither would the contractors.  It was often difficult to 
determine the root causes of technical failure and thus to ascertain which party had to bear the 
blame. Despite investigations into technical breakdown there remained a substantial degree of 
indeterminacy which had to be negotiated by the interested parties. In the absence of a proper 
diagnosis of the technical fault, a necessary step towards repair, engineers from the 
contracting company and from Eskom alike often disagreed on the root problem of the 
technical failure.   
Boilers 
One of the most litigious conflicts related to a crack that surreptitiously appeared in the boiler 
exhaust ducts. The crack was large- an estimated six to seven meters long- in a massive pipe 
that was 60 metres in length. The chief problem lay in the nature of the economiser. The 
economiser is a heat-saving mechanism installed in the boiler exhaust duct and extracts heat 
from the waste gases emitted during combustion processes in the boiler. The heat is extracted 
as the gases pass through the economiser and as much of it as possible is returned to the 
boiler. The material used for the exhaust duct was however limited in its application for high 
temperature. According to le Roux, the designers of the boiler placed the economiser at the 
bottom rather than at the top of the boiler exhaust duct. This different placement raised the 
temperature in the pipe to 410 degrees under normal operating conditions; a level that 
exceeded the pipe’s maximum design temperature of 390 degrees. One of the main reasons 
for the design fault was that the consortium had no experience in designing a boiler of the 
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size that Matimba required. 44 Thus the Matimba power station had to later absorb the 
pressures of the high risk-taking that characterized its construction period in the 1980s. 
The matter of the cracks in the boiler exhaust ducts had arisen years earlier. In 1991 an 
internal memorandum addressed to the manager of the Matimba power station, le Roux’s 
predecessor, stated that “No agreement could be reached between Eskom and the Consortium 
on the results of the tests performed on the Corten-HT material on unit four. Eskom’s 
standpoint is firm that the Corten-HT material on all six boilers will have to be replaced from 
the economiser upwards. This is disputed by the Consortium.” 45  
Corten-HT, otherwise known as “weathering steel” is a steel alloy designed to resist rust and 
erosion. It gained popularity in the United States during the 1930s when it was used in coal 
transporting railway wagons.46 According to an engineer who worked for the Sieva 
consortium at the time of construction, a chief problem was that the material has not been 
suitably handled at the time of installation. “They made it out of Corten and it cracked 
because Corten is a funny material. When you weld it you kind of have to stress relieve it.  
And because they didn’t do that they had lots of cracking and had to replace the ducting 
pretty early in the life of the boiler.”47  
During the subsequent stretches of litigation between Eskom and the contractor under le 
Roux’s tenure, the contractor disputed the need for a complete overhaul. It argued instead that 
the boiler exhaust ducts simply required regular repair work. As le Roux related, the 
contractor’s prescriptions would have significantly impeded the power station’s productivity 
and its consequent ability to contribute electricity to the national grid:   
And the contractor said they could prove that the cracks would grow to 20 metres before 
it falls and therefore all we have to do is take the boiler off every six months, check the 
cracks, what their size is, and when they get to 20 metres long then we shut down and we 
weld them up. And we said that’s not what we bought – we bought a machine that would 
run for two years at a time. We’re not taking it down, waiting for it to cool down for 
three days, then going in and doing inspections, and if the cracks are long then weld 
them up, and that’s three months later before we come back on. That’s not what we 
44 ibid. 
45 From P de W la Grange to Matimba Power station manager, Flue gas exhaust ducts, 6 June 1991; Matimba 
Power Station Document Centre, 4066123 
46 http://allsteelsculpture.com/history-of-corten-sculptures 
47 Interview (anonymous), Johannesburg Country Club, 25 June 2015. 
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signed up for. We signed up for a car that can actually run. So we disagreed. But they 
insisted that was the solution – it was a small change to the maintenance, and it was no 
problem. Well the courts couldn’t say whether it was or wasn’t a problem. We ended up 
paying 50% of that repair.48  
Improved Productivity 
In 1997 Matimba power station was awarded the National Productivity Award from the 
National Productivity Institute. In his initial submission for the award, le Roux detailed the 
changes he had overseen at the power station to raise its productivity in operational and 
financial terms. 49 The power station’s efficiency was demonstrated by the fact that it 
operated with relatively few disruptions to its activity. In 1996 it ran all 6 units for 80 days in 
one stretch, beating the world record for uninterrupted operation. Greater productivity at 
Matimba, he argued, translated into an 18% reduction in the cost of electricity production 
over the preceding five years. The additional 20% of power station availability on the 
national grid improved the fortunes of Eskom’s shareholders albeit in a hypothetical manner. 
This allowed for the “indefinite deferral of capital” otherwise required for a 767 MW power 
station, which was the capacity technically required to make up for the shortfall in electricity 
supply had Matimba not improved its availability. 
Changes made to the power station’s maintenance routine, which resulted in improved 
productivity, were a particular point of pride. The maintenance team had adopted a “proactive 
approach” to maintenance, which meant that safeguards were implemented to prevent 
technical failures.  This differed from the retroactive approach of previous practice where 
dysfunction was treated only after it had become apparent. The proactive approach meant that 
the power station improved its investigative capacity and developed an “occurrence 
investigation system to identify the root cause of incidents, and to propose actions to prevent 
re-occurrence.”50 Preventative mechanisms were implemented to include, for instance, 
placing protective shields on the boiler tubes to alleviate the effects of general wear and tear 
processes.  
At times the maintenance of core components of the power station meant that the power 
station had to be taken “offline” and cease production. But since it generated such large 
quantities of heat, the cooling down process was long and tedious. Part of its claim to 
48 Interview with Clive le Roux, February 18, 2015, Megawatt Park, Gauteng.  
49 “1997 National Productivity Awards”; Matimba Power Station Document Centre, 4075785. 
50 ibid. 
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improved efficiency in 1997 was that the power station had sped up its cooling down and 
starting up processes.51 Under normal operating conditions, the boiler pipes channelled a 
continuous stream of hot steam. An innovative forced cooling process, which involved cooler 
steam being forced into the boiler pipes, encouraged the optimisation of production. 
Matimba’s engineers boasted that they had successfully cooled down the power station in 18 
hours, a record time for all the power stations in Eskom’s fleet.52 As related by le Roux, a 
black novice power station engineer was responsible for developing the innovative process. 
The engineer will remain anonymous and will be referred to here as William.53 Le Roux 
recruited William to Matimba’s employ during the process of staff overhaul he initiated at the 
power station. While a qualified engineer, William had no prior experience of work at a 
power station. He had been previously employed as an assembly line manager at a Lever 
Brother’s toothpaste factory on the East Rand. As the only black engineer at the power station 
in a notoriously conservative section of the country, William found that his colleagues were 
unwilling to act as mentors. Le Roux first placed him to work at what was considered to be 
the simplest part of the power station. But there he encountered open hostility from the white 
employees rather than technical guidance. After he encountered the same hostility in different 
departments, and in response to his eventual exasperation, le Roux promoted him to the 
production manager of two generating units. For le Roux, this was a calculated risk because 
Matimba’s productivity had by that stage improved to allow some relaxation of the incessant 
drive for technical excellence. Taking advantage of William’s general intelligence as well as 
his technical naivety, le Roux set him on what was broadly considered an impossible 
technical feat. He described it as follows: 
In that time, the average time to repair the boiler when one of the tubes burst was 84 
hours ... So I said to William I want you to find a way to repair the boiler in 42 hours. 
Why? Because William didn’t know that it couldn’t be done. And I didn’t believe my 
guys that it couldn’t be done in less than 24. But I didn’t want William to do it in 82, I 
needed a real step change, that’s why I said half, in 42. William went out there, but it 
took a few months before he got his first tube leak on unit three. And he did the repair, 
and he did it in 47 or 48 hours. Now that was the record, it was the record by 20 hours. 
Fastest tube leak repair ever. Because he spent the next two months asking “stupid” 
questions: Why does it take you 35 hours to cool the boiler? And they said because the 
51 ibid. 
52 ibid. 
53 Interview with Clive le Roux, February 18, 2015, Megawatt Park, Gauteng. 
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air that we’re pushing through the boiler is hot and it takes a long time to cool a boiler 
down before we can go in to inspect where the tube is broken first. He said: Isn’t there a 
way to cool it down quicker? And they’d say: No, that’s just the way we do it. 
Conservativism.  And the more and more he asked questions, the more they were not 
giving him logical answers and because he was a very clever man, he found the illogic in 
their answers. So he questioned them further and further and further. And he found a 
way to do it quicker, to speed up different parts of the process.54  
Eventually William repaired the boiler in 18 hours, and the new methodology spread 
throughout Eskom’s fleet of power stations to become engrained operational wisdom. As a 
result of his proven technical competence, white employees at the power station warmed 
somewhat towards William, allowing for some loosening of the occupational racial barriers. 
Le Roux brought in a particular style of management.  Describing it as a “liberal” view, he 
contrasted it with the more “conservative” approach of some of his contemporaries. 
“Technological innovation was at odds with a centralised command approach, which he 
termed a “disempowering process”, praising instead the power of individual autonomy in 
solving mechanical problems and ultimately towards enhancing the power station’s 
efficiency.  
At the time of writing, the current leadership at Matimba faces the similar challenge of 
achieving technical excellence in a context of cost constraints. This challenge was 
particularly pressing following the electricity supply crisis of 2008 which increased the 
pressure on Eskom’s power stations to improve their generating capacity. A former power 
station manager at Matimba, who assumed the position in 2012, described innovation through 
engineering excellence as a key component of improved productivity. His expectations from 
the engineers at the power station are based on autonomous and innovative problem solving:   
If you are an engineer here your job is to solve problems, not to say you want to shut the 
machines down. You need to come up with innovative solutions. Shutting down the 
machine should really be the last resort, when it’s not safe to operate it and when it’s a 
danger to people’s lives … It’s like trying to fix a car while it is running. That’s the type 
of expectation I have for egineers … The time of a pit stop was for the old engineers, 
that time is gone. Your job is to fix it while its running.55  
54 Interview with Clive le Roux, February 18, 2015, Megawatt Park, Gauteng. 
55Interview with former Matimba power station manager, March 2016, Matimba Power Station, Lephalale. 
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Thus successful innovation was measured through its ability to enact cost efficiency and 
improved productivity at the power station.  
Racial Transformation 
When le Roux when hired employees, he insisted that prospective employees had the right 
“value system” and this trumped any consideration of race. Prospective employees had to 
appreciate the value of autonomous decision-making rather than rely on commands from 
management. He had undertaken further studies through the University of South Africa, 
which emphasised “information management” and “key performance indicators”. The 
emphasis on “performance indicators” and on decentralised decision-making echoes the 
precepts of the new public management discourse that Ivor Chipkin and Barbara Lipietz 
describe as gaining ground in South African public administration circles during the 1990s.56 
While their analysis is centred on the transformation of state bureaucracy, it is likely that state 
corporations were similarly influenced by the emergent managerial discourse.  
 After a review of Matimba’s staff contingent during the first few months of his arrival, le 
Roux fired nine out of the ten managers who reported directly to the power station manager 
and then began a rehiring process to replace them. He subsequently turned his attention lower 
down the hierarchy to dismiss 70 out of 100 of the first line managers. To observers such as 
the National Union of Metalworkers in South Africa (Numsa) representative at the power 
station Stephen Kekana, le Roux had made a clean sweep of it: “Then the role that he played 
here was that he removed all heads of section, heads of function, and heads of department. He 
removed them all.”57  
This attitude informed his thinking on le Roux’s racial transformation. According to Stephen 
Kekana, le Roux had left a lasting impression on workers long employed at the power station, 
as the bearer of transformation. One of the initiatives to encourage racial integration was a 
weekend retreat for power station workers with well-known TV personality Freek Robinson 
as a special guest. Robinson was known as the face of the popular current affairs TV show, 
Fokus, then broadcast across South Africa. It was also, at times, coercive, as Kekana related:  
On a bus with three seats on one side and two on the other you’d find a black wouldn’t 
sit with a white and there’d be empty spaces. When Clive saw this, he said the bus must 
56Barbara Lipietz and Ivor Chipkin, “Transforming South Africa’s Racial Bureaucracy: New Public 
Management and Public Sector Reform in Contemporary South Africa,” Paper presented at the Wits 
Interdisciplinary Seminar for the Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand, 2012. 
57Interview with StephenKekana, March 16, 2016, Matimba power station, Lephalale. 
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stop and then put us one, one, one, one. He said he didn’t want to see two blacks sit 
together or two whites sit together.58  
Le Roux carried a mandate from Eskom’s management to encourage racial integration and 
employment equity at the power station. This was a time when Eskom had appreciated its 
own autonomous role in hastening racial transformation within its operative domains. As 
discussed in Chapter Three, it had also recognised the reality of a permanent African 
population in urban areas. Fitting with the apartheid government’s techno-political project 
after 1976, Eskom embarked on a quest to electrify the townships.59 In his memoirs, former 
Eskom CEO Ian McRae describes his clandestine meeting at the Regina Mundi Church in 
Soweto, presumably in the late 1980s, to make contact with ANC members. His first point of 
contact was with John Rees and Bishop Peter Storey at the Central Methodist Church in 
Johannesburg, who then accompanied him to Soweto where he met with ANC leaders. Apart 
from his driver Moses Metsweni, no one at Eskom was aware of this meeting. Nonetheless, 
while he lacked any official mandate from Eskom for his trip to Soweto, Eskom chairman 
John Maree had prioritised racial transformation among the staff contingents at Megawatt 
Park and at the power stations across the country. McRae was personally struck by the 
glaring squalor of the black townships in the Johannesburg periphery and the worrying 
implications of material inequality for a successful democratic transition.60 Eskom’s efforts at 
racial transformation preceded the official political transition and the statutory removal of 
racial segregation. Thus they were in a position to deliver the material basis for political 
change.  
Le Roux had some experience with initiating such a project. Before Matimba, Ian McRae had 
appointed him the manager of the Majuba power station in 1987. The Majuba power station 
was built during the 1980s as part of Eskom’s power station six-pack but its completion 
coincided with Eskom’s dawning realisation that it had an over-supply of electricity. Thus 
Majuba was mothballed after its construction. This made it an attractive site for an 
experiment in racial integration because the white trade unions there enjoyed less bargaining 
power. Work stoppages of white artisans and specialist skilled workers were to no avail, 
because there was no pressure on the power station to produce electricity. Their protests at 
the loosening of racial segregation in residential areas and in the workplace therefore fell on 
58 Interview with Steve Kekana, March 16, 2016, Matimba power station, Lephalale. 
59 Antina Von Schnitzler, “Travelling Technologies: Infrastructure, Ethical Regimes, and the Materiality of 
Politics in South Africa,” Cultural Anthropology 28, no. 4 (November 1, 2013): 670–93. 
60 McRae, The Test of Leadership, 13. 
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deaf ears. Le Roux was tasked with introducing racial integration in the Eastern Transvaal 
town of Volksrust, which was the nearest town to the power stations. In particular, this meant 
the loosening of residential restrictions in the formerly white districts. He was assisted by an 
oft-ignored clause in the Group Areas legislation at the time, which exempted Eskom from 
the Act. Eskom’s staff residential districts could thus legally be racially mixed.  
In 1992, when le Roux arrived in Ellisras61, the NP was in negotiations with the ANC and 
government had begun the process of scrapping the Group Areas Act. Le Roux found it of 
immense value to solicit the support of the Ellisras police station commander. Having failed 
to enlist the support of the police station commander at Volksrust, during his tenure at the 
Majuba power station le Roux found that violent sabotage was visited in the night on the 
property of the few black employees who ventured to inhabit houses in the white residential 
areas. He felt that the support of the police chief in Ellisras would prevent official 
legitimation of vigilante activity. He achieved this by convincing the station commander of 
the legality of mixed race settlements and by alleviating his fears that the impending 
transition would give rise to a black onslaught.  
Coal Purchase Agreements 
Despite the fact that both Iscor and Eskom were state corporations, the price of coal was 
continually negotiated. Nonetheless, the two enjoyed an intimate relationship because Eskom 
had no other source of coal in that region, so its only option was to negotiate with Iscor’s 
managers to achieve its desired product and at a reasonable price. The parties were “locked-
in”62 to their relationship. As a result, Eskom had a direct interest in the operational changes 
Iscor effected at the coal mine. Coal contracts involved a large amount of tussling between 
the power stations and the coal mines. Rather than the fluid, flexible and dynamic market 
relations associated with the neo-liberal era, there emerged a relatively stable relationship that 
was strong enough to withstand the vicissitudes of the privatisation of the coal mine in the 
2000s. Each side was concerned to hedge against risk and ensure its own operational stability.  
From its inception, Matimba was intended to function as a base load power station. Those 
power stations that were cheapest to operate occupied the lowest place on the merit order and 
were termed base load power stations. The merit order is a mechanism commonly used by 
electricity suppliers across the world to describe the hierarchy of power stations. A base load 
61 Interview with Clive le Roux, February 18, 2015, Megawatt Park, Gauteng. 
62 Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. 
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power station could operate at maximum capacity without any fluctuations in output to meet 
the minimum, and often easily predictable, level of national demand. Those power stations 
with more expensive operating costs were termed “load following” power stations and 
contributed to the grid only during times of high demand.63 In Ellisras, the managers of the 
Grootgeluk coal mine were concerned to sell as much of the steam coal, suitable for power 
station combustion, as possible. Matimba would thus ideally fit into Eskom’s fleet as a base 
load power station because it would have to handle large quantities of coal, and thus produce 
large quantities of electricity. But the technical faults of the power station equipment, before 
they were systematically dealt with during the course of the 1990s, constrained its ability to 
achieve the generating reliability required of a base load power station.  
In the late 1980s Michael Deats, one of the founders of the Grootgeluk coal mine (see 
Chapter One), resigned from Iscor to assume a new position as Eskom’s Fuel and Water 
Manager. He thus oversaw the coal supply of power stations across Eskom’s fleet of power 
stations. At Matimba he encountered what he considered a problematic coal contract between 
Matimba and the Grootgeluk coal mine. In a letter written in 1993, Deats noted the 
problematic nature of the coal contract: “Matimba has for some time been artificially elevated 
in Eskom’s merit order64 for base load power stations, largely in order to accommodate the 
coal supply agreement.” But the power station had been experiencing load losses, due to 
stoppages in production and Deats warned that if the power station experienced any more 
load losses, it would be downgraded on the merit order. This meant that it would be required 
to generate less electricity and utilise less coal. Deats detailed his experience of switching 
employment from Eskom to Iscor as follows: 
Suddenly I was a customer; previously I was a seller of coal. And I found Ben Alberts on 
the other side of the fence. And I found some of my people now working for me at 
Eskom had made some startling concessions to Iscor. And I said that’ll be the day. Based 
on what? Why have these concessions been given?” 
These concessions included:  
Increased tonnage that would mean increased revenue for them and so forth. This is a 
‘you scratch my back I scratch your back arrangement.’ So I said let’s get Iscor in here 
63 “1997 National Productivity Awards.” 
64 “Merit order power stations were a commonly used hierarchy and fell out of favour during the privatisation 
period in Britain and was replaced by an electricity pool.”  
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and have a discussion. After that Ben Alberts said, If you ever go near Mike Deats make 
sure your pockets are zipped ... He’ll rob you blind. I said, Ben, say what you like, but 
you guys are taking Eskom for a ride. Anyway, we built, they built the colliery, Iscor, to 
supply 14-million tonnes of steam coal a year and 2-million tonnes of coking coal and I 
was now a customer for the 14-million. And it was our cheapest coal. When I left 
Eskom, the price of coal was R70 a tonne. And Grootgeluk was R30 a tonne so it was by 
far the cheapest.65 
Mike Deats’ interventions followed a period of relative crisis in the Matimba stable in August 
1991. Defective flue gas exhaust ducts had wrought a short period of power station inactivity.  
This was because “temper embrittlement of the steel used in their construction has[d] led to 
numerous cracks appearing in these flue ducts and consequently they will have to be 
replaced.”66An unexpected stoppage was termed a “force majeure” or “act of God” situation, 
in the coal contract. This was a built in contractual clause intended to provide Eskom with a 
reprieve from paying for what would be unused coal while the power station was off line.67 
Deats initiated a comprehensive review of the pricing components embedded within the coal 
supply. While constrained by the original coal contracts, Deats was however able to suggest 
enough changes to cause a “stand-off” between Iscor and Eskom.68  
In earlier years, negotiations over tonnage were related to the cost of coal. If Eskom proposed 
that the colliery reduce the amount of coal it supplied to Matimba, Iscor was likely to 
increase the price of coal.69 A memorandum from Iscor’s manager of mining operations in 
1990 said as much: “The price of coal is primarily influenced by a few major factors, the 
most important being the annual coal tonnage offtake by Eskom.”70 Iscor was prepared to re-
open negotiations on the “alternative and volume variances…provided that Iscor’s financial 
position as it was envisaged in the existing draft agreement is left unchanged.”71 In February 
1990, one of the Matimba’s senior managers complained that the coal contract then in 
existence clearly favoured the Grootgeluk coal mine and that “certain clauses” could create 
65 Interview with Michael Deats, September 2, 2013, Woodmead, Gauteng. 
66From MJ Deats to BC Alberts, Coal Supply Agreement, August 20, 1991; Matimba Power Station Document 
Centre, 556238 
67 Gabrielle Hecht, Being Nuclear: Africans and the Global Uranium Trade (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 
2012). Hecht has described force majeure clauses in contracts over uranium.  
68From MJ Deats to CR le Roux, Coal and water supply contracts, November 5, 1992; Matimba Power Station 
Document Centre, MPS, 4069206 
69 ibid.  
70 From JP Deetleefs, Manager Mining Operations to MJ Deats , Fuel and Water Manager, Coal Supply 
Agreement, June 19, 1990; Matimba Power Station Document Centre, 4058417. 
71 ibid. 
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significant financial embarrassment for Matimba.72 The matter of tonnage supply was 
particularly onerous. He wrote that: “The mine’s cash flow is over-protected and the power 
station’s cash flow has not been taken into consideration. If the power station cannot receive 
the coal, its generation is reduced with negative effects on its income and on top of that, a 
fine must be paid for the coal which cannot be received.” Despite the fact that the agreement 
was a fixed-price contract rather than a cost-plus contract, Eskom was still bound to make 
capital contributions to the colliery. The senior manager wrote that the “75% fixed cost 
element of the coal price is exceptionally high; especially if Eskom’s capital contribution to 
the mine and the fact that Grootgeluk doesn’t only produce for Matimba is taken into 
account.”73 The above-mentioned capital contribution related to the ownership of the coal 
beneficiation plants at the Grootgeluk coal mine. Iscor cited a “cost of asset replacement 
clause” in the coal purchase agreement, and insisted that Eskom owned some of the 
machinery at the coal mine, the coal crushing plants and blending beds, and would thus be 
partly responsible for replacing faulty components. In financial terms, Eskom’s capital share 
in the mine’s equipment amounted to an increase in the coal price of R 0.30 per tonne.74  
Matimba was also adversely affected by factors beyond the price of coal. Managers at the 
power stations accused Iscor of delivering coal of an unsuitable quality to the power station. 
On one level, Eskom had no experience in handling the type of coal that the Grootgeluk mine 
yielded. The coal had a particularly high ash content, and this was considered the justification 
for one of Matimba’s engineers to visit England to study the workings of power stations there 
which utilised a similarly type of coal.75 The chief impact on the unusual coal quality was on 
the equipment and installations when burned, which would experience a more rapid 
deterioration utilising a different coal from that of their original design parameters.76 The coal 
also contained an intolerably high moisture content.77 Matimba’s managers complained of 
sporadic deliveries of coal with high moisture content which causes problems with the 
72 From HP Steyn to Kragstasie Bestuurder, Steenkoolkontrak tussen Matimba en Yskor, February 16, 1990; 
Matimba Power Station Document Centre, 4060876 
73 ibid. 
74 Iscor placed an offer on the table for Eskom to hand over ownership of the plants to Iscor in return for an 
increase 0.30 per ton in the price it would then have to pay for coal.  
 
75Proposed visit to United Kingdom: Mr K Watson, July 19, 1989; Matimba Power Station Document Centre, 
4059825  
76Interview with Joe Meyer, August 2015, Onverwacht.,  
77From MJ Deats to J v/d Merwe Grimes, Moisture Content and Fine Material, 5 March 1993, 4069465. 
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transport of the coal, due to a fault in the pipeline.78 This emerged after Iscor altered the 
Grootgeluk I coal beneficiation plant, without effectively communicating the change to 
Eskom. Changes in the plant affected the quality of coal supplied to the power station which 
in turn experienced “trips and load losses” and some damage to installations. In March 1993 
Deats decried Iscor’s intransigent stance, because it failed to communicate its reasons for 
insisting on certain crucial aspects of the coal agreement. Eventually in August 1993, Deats 
reached a new, and tougher, agreement with Iscor, detailed in a renegotiated Heads of 
Agreement. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has detailed the implications of the privatisation era on Eskom’s electricity 
network and its activities in Ellisras. The privatisation debate of the late 1980s differed 
fundamentally from the debate over privatisation that occurred during the next decade. This 
was because the former was characterised more by the need to realise commercial efficiency, 
while a more concerted neo-liberal ideology drove the privatization process of the 1990s. 
Thus Eskom escaped complete privatisation during the 1980s because of its valuable techno-
political role and because it had polished its financial image. During the 1990s, privatisation 
was scuppered by the fact that electricity supply in the country had to remain affordable for 
low income households.  
 Nonetheless during the late 1980s Eskom was forced to implement a programme of reform 
that prioritised cost saving. In this model, engineering innovation was a prized method of 
ensuring cost efficiency. Exercising its techno-political power, Eskom implemented racial 
transformation in the notoriously conservative district of Ellisras in advance of the official 
political transition. The network was thus able to absorb the various political and economic 
imperatives of its time so that it took a particular form within the actual enactment of the 
technological developments in Ellisras. This will be discussed in the following chapter, which 
considers the transformation of labour relations in the town. 
78 From GJJ Strydom to die Myn Bestuurder, Grootgeluk Steenkoolmyn, Steenkool voorsiening na Matimba 
kragstasie, 24 Nov 1989; Matimba Power Station Document Centre, 4059831. 
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 Chapter 5: Labour in Lephalale 
Introduction 
The previous chapter described the effect of the twin processes of “neo-liberalism” and 
democratisation during the late 1980s on Eskom’s activities in Ellisras. Rather than a sharp 
break with the past there emerged instead a remarkable level of continuity as the network of 
large technical systems, both at a local and national level, incorporated the changing 
prerogatives of the political transition. The 1990s also saw a substantial transformation in the 
nature of labour relations as political liberalisation enabled the growing assertion of rights by 
the country’s black majority. This chapter details the transformation of labour relations in 
Ellisras from a system based on cheap migrant labour to one that recognised the existence of 
a permanent black workforce. From the 1970s the migrant labour system, which governed 
labour relations for much of the twentieth century, began to lose its steam. Both industry and 
organised labour recognised the possibility of a settled, and permanent black workforce in the 
urban industrial areas nominally reserved for whites.  
Dynamics in Ellisras closely resemble those that Stephen Sparks details in his study of the 
company town of Sasolburg.1 Sparks describes a situation of labour relations structured on 
“paternalist” lines rather an on an entirely coercive regime under apartheid. However, while 
this system of labour relations rested on a degree of consensus between managers and 
labourers, it was also fundamentally hierarchical. An examination of labour relations in the 
mine and power station in Ellisras during the 1970s and 1980s suggests that the impact of 
personalised labour relations was variable and that workers enjoyed few official channels to 
improve their working conditions. There were thus limits to the concessions African workers 
could win in a context of large-scale land and capital dispossession. This dispossession is 
expressed in a recurring debate over the removal of graves from the region. I argue that the 
formal recognition of independent black trade unions fundamentally improved the bargaining 
power of African workers. This argument is however largely based on the historical 
experience of labour relations at the Matimba power station where the most detailed evidence 
is available.   
1 Sparks, “Apartheid Modern: South Africa’s Oil from Coal Project and the History of a Company Town.” 
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From 1992 regular meetings between management and trade union representatives occurred 
at the Matimba power station. Records of these negotiations reveal the persistent demands for 
Eskom to gear its services and skills development to the local, Ellisras-based populace. This 
sentiment was at times strong enough to transcend racial barriers in the interests of improving 
the fortunes of workers and residents of the region. They also reveal that a distinctive neo-
liberal style of governance was implemented at the power station. As Foucault notes, one of 
the main concerns of neo-liberal governance is to mould the individual into a private agent 
that is removed from the responsibility of bearing the collective risk.2 Trade unions assisted 
with the navigation to a regime of consensus that was nominally based on the dictates of the 
free market.3 But this threw up a wary realisation of the perils of “neo-liberal” freedom 
among power station management and trade union officials alike some years before the end 
of apartheid. While the scrapping of the Group Areas Act meant the formal end of racial 
segregation, spatial inequality persisted, based instead on the constraint of affordability. 
Enacting neo-liberal reform in a context of large-scale dispossession posed significant 
challenges for the large technical systems and created a tension between transformation and 
the efficient workings of the power station. This tension persists to the present day, despite 
the efforts of managers to hasten transformation. Thus, entrenched in the functioning of the 
large technical systems was a deep history of dispossession and desperate under-skilling.  
Labour Relations during the Twentieth Century 
For most of the twentieth century, industrial corporations in South Africa relied on a deeply 
embedded system of low-wage migrant labour. The system was sustained by a bureaucratic 
coercion that rested on a convoluted body of labour legislation, rather than a consistent and 
brutal show of force. But the 1970s signalled a sea change in the nature of South African 
labour relations. Firstly, South African industry came under pressure to reduce its reliance on 
migrant labour from neighbouring Southern African countries and encourage the “South 
Africanisation”4 of the black workforce. Processes of decolonisation in Mozambique and 
growing signs of unfriendliness from Malawian authorities and from Lesotho raised the 
possibility that these countries would close their labour-sending channels to South Africa.5  
2 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics; Faeeza Ballim, “The Pre-History of South African ‘Neo-Liberalism’: The 
Rise and Fall of Co-Operative Farming on the Highveld,” Journal of Southern African Studies 41, no. 6 
(November 2, 2015): 1239–54, doi:10.1080/03057070.2015.1093835. 
3 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics. 
4 Sparks, “Apartheid Modern: South Africa’s Oil from Coal Project and the History of a Company Town.” 
5Leger in  Gelb, South Africa’s Economic Crisis, 143; Sparks, “Apartheid Modern: South Africa’s Oil from Coal 
Project and the History of a Company Town.,” 215. 
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In addition, as corporations invested in machinery their demand for unskilled labour fell. The 
government encouraged mechanisation, particularly in the agricultural sector. There, farmers 
benefitted from a number of government-sponsored incentives designed to ensure that they 
had sufficient access to agricultural machinery. Mines across the country opted for capital 
intensive, automated operations. But this also gave rise to a shortage of skilled labour and 
corporations in the private sector began calling, in ever greater numbers, for the relaxation of 
the colour bar. By virtue of the colour bar, only a minority of white workers, and later 
“coloureds” could be trained to perform artisanal and professional work. Greater racial 
integration of the workplace was only successful, as Feinstein writes, in the smaller industries 
where belligerent white trade unions were relatively scarce.6 Another reason for the 
slowdown in labour demand was the growing assertiveness of the African labour force and 
the growth in wages paid to black workers. Wages for black workers began to rise in the mid-
1960s largely in the manufacturing sector, and this encouraged the increasingly confident 
trade union movement of the 1970s. As a result of the concerted upward pressure on the 
wages paid to black workers, they steadily expanded their share of the national wage bill. 
While they still earned far less than their white counterparts, the gap between the two 
narrowed.7  
The migrant labour system that predominated for much of the twentieth century was not 
solely based on brutal state-employer coercion, but on some degree of worker consensus.8 
We should not exaggerate the sheer coerciveness of the earlier system. Dunbar Moodie has 
described the “moral economy” governing relations between managers and workers on the 
gold mines during the 1940s. He writes that: “The mobilisation of the entire workforce in 
moral outrage was an infrequent and hazardous exercise. But it did happen, and the fact that it 
might happen placed definite limits on complete autocracy.”9 As this chapter demonstrates it 
was only with the formal recognition of trade unions during the 1990s that African workers 
were able to enter into negotiations with management on equal terms. Describing the 
workings of paternal management in nineteenth century France, Donald Reid writes that: 
“For the worker...paternal power-affective, arbitrary, and discretionary-was exercised at all 
6 Feinstein, An Economic History of South Africa : Conquest, Discrimination, and Development, 232. 
7 Dubow, Apartheid, 1948-1994, 178. 
8 Sparks, “Apartheid Modern: South Africa’s Oil from Coal Project and the History of a Company Town.” 
9 Dunbar Moodie, “The Moral Economy of the Black Miners’ Strike of 1946,” Journal of Southern African 
Studies 13, no. 1 (1986): 3. 
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levels within the firm.”10 While paternal labour management allowed workers a degree of 
leeway, the absence of bureaucratic norms meant that its impact was variable and dependent 
on personal relations between workers and management. Reid also discusses the fact that in 
some cases employers resented the interference of external forces, such as that of the military, 
and called on them reluctantly during times of worker unrest.11 In addition as the term 
“paternal” suggests, management viewed African workers as child-like dependents.12 I draw 
a distinction between this paternalist imaginary of the worker with the notion of the worker as 
an autonomous agent in the liberal sense of the word. I argue that it was only with the 
formalisation of trade union engagement during the 1990s at the Matimba power station that 
African workers were able to enter into negotiations with management on an equal footing.  
This combination of the declining low wage migrant labour system and the greater demand 
for skilled labour encouraged the “stabilisation” of the black labour force. “Stabilisation” 
entailed the recognition of a permanent black labour force in the regions of industrial activity 
together with the development of social amenities to serve black workers and their families. 
As I discuss in Chapter Three, the Riekert Commission report of 1979, tasked with 
investigating the implications for African influx control of the changed labour regime, urged 
the recognition of a permanent black, skilled and semi-skilled workforce in urban areas. 
Stephen Sparks has closely considered “stabilisation” in his study of Sasol’s company town 
of Sasolburg. While Sasol’s initiative to implement stabilisation coincided with the 
government’s strategy to appease Africans through limited service provision, its managers 
also held particular visions of African urban development. Sparks notes that Sasol’s 
managers argued that good quality housing for blacks was essential to “developing a middle 
class black employee group.”13 Frederick Cooper has detailed the stabilisation pressures 
faced by both colonial and post-colonial governments. Rather than invest in social services 
for African workers, the colonial powers opted to withdraw entirely and retain only a 
financial hold where it was profitable. In contrast with Cooper’s model, where colonial and 
post-colonial leaders failed to bear the developmental burden, this chapter demonstrates the 
efforts by industrial corporations to encourage stabilisation on a continual basis. 
10 Donald Reid, “Industrial Paternalism: Discourse and Practice in Nineteenth-Century French Mining and 
Metallurgy,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 27, no. 4 (1985): 588. 
11 Ibid., 585. 
12 Sparks, “Apartheid Modern: South Africa’s Oil from Coal Project and the History of a Company Town.,” 21. 
13 Ibid., 217. 
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Antina von Schnitzler describes the efforts of late apartheid era politicians to couch their 
political reforms in the language of neo-liberalism, so ensuring the survival of the apartheid 
regime and its policy of racial segregation. She describes the work of an influential 
economist, Jan Lombard whose book on the subject was published in 1978. He argued for a 
neo-liberal reform that would mould racist principles to recognise the black population as a 
pool of consumers.14 In Ellisras, Eskom’s stabilisation efforts were succeeded almost 
immediately by its organisational reform in the direction of commercial efficiency. The onset 
of democratisation in the 1990s also brought with it the rise of trade unions in Ellisras. This 
had a fundamental effect on labour relations at the Matimba power station and the transition 
to the free market was negotiated in partnership with the trade unions.15  
The pressure for stabilisation also increased the pressure for “localisation” or for the 
employment and developmental opportunities offered by the power station to benefit the 
residents of the region. This was due to the existence of a permanent African population in 
the immediate vicinity of Lephalale who were invested enough in the region to agitate for 
better service provision. This relatively permanent workforce was invested with a loyalty to 
their locale and lacked the easy “exit” strategy envisioned by Hirschman.16 Home ownership 
in Lephalale was one of the guarantors of stability. While this was an ordinarily desirable 
outcome, it also encouraged demands for local development of people and things. These 
demands were to come to the fore at a local and national level during the construction of the 
Medupi power station during the 2000s.  
Bureaucratic Coercion  
Despite its remote position in the country’s north-west border Ellisras was a heavily 
securitised pocket of the bushveld. As discussed in Chapter Two the apartheid state 
prioritised border defence in the 1970s and 1980s in response to the threat of guerrilla 
incursion from neighbouring African countries. In Ellisras, a military force stationed at a 
nearby military base bolstered the power of the town’s police station commander. Because of 
the high security risk, the Matimba power station was considered a “national key point”. This 
14 Antina von Schnitzler, Democracy’s Infrastructure: Techno-Politics and Protest after Apartheid (Princeton 
University Press, 2016), 53. 
15 Andries Bezuidenhout and Sakhela Buhlungu, “From Compounded to Fragmented Labour: Mineworkers and 
the Demise of Compounds in South Africa,” Antipode 43, no. 2 (March 1, 2011): 237–63.  Sakhela Buhlungu 
and Andries Bezuidenhout argue that the dissolution of the compound system at the mines has fragmented the 
workforce and posed an organising challenge for the National Union of Mineworkers. While important to note, 
it is difficult to draw comparisons here because I describe a different industrial sector.  
16 Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. 
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meant that it enjoyed special military protection. When construction at Matimba began, the 
Rand Daily Mail described the intensive security measures at the power station site as such: 
“9.5 kilometres of double, barbed wire-topped security fencing around Matimba's l00ha 
[hectare] site, with patrol roads on the perimeter and para-military guards at all access 
points.”17 According to Stephen Kekana, who worked at the power station during the 1980’s, 
the security guards at the power station were a force to be reckoned with: “The security [at 
Matimba] then trained like soldiers,” he said.18 Labour strikes, which were technically illegal, 
were easily curtailed by a show of force.  
A plethora of labour legislation underpinned this system so that it operated through a form of 
bureaucratic coercion. In 1979 the Riekert Commission remarked on the unnecessary 
complexity of the labour legislation. As Feinstein writes, the Commission “was particularly 
struck by the extensive, complicated, and in many respects, fragmentary and overlapping 
measures i.e statutes, regulations, administrative rules and practices having a bearing on 
manpower matters in South Africa.”19 The Department of Labour ensured that corporations 
complied with the legislation by conducting routine inspections. During Iscor’s initial 
prospecting work in Ellisras in the early 1970s, a labour inspector visited the district at 
regular intervals to investigate the housing and disciplining of African workers. The 
inspector’s reports provide useful insight into the nature of the bureaucratic coercion that 
structured labour relations. They reveal that his chief preoccupation was to avoid labour 
turbulence and the consequent loss in productivity. This meant ensuring that the management 
of labour contained an optimal combination of coercive control and worker consensus. 
When Iscor began its prospecting work for suitable sites to situate the coal mine in the region 
during the late 1960s, many of the African workers were re-deployed from Iscor’s iron ore 
mine in the nearby town of Thabazimbi.20 By the nature of the prospecting work, the site of 
operations constantly shifted so that workers were housed on a temporary and makeshift 
basis, generally in huts built of zinc. Iscor had to gain the Department of Labour’s approval 
for these houses. In its initial application, it requested clarity on the amount of “air space” 
each black worker was allowed by government regulation.21 In response the Director of 
17 ‘SA ready to stake billions on dry-cooled answer to energy problems,’ Rand Daily Mail, 23 July 1983 
18 Interview with Stephen Kekana, Matimba power station, April 14, 2015. 
19 Feinstein, An Economic History of South Africa : Conquest, Discrimination, and Development, 242. 
20 Hendrik Ndebele, group interview with Johannes Mfisa, Hellen Kekae, Hendrik Ndebele, April Selema and 
Kgantshi Makubela (translator), August 25, 2015, Marapong (Lephalale). 
21 From DCU Conradie, Yskor personeelbestuurder, to Direkteur van Bantoe-Arbeid, December 8, 1966; 
NASA, BAO 2541 C31/3/1151/10. 
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“Bantu Labour” wrote that each hut ought to house 6 workers, so that there was “200 cubic 
feet of air space per person”.22 A few months later, in June 1971, a labour inspector, visiting 
a hostel under Iscor’s control, descried the labour conditions he encountered. He found that 
though the temporary hostel for black workers had been approved in April 1971, it had not 
yet fulfilled the requirements of the Regional director of State health services. He also 
ordered the demolition of “self-erected” zinc huts housing three families. Despite the fact that 
the huts had been recently constructed at the time of the inspector’s visit, he thought it 
probable that they were already “smothered with germs”.23 The inspector was however most 
bothered by a strike that was in process at the time of his visit. Workers on strike agitated for 
better wages, complaining that the daily rate they were paid of R0.50 was too low.  
Following another visit in March 1972, the inspector reported that conditions at the hostel 
had vastly improved. He praised the efforts of the new hostel manager who had properly 
fenced off the living quarters of black workers and increased the number of policemen on 
site. He also reported on an improvement in the quality of the food served to black workers. 
By “improvement of living conditions” the inspector meant that black workers had become 
acquiescent and that appropriate measures had been taken to prevent future strike action. The 
inspector also suggested that the labour situation was assisted by the presence migrant 
labourers from Botswana who sought employment at the coal mine at the time. It is not clear 
from the archival record the extent to which workers from Botswana were available in 
general but at that point it appeared that the labour supply exceeded demand. This played a 
role in reducing the bargaining power of the workers housed in the hostel.24  
Graves and Spirits 
One of the recurring community complaints has been around the exhumation of graves and 
bodies at the coal mine and at the sites of the power stations. In the context of the large-scale 
capital and land dispossession (see Chapter Two) struggles over the recognition of burial sites 
can be considered a channel that allowed African families to stake their claim of belonging. 
This legacy formed the founding mythology of the African township, whose name 
“Marapong” translates into “place of bones”. When Iscor’s workers initially excavated the 
site for the establishment of the Grootgeluk coal mine, they uncovered the bones of people 
22 From Die Hoofbantoesakekommissaris, Pietersburg, to Die Personeelbestuurder, Yskor, December 12, 1966; 
NASA, BAO 2541 C31/3/1151/10. 
23 From Mnr Adendorff to Hoofbantoesakekommisaris, June 7, 1971; NASA, BAO 2541 C31/3/1151/10. 
24 From Inspekteur van Bantoe-Arbeiders: Noordelike Gebied to Hoofbantoesakekommisaris, March 20, 1972; 
NASA, BAO 2541 C31/3/1151/10. 
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who had not received proper burials and were likely to have perished alone. When Seodisa 
began work at Grootgeluk coal mine, workers digging up the soil at the site of one of the 
mine shafts uncovered numerous sets of human bones. Community members identified one 
of these, by the cloth found in its immediate surrounds, as a woman called Sara Moloantoa. 
She hailed from the nearby village of Seleka. She had gone missing after she left her family 
on 24 December 1953 to visit her brother who lived on a nearby farm for Christmas. 
Travellers on foot would have faced a vast expanse of dry bushveld and deep darkness after 
sunset and it was thought that she had lost her way and perished.25 According to Seodisa, 
workers uncovered other bones at the site they thought were most likely to have been the 
remains of people from the neighbouring countries of Botswana and Zimbabwe. These 
travellers would have crossed the border into South Africa with the hopes of finding work at 
the iron ore mine of Thabazimbi, or heading further South to the gold mines on the 
Johannesburg Rand. In addition Seodisa believes that fighters from the ANC’s armed wing 
Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) who died in the Ellisras district were buried at the current site of 
the Medupi power station. In more recent years, a group from Marapong, led by Seodisa were 
at the time of the interview trying to gain an admission from the managers of Medupi that 
they had come across the bones of human bodies during the excavation of the site. These 
bodies were thought to belong to MK fighters who had died and been buried on the site. 
According to Seodisa,“Remember they were using their fighter names…Now the veterans 
they start to say, we know this number with this names, they are the ones who we buried – we 
buried them there.”26  
In the early years of Iscor’s prospecting, he thought that the angry spirits sabotaged the 
establishment of coal mines at various sites. Workers had considered digging shafts in a site 
close to the Seleka village, and another close to the dumping grounds in Onverwacht. At 
these sites water flooded out of the first holes that workers dug, and Seodisa interpreted this 
as a sign that the spirits were unhappy at the rude disturbance. At the site of the Grootgeluk 
coal mine, excavated during the early 1970s, workers insisted that the bones be exhumed and 
relocated to nearby gravesites. Iscor’s management watched as traditional healers performed 
cleansing ceremonies during the burial.27 A proper burial was considered necessary to lay the 
spirits of the dead to rest, without which they would wreak havoc for the living. Seodisa 
argued that the spirits had to be approached with reverence and caution if the mine was to 
25 Interview with Dr Lazarus Seodisa, translated by Kgantshi Makubela, March 2015, Marapong (Lephalale). 
26 ibid. 
27 Meyer recalled the cleansing ceremonies that occurred at the excavation site. 
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successfully sink a shaft. The unrest of the spirits has become an important interpretive theme 
for Seodisa in his narrative of events in the region. As part of his current work as a traditional 
healer in the community he has lobbied the Department of Traditional Affairs to consider the 
relocation of graves at the site of the Medupi power station. At Medupi, he argues, the spirits 
of the bodies who have not been laid to rest caused supernatural incidents and freak accidents 
for the workers at the power station, particular those on the night shift. He argued that 
workers at Medupi who were born and bred in Marapong were generally aware of the role of 
spiritual forces in the region28  
Worker Organisation 
This section details the changes in labour relations over the transition from the 1980s to the 
1990s. Correspondence around the development of the township at Marapong provides some 
sense of the ethnic and geographical spread of the labour contingent at Eskom’s Matimba 
power station. The Magol Kommando29 estimated that in October 1986 the total black 
workforce at the construction site was 692 strong, with 687 workers resident at the hostel. 
Approximately 80% of the workforce came from the black township of Mokerong which was 
part of the Lebowa homeland and North Sotho speakers made up 68% of the workforce.30 
Iscor’s workforce numbered 1650 at the time, and was drawn mainly from Mokerong. Thus 
the power station and coal mine relied heavily on migrant labour from the nearby homeland.  
Once the Grootgeluk coal mine was established and fully operational from the mid-1970s, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that a paternalistic approach to labour relations reigned. The 
balance of power between management and labour was variable and heavily dependent on 
contingencies. A current resident of the Marapong township, Lazarus Seodisa, described his 
experience serving as a “general officer” at the coal mine. Seodisa was part of the prospecting 
team that initially traversed the Ellisras district in search of a suitable site for a coal mine 
before he was employed at Grootgeluk during the early excavation of the coal mine. During 
certain instances of labour strife, he assumed the role of an informal mediator between 
management and workers. He took advantage of the presence of an Australian mine manager 
at Grootgeluk who he considered to lack the racist attitudes of his Afrikaner counterparts and 
was more inclined to take seriously the demands of African workers.  He also realised the 
28 Interview with Dr Lazarus Seodisa, translated by Kgantshi Makubela, March 2015, Marapong (Lephalale). 
29 The Mogol Kommando is discussed in more detail in Chapter Three.  
30 “Arbeidsmagontleding soos in Oktober 1986 by Yskor/ Eskom (Matimba) werksaam,” Aanhengsel 6 
(Attachment 6) to the Magol Kommando, Memorandum: Voorgestelde swart dorp in die Marapongarea; 
NASA, RLA 745 20/5/E36/1. 
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value of playing off tensions between the Australian manager on site and the Afrikaner 
managers, calling on the former’s assistance when black workers were mistreated by the 
Afrikaner workers on site. As Seodisa related: “I told the manager, no that guy is 
wrong…you know that fight between the white people… So these Afrikaans people they 
don’t like the Australian people. And that one don’t like them. They like us, black people.”31 
He recalled the occurrence of two strikes during his employ at the coal mine. At times he 
acted as an advisor to the Australian manager, stating that: “I say manager, the people are 
coming to strike, so you know what, just give little bit 2% money, then the work must run.”32 
Nevertheless this paternalist labour regime rested on an intrinsic hierarchy of power that was 
structurally intolerant of dissent. African workers could not always rely on the manipulation 
of inter-personal relationships and there were limits to the concessions African workers could 
gain. Another early employee of the coal mine and current resident of Marapong, Hendrick 
Ndebele, recalls an instance in 1981 when African workers at Grootgeluk went on strike to 
protest the single-male hostel accommodation, demanding that housing for married couples 
be provided. Workers wanted their families to be able to reside with them and seek 
employment in the Ellisras locality. Iscor implemented heavy controls on access to the 
hostels so that only employees of the mine were allowed onto the hostel premises. There was 
thus little opportunity for workers to reside with their families informally beneath the official 
radar. Ndebele argues that recurrent pressure from black workers led to the development of 
Marapong. While the impact of these protests is not clear, it is likely that they encouraged 
Eskom to create the Marapong township.33  
The hostel was also situated in a far distant location, necessitating daily transport from the 
hostel to the mine. Ndebele remembers being made to stand upright in the back of the truck. 
Despite worker discontent, buses with seating places were only introduced during the 
1990s.34 Thus there were limits to the concessions worker unrest could achieve, and reforms 
were enacted at the behest of management. Melton Mothoni, who worked at the Matimba 
power station during its construction period and later became the National Union of 
Mineworkers’ (NUM) main representative at Matimba, descried the absence of formal 
negotiation structures for African workers within the power station during the1980s. As a 
31 ibid. 
32 Interview with Dr Lazarus Seodisa, translated by Kgantshi Makubela, March 2015, Marapong (Lephalale). 
33 This is discussed in more detail in Chapter Three. 
34 Hendrik Ndebele, group interview with Johannes Mfisa, Hellen Kekae, Hendrik Ndebele, April Selema and 
Kgantshi Makubela (translator), August 25, 2015, Marapong (Lephalale). 
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result management was not obliged to seriously consider the demands of the African 
workforce.35  Stephen Kekana, who joined Matimba’s employ in 1985 and introduced the 
Metal and Allied Workers Union (Mawu) to the power station, described black worker 
activism as tepid and directionless before the arrival of the trade unions. Workers, he argues, 
were like a “flock of sheep”.36 
There were however clear instances of strike action during this period. They were either 
ended by a show of force or taken seriously if management deigned to consider workers’ 
demands. Stephen Kekana detailed his struggle to organise workers during the 1980s at the 
Matimba power station at a time when strikes were headed off by the power station security 
and the police force. When Kekana first began to work at Matimba in 1985, there were a few 
trade unions that organised workers at the power station. One of these, the Electricity 
Workers Union was an internal union sponsored by Eskom. According to Kekana, workers 
easily lost faith in its organisational structures because they perceived them to be too closely 
tied to management. Another was called the Boiler Makers Union. While it had a multiracial 
membership, its leadership was white so that black workers easily left its fold once an 
alternative emerged. According to Kekana, employees that sought to unionise workers could 
submit stop order forms to management for distribution to workers. This would allow the 
subscription to be paid from workers’ salaries to the incipient union.  But there was a 
perception that management discarded the stop order forms if they disliked the idea of the 
proposed union. “We didn’t have structures,” he says. “It was difficult to organise workers 
those years because we were not protected.”37    
The legislation governing strike action and the mobilisation of black workers was complex 
and for budding trade unionists, open to manipulation. Kekana recounts his strategic 
manipulation of labour laws, revealing that when challenged the body of bureaucracy 
governing African labour tripped itself up. For instance, one of the arguments they used in 
court when workers were indicted for illegal strike action involved exploiting the 
contradiction of African rights to citizenship. By law, Africans lacked citizenship rights 
outside of the homeland borders and were considered foreign workers in the white districts of 
industrial activity. “…They told us we were in an illegal strike but we said no and they say 
yes you did not come to work and you had an illegal strike but we told them no – those laws 
35 Interview with Melton Mothoni, April 2015, Matimba Power Station, Lephalale. 
36 Interview with Stephen Kekana, Matimba power station, April 14, 2015.  
37 ibid. 
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don't bind us because we did not have the right to work. That's how we used to argue.” The 
complicated tangle of labour bureaucracy ran to the end of its tether when faced with the 
assertion of rights from the African workers it intended to hold in place.  
Trade Union Activity 
In 1979 the Wiehahn Commission paved the way for South African corporations to recognise 
black trade unions. The arrival of independent black trade unions, the National Union of 
Mineworkers (NUM) and the National Union of Metal Workers (Numsa) fundamentally 
transformed the nature of labour relations at the Matimba power station, by improving the 
bargaining power of African workers. The introduction of collective bargaining practices for 
African workers, which corporate managers accepted as a measure to alleviate industrial 
conflict, was a decided break from the past.38 Black trade unions emerged in a disparate 
manner during the 1970s with many struggling to gain recognition from management and 
legitimacy in the eyes of the workers. Their power grew apace and they demonstrated their 
full force when they cohered under the banner of the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (Cosatu) in July 1985. One of these unions was Mawu which later morphed into 
Numsa. Kally Forrest writes that by the end of the 1970s, Mawu was on the “brink of 
collapse, as membership fell, and by 1977 all organised workplaces had folded.”39 This was 
partly due to the fact that some companies had refused the union space to organise the 
workers in its employ. Mawu’s waning popularity and consequent subscription crisis during 
this period was worsened by the brutal police shut down of a strike at the Heinemann 
Electrical Company in the Johannesburg East Rand, one of its most important sites of worker 
organisation. But over the course of the next decade the union’s fortunes steadily improved, 
buoyed by the rising tide of anti-apartheid activism.  
Mawu also improved its organisational strength during the 1980s and adopted particular 
strategies to manoeuvre around the restrictive labour legislation of the apartheid government. 
To deal with the intransigence of individual factory managers to recognise the union, for 
instance, Mawu worked on entrenching the concessions to labour that had already been 
awarded in civil contracts.40 The union’s management also emphasised developing the shop 
floor strength of each factory to encourage an in-depth familiarity with its particular working 
conditions. As Forrest notes, budding trade unionists attended information sessions run by 
38 Dubow, Apartheid, 1948-1994, 198. 
39 Kally Forrest, Metal That Will Not Bend: National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa 1980-1995 
(Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2011), 17. 
40 ibid. 
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academics at the University of the Witwatersrand. They faulted pre-apartheid black trade 
unions such as the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU) led by Clements 
Kadalie, for organising as “general trade unions”. A sector-wide organising strategy also 
alleviated the fears of individual factory managers that labour concessions would give their 
competitors the upper hand, because Mawu could point to similar worker demands at the 
factories of their competitors.41  
The NUM and the National Union of Metal workers of South Africa (Numsa) began 
organising workers in Ellisras in the late 1980s. They have remained the main trade unions in 
the district’s coal mine and power station nexus. By organising workers at the Matimba 
power station, both unions strayed from the traditional industrial sectors. NUM had 
traditionally organised mineworkers while Numsa concentrated on the metals and 
engineering sector. Union organisation at Eskom’s power stations followed the network 
connection of the mine and power station nexus.42 According to Kekana, the involvement of 
both unions at Eskom’s power stations is rooted in the Highveld industrial hub of the Vaal 
Triangle. Mawu had organised workers in VanderBijl Park, which was the site of one of 
Iscor’s major steel factories. Two of Eskom’s power stations, the Vaal and Lethabo power 
stations, were also situated in the vicinity of VanderBijl Park. Both Eskom’s power stations 
and Iscor’s steel factories drew their coal supply from the nearby coal mines where NUM 
organised mineworkers. According to Kekana, Mawu’s strong regional presence was due to 
its mobilisation of workers at Iscor’s Vanderbijlpark Steel. This encouraged the union to 
venture into the energy sector and organise workers at the nearby power station.  In a similar 
manner, NUM began to organise workers at Eskom’s power stations in the Eastern Transvaal 
because of their proximity to the coal mines. In this way both NUM and Numsa gained 
experience with organising power station workers, which eased their organisational access to 
the Matimba power station in Ellisras.  
Numsa and the Matimba Power Station 
The arrival of Mawu at the power station represented the first attempts at independent and 
concerted black worker organisation. Kekana played a formative role in introducing the union 
to the power station workers. Before the arrival of Mawu, he worked as a shop steward for 
the EWU and following a workshop for EWU shop stewards in Ellisras, took a car ride to the 
41 ibid, 18. 
42 Mitchell, Carbon Democracy, 2011. Mitchell describes this coal-mine, power station nexus as creating the 
conditions for political subversion.  
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nearby town of Nylstroom with one of the instructors there who was on his way back to 
Germiston, on the East Rand. The instructor was ordinarily based in Johannesburg and took 
the idea of recruiting workers at Matimba to Mawu’s head office. The union deployed two of 
its members to the power station to help Kekana recruit members and gain recognition from 
the power station management.  With the formation of Numsa in 1987 and its growing 
reputation across the country, the union built up its strength at the power station. This was 
also in the context of the ruthlessly repressive State of Emergency that began in 1985. In 
1987 Kekana successfully defended a worker who faced disciplinary action after a coal-
carrying conveyor had caught alight under his watch. Fires on coal conveyors are a common 
occupational hazard, caused when the friction between the rollers and the carrying surface of 
the conveyor generates enough heat to ignite the coal being carried on the conveyor belt. The 
worker had not paid enough attention to the process to prevent the occurrence. Kekana 
argued that his lack of concentration was due to an illness that the worker had reported to his 
supervisor beforehand. This victory encouraged other workers to place their faith in Numsa’s 
organising structures, opening the door to further recruitment. According to Kekana, workers 
from different departments at the power station subsequently joined the union’s fold in large 
numbers:  
I was working at the real estate or in township maintenance and it had 276 workers- they 
all joined Numsa at once. And then go to security, they all joined it was about 360 of 
them. Then we go to maintenance. We didn’t get the whole maintenance but above 80% 
of them joined. And then operating as well we got 100% to join … Then HR and all 
those other office staff members we got them to join.43  
Negotiations at Matimba 
Once black trade unions achieved formal recognition at the power station, they were absorbed 
into a formal negotiation process that oversaw the power station’s transition into the 
democratic era. This period coincided with Eskom’s growing emphasis on market-related 
reforms. African workers, who were newly enjoying formal worker rights, also had to 
navigate their political and economic freedom. But the transition to the free market came with 
its own constraints, notably that of affordability. In addition, with the removal of formal 
colour bar restrictions the terms of occupational mobility had to be re-made through a process 
of continual negotiation.   
43 Interview with Stephen Kekana, Matimba power station, April 14, 2015 
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Once le Roux settled into the driving seat as the Matimba power station manager in 1992, he 
introduced regular meetings that allowed for consultation between power station management 
and representatives of the three main trade unions at the power station. One of the most 
pressing items on the agenda was the need for the different parties to reach consensus on the 
way that affirmative action would play out at the power station, especially as it related to 
recruitment and training policies. As I discuss in Chapter Four, Eskom’s executive 
management advocated the development of transformation among staff at its various 
outposts. The minutes of the various negotiation forums in which the unions and management 
hammered out the details of transformation reflect a surprising degree of consensus from the 
trade unions that transcended racial divisions. This concurrence rested on their desire to 
protect the rights of their members already in the power station’s employ and to resist the 
recruitment of staff members from outside of the power station.  
The minutes of a meeting of the affirmative action task group held in August 1994 provide 
useful insight into the viewpoints of the various trade unions.44 The union MWU-Solidarity, a 
union with a historically white membership, disputed the idea of “token” appointments from 
the outset. The notion of “token” appointments here refers to the practice of hiring employees 
on the basis of their skin colour to fill affirmative action quotas while neglecting their actual 
competency. While not explicitly rejecting the policy of affirmative action, MWU’s 
representative argued that management should first consider “internal” candidates, or those 
candidates already in the employ of the power station. In this formulation, a suitably qualified 
white internal candidate should be preferentially appointed over an affirmative action 
candidate, drawn from outside the ranks of both the power station and Eskom. Numsa’s 
representative concurred with MWU-solidarity on the need to avoid tokenism but disagreed 
on the order of preference for appointments. Numsa agreed that white internal candidates be 
considered before an affirmative action candidate from outside of Matimba and Eskom. 
However, the union argued that the needs of affirmative action candidates at Matimba and 
then Eskom were paramount, and were to be considered before internal white candidates. 
NUM attempted to refine the criteria for appointing internal affirmative action candidates, 
stating that “minimum qualifications” were to be applied in considering these candidates, 
while “maximum qualifications” were relevant for white employees.45  
44 Minutes of the Task Group, August 19, 1994. Personal collection of M Mothoni. 
45 ibid, p3. 
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On 29 August, the Affirmative Action task team was ready with its report and the meeting 
accepted the principals and procedures for recruitment that it laid out. For the next few 
months, the recruiting relationship ran smoothly, and in September 1994 the unions 
“expressed their appreciation of the way Engineering consults with them in terms of 
recruitment and transparency thereof”46. However, the trade unions continually propagated 
the importance of internal candidates in their views on subsequent appointments. This 
demand often came up against the shortage of suitably competent internal candidates. In June 
1995, an employee in the electrical maintenance department proposed the appointment of a 
particular affirmative action candidate for work in the welding and boiler making section of 
the power station.47 While the appointment was eventually approved at the meeting, NUM’s 
representatives voiced their concern that the proposed candidate was not an internal one. 
Rather, “they felt that Matimbans irrelevant of race should get first preference.” But 
management responded that no internal candidates had applied for the position and that those 
potential affirmative action candidates in the “accelerated development programme” at 
Matimba were not yet suitably equipped to perform the job satisfactorily.48 Thus the 
imperatives of stabilisation49 gave rise to concerted efforts for local residents to enjoy the 
opportunities for employment and skills development that the power station offered.  
Certain senior managers at Matimba appreciated the value of employing internal candidates, 
though out of necessity rather than virtue. At a meeting held on 7 August 1995 the head of 
Matimba’s engineering department spoke of his travels to the Eastern Cape town of East 
London to investigate the possibility of appointing affirmative action candidates from the 
region.50 East London was a known hub of industrial skills because it was the concentrated 
sector of the country’s motor vehicle manufacturing. But out the 25 candidates he 
interviewed, none met the requirements for employment at Matimba. This highlighted the 
limits to the recruitment of external candidates and he thought it more fruitful to focus on 
training employees within the power station. There were then three vacant positions which he 
proposed to fill with trainees from Matimba. NUM and Numsa supported the proposal and 
added that the danger was that appointments from outside of Matimba (and possibly Ellisras) 
46 Minutes of Engineering sub BU forum, September 7, 1994, Matimba power station. In the personal collection 
of M Mothoni. 
47 Minutes of a Special Maintenance sub BU forum, June 13, 1995, in the personal collection of M Mothoni. 
48 ibid. 
49 Cooper, Africa since 1940. 
50 Minutes of an Engineering sub BU forum, August 7, 1995. Personal collection of M Mothoni.  
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simply used the power station as a “stepping stone” before disappearing.51 Thus Matimba and 
Eskom required custom-designed training programmes to fill their skilled labour 
requirements.  
Training Positions 
One of the problems with hiring internal candidates was that the training pipeline could not 
match the power station’s demand on time. In 1994 le Roux complained of the dire state of 
the pool of engineers that Matimba could draw from at a national level so that even with the 
power station’s engineers then in training there was likely to be a shortfall by the year 2001. 
The situation worsened if the pool was narrowed to include only engineers who qualified as 
affirmative action candidates because they were not graduating from universities in the vast 
quantities required. Matimba’s head of engineering had previously highlighted the need to 
employ a number of “surplus engineers” who could be trained to become “system 
engineers”.52A young engineer, he argued, required seven years of training before they could 
make autonomous technical decisions.53  
The shortage of skilled engineers and artisans at the time constituted a national skills crisis. 
This was due to the historic exclusion of black students from the institutions of higher 
learning. Nonetheless some workers had acquired technical competency by learning on the 
job despite a lack of formal certification. As a result there emerged a process of assessment, 
motivated in large part by Numsa, known as the Recognition of Prior Learning (RPL).54 
Proponents of RPL argued that workers should be eligible for promotion on the basis of their 
experiential learning and in many instances employers accepted the argument with relief.55 
Institutional mechanisms for assessment were developed at a national level to determine an 
employee’s actual efficacy and ascertain whether or not they fulfilled the necessary 
occupational requirements. Kekana related that certain employees at Matimba were 
successfully promoted on the basis of RPL. These included plant operators, for instance, who 
had learned how to handle certain equipment on the job.56 Staff members performing 
51 Minutes of BU forum, May 4, 1995. In the personal collection of M Mothoni.  
52 Minutes of the Engineering sub BU Forum, August 3, 1994, Matimba power station. In the personal collection 
of M Mothoni.  
53 Minutes of the special generation sub BU Forum, 23 Sep 1994, at 8AM. In the personal collection of M 
Mothoni.  
54 Ballim, Y, Omar, R and Ralphs, A. ‘Learning Assessments in South Africa’ in Evans, N (ed) Experiential 
Learning Around the World: Employability and the Global Economy, London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 
2000.  
55 ibid. 
56 Interview with Stephen Kekana, March 16, 2016, Matimba power station, Lephalale. 
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administrative tasks also achieved certification through RPL processes. Since it was usually 
the case engineers with university degrees came from outside of Elliras, RPL processes 
enabled the promotion of internal candidates, generally from the Ellisras district, who had not 
had access to tertiary education.  
Le Roux argued that there were limits to the scope of promotion available through RPL. He 
argued that for certain high level occupations, experience on its own was not enough to 
justify the movement of an employee to a higher grade of employment. Here, knowledge, 
achieved through theoretical education, was more important than skill, hence the particular 
training that management had instituted. According to Kekana, later reminiscing on the 
question of the recognition of prior learning, le Roux did not oppose the principle of RPL but 
was responding to the demands of white employees who lacked formal engineering 
qualifications and sought promotion on the basis of RPL. But NUM asserted that by 
“watching someone do a job one should be able to do it” and that “‘spanner boys’ after 10 or 
15 years could be artisans.”57 They also argued that theoretical training was tied to 
competency in the English language and this posed a language barrier for those workers who 
were unaccustomed to the technical terminology.58 NUM continued to insist that 
transformation occurred too slowly at the power station, illustrated by what they considered 
to be the sluggish movement of workers through the employment hierarchy. Complaints 
persist to the present day of the partial and long-drawn out nature of the certification process 
for otherwise deserving employees.59  
Strike 
Discontent came to a head in March 1997, when the three trade unions declared a dispute and 
embarked on a week-long strike. The matter necessitated the intervention of the Executive 
Director of Generation at the time, Bruce Crookes, who visited the power station and drew up 
a report detailing recommendations. He intervened with the explicit aim of restoring the trust 
between management and labour. The persistence of racial segregation practices animated the 
protest. Numsa demanded the removal of racially segregated toilets, which was a legacy of 
Matimba’s construction roots in the latter years of apartheid. According to Kekana, who was 
the chief Numsa representative at the time of the strike:  
57 Minutes of BU Forum, October 29, 1996. Personal collection of M Mothoni.   
58 Minutes of BU Forum, April 20, 1998. Personal collection of Stephen Kekana. 
59 Interview (anonymous), March 2016, Matimba Power Station, Lephalale. 
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In 1997 one of the things that we were fighting for here in our own power station was 
that even after the 1994 general election you still had toilets being locked, you still had 
toilets for Europeans or whites. And then we had black ladies who were part of cleaning 
companies, they had to share toilets with the men.60  
An official bulletin released by the power station management provides a useful summation 
of the main issues in dispute.  The “implementation of affirmative action” was one of the 
chief concerns, and the neglect of “people from Matimba” was particularly at issue, in 
training and presumably also in promotion.61  
In August 1997 the unions and management reached some certainty about the way the power 
station would handle the recommendations of the Crookes report. Following concerted 
pressure by the unions on management to find positions for the surplus staff, le Roux thought 
that more time was needed, because “work had to be fabricated for these individuals”.62 On 
the policy of recruitment, the eventual decision, reached in September 1997, was that 
Matimba would revert to Eskom’s power station wide policy on affirmative action, rather 
than rely on its own Matimba-specific one. Numsa agreed with the policy on the grounds that 
it would “prevent an island,”63 diverging from the normative policy framework established at 
Eskom’s other power stations. The main implication of this transformed policy64 was that all 
positions would only be advertised externally when all possible means of recruiting from 
within the power station were exhausted. These avenues included the thorough consideration 
of the staff that were in training and the “surplus staff”. Trade unions were to “influence the 
compilation of the job description and the profile of the desired incumbent.” But this rigorous 
consultation at the initial levels of recruitment allowed management some autonomy when 
deciding on the final candidate. A memorandum detailing the new recruitment and selection 
procedure stated that the “final selection of successful candidates is now left to the discretion 
of line management and needs not to be reported back at a sub BU forum.” 65   
60 Interview with Stephen Kekana, March 16, 2016, Matimba power station, Lephalale. 
61 “Bulletin: Industrial action issues and processes”, attachment to the: Minutes of steering committee, August 8, 
1997. Personal collection of M Mothoni.  
62 Minutes of a BU forum, August 25, 1997. Personal collection of M Mothoni. 
63 Minutes of a BU forum, September 4, 1997, item 4.4. Personal collection of M Mothoni,  
64 From Melinde Coetzee. “Recruitment and Selection Procedure”, September 9, 1997. Personal collection of M 
Mothoni.  
65 ibid.  
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From Hostels to Single Quarters 
In 1998 the power station began the slow phasing out of the hostel-based residential system. 
The housing transition was one from a residential system based on coercion and heavy 
company and state surveillance, to one in which residential life was subject to the wiles of the 
free market. The residential transition also marked the arrival of the neo-liberal reign of 
“choice”, departing from the paternalist and coercive labour regime of preceding years. The 
impetus to home ownership and the creation of a local black middle class was also a means of 
creating a class of citizens who demanded better service delivery and the social amenities due 
to permanent residents of the district. 
At Matimba the perils of the free market are best illustrated in the question of salary 
deductions. Over the course of the 1990s Matimba’s management shed pretensions to 
paternalism and attempted to gradually halt the practice of salary deductions. The trade 
unions, mainly NUM, however considered payroll deductions to be a safeguard for workers 
who would sometimes neglect to make the more mundane but essential payments if left to 
their own devices. One of these was to a company called Istores, although the nature of the 
services it provided is not clear. In May 1998, NUM urged management to re-instate the 
system of stop orders from employees’ payrolls and proposed that Istores impose limits on 
the amount that workers could purchase, noting that “some individuals did not manage their 
money.”66 A similar debate arose over the question of the salary deductions for payments to a 
company called IEMAS, which was a retirement fund company. NUM protested against the 
proposed cancellation of the payments and a member of Matimba management team stated 
his concern that workers were having difficulty managing their money and were “using 
Eskom as a tool to control finances.”67 Then in May 2000, unions urged management to 
continue deducting water and lights payments from workers’ payrolls fearing that if the 
practice was stopped, workers would not make the payments themselves and their water and 
electricity would be disconnected.68 The question of the visitors allowed to residents of the 
hostel is an example of the end of the paternalist system of labour organisation. While the 
hostel was in place, Matimba’s management had to rule on the question of allowing female 
visitors to enter the hostel premises. Because there were multiple workers to a room, they 
opted to ban women from the hostels.   Le Roux described it as follows:  
66 Minutes of a Joint Forum, May 4,1998. Personal collection of Stephen Kekana.  
67 Minutes of Joint Forum, August 3, 1998, Personal collection of Stephen Kekana. 
68 Minutes of a BU Forum, January 17, 2000. Personal collection of Stephen Kekana. 
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You know the apartheid system created dependency. People were dependent. The system 
told you what you could and couldn’t do, so you didn’t have choice. And we were the 
system- we had to make those decisions: can you bring a woman into your room or not 
and you’re 55 years old or 35 even, you know more independent. So those were the 
things we were dealing with- all of us, not just at Matimba, all the power stations, the 
whole of Eskom was dealing with those dynamics in the 1990s.”69  
The decision to close the hostel was a product of both ideology and necessity. The hostel was 
a massive structure, built to house 5 000 labourers during the time of construction.70 By the 
mid-1990s only a tiny portion was occupied and the hostel fell into disrepair. Vandals had 
steadily stripped the near vacant hostel of those fixtures which still held some market value. 
Electric cables were popular items of theft, but removing them was a dangerous exercise and 
at times the bodies of those who tried were discovered on the hostel premises. One option put 
on the table was that Matimba turn the hostel loose onto the free market and offer the rooms 
to the public at a low rent but the prospect of uncontrolled access raised the serious threat of 
further vandalism.  
One alternative to hostel accommodation was the “single quarters”, which had historically 
housed Eskom’s white and professionally skilled workforce. These tended to be single males 
in their twenties.  The single quarters accommodated one person per room, which contained a 
bed, desk and closet. But workers paid more for lodging and meals than at the hostels. Le 
Roux recalled that while hostel dwellers paid R5 per month for accommodation and meals at 
hostels, residents at the single quarters paid R105.71 As a result some workers dug in their 
heels and refused to leave the hostels. Workers who moved to the single quarters complained 
that the meals served there more vegetables and less starch and meat than the food 
traditionally served at the hostels and referred to as “westernised meals”72. But NUM and 
Numsa encouraged the closure of the hostel, in line with the unions’ national campaign, 
because of its visceral connection to the brutality of the colonial and apartheid regimes. The 
number of residents in the hostel gradually declined so that in July 1998, Matimba’s 
management reported that the hostel was inhabited by just 14 employees of Eskom.73 
According to Kekana, the intransigent workers who remained at the hostel were those 
69 Interview with Clive le Roux, February 18, 2015, Megawatt Park, Gauteng 
70 ibid. 
71 ibid. 
72 Minutes of Joint Forum Meeting, July 6, 1998, Personal collection of Stephen Kekana. 
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migrant labourers from the Kwa-Zulu Natal and the Eastern Cape provinces. He suggested 
that with a permanent homestead in these regions, the migrant labourer was more willing to 
live a transient life at his place of work: “I don’t know - because they prefer to go and work 
far from home. And then his home will always be his home. And then he’ll go home when he 
is on leave and then come back. And he doesn’t want to have any other place that is home.”74  
With so few inhabitants the hostel became economically unsustainable, setting the stage for 
its eventual closure. But the mass migration from the hostel caused some consternation 
among those employees already resident in the single quarters. Le Roux related that: “When 
hostel people started coming in and eating with their hands, the single quarter people who 
were eating with knives and forks, couldn’t stand it anymore, so they all demanded to go into 
houses as communes. So we had a whole social movement taking place.”75 One particular 
complaint was of the pockets of prostitution that followed the hostel dwellers to the single 
quarters.76 According to Le Roux:  
So we started moving people out of the hostel to the single quarters which is from the 
original black township into the traditional white township. We then had the white 
families come to me - they’re tearing their hair out and being angry because they’ve now 
got shebeens and prostitutes and drunk women walking across the street.77  
Thus the closure of the hostel, which symbolically signalled a shift away from the migrant 
labour system, was met with a degree of resistance from workers themselves and from 
some of the townsfolk.  
Phasing in Market-Related Rentals 
Across Eskom’s fleet of power stations, managers had to introduce market related rentals to 
Eskom-owned houses. The Eskom Housing Policy of 1995 stated that, in line with the 
Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) and national housing policy, Eskom 
committed to finding housing for its employees, and in particular to assist employees own 
their own homes.78 Eskom thus had to provide housing in terms of the free market. Eskom’s 
former sister parastatal, Sasol, faced a similar challenge. Sparks cites a memorandum from 
Sasol’s managing director Peter Cox written in 1987, who argued that: “an employer should 
74 Interview with Stephen Kekana, March 16, 2016, Matimba power station, Lephalale. 
75 Interview with Clive le Roux, February 18, 2015, Megawatt Park, Gauteng. 
76 ibid. 
77 ibid. 
78 Eskom housing policy, 1995. 
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not become directly involved in the personal affairs of its employees. Housing could be 
classified as such a personal affair.”79 Apart from the financial incentive of improving cash 
flow by cutting the costs of employee housing, there was also an ideological basis for 
insisting that employees assume financial responsibility for housing.  
One of the persistent problems of housing provision for Matimba’s employees has been the 
shortage of affordable housing for workers, largely African workers, at the lower end of the 
pay pool, and on the other hand, a surplus of the houses at the higher end of the rental market. 
Demand for houses at the lower end of Eskom’s rental grade exceeded supply so that black 
employees were entitled to more help from Eskom in shifting to houses that could 
accommodate their families. They thus were entitled to a settling in allowance for moving to 
married quarters, a first for many because the dictates of the Group Areas Act had outlawed 
their residence there in previous years.80 According to Kekana, a government moratorium on 
the sale of state assets prevented Eskom selling many of its houses. As he related: “First the 
moratorium came from the government. Because there were farms, buildings in towns, 
whatever that belonged to the government and the government didn’t know them all after 
1994. Some of those buildings and farms, houses vanished because people would just register 
it under their name. Then they placed a moratorium on the selling of state assets.”81 This 
moratorium was only lifted in 2010. This meant that some levels of Eskom housing, 
particularly the lower cost housing, could not be sold onto the private market while the 
complete accounting of state owned land was in the process. A parliamentary monitoring 
group report of 2014 indicates that the task of auditing state assets had not been resolved by 
then.82  
In August 1997, at a housing steering committee meeting, Matimba’s management 
announced that the maintenance of Eskom houses had been outsourced to the property 
company Resprop. The anxiety of the transition to a system of private ownership is evident in 
discussions over the “maintenance of gardens”. Numsa opposed the outsourcing of 
maintenance work in Eskom’s housing, instead stating that “they support community 
development and RDP and feel that Eskom could play a bigger role in developing 
79 Sparks, “Apartheid Modern: South Africa’s Oil from Coal Project and the History of a Company Town,” 227. 
80 Minutes of a Special joint forum meeting held in conference room 2, Monday 24 Oct 1994. In the personal 
collection of M Mothoni.  
81 Interview with Stephen Kekana, March 16, 2016, Matimba power station, Lephalale. 
82 Parliamentary Monitoring Group, Cooperation between departments and progress on the audit of land and 
property that belongs to government, with Deputy Minister of Public Works, February 11, 2014.  
https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/16901/. 
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community.”83 Sparks has remarked on the importance of gardens as the prime marker of 
respectability in Sasolburg. The lease stated that individuals were responsible for maintaining 
their gardens, and it was proposed that Resprop issue warnings before sending in a 
horticultural specialist, and then billing the tenant for the service.84 In contrast to the situation 
of labour control during the 1970s, the managers of the single quarters had limited scope for 
intrusion into the affairs of its inhabitants. Trade unions consistently urged that the rights to 
privacy of individual inhabitants be respected. In 1997 Eskom’s employees occupied 105 
rooms in the single quarters. A suggestion was made at one of the meetings, to upgrade or 
replace the fence around the single quarters to better control the “unwanted elements”. But 
the Resprop regional manager stated that the matter required greater consultation with the 
residents of the single quarters because “there are residents who are against fences and other 
controls.”85 
In October 1997 Numsa pointed out that there had been police raids at the single quarters for 
married couples and urged the power station management to ensure that the police raids were 
lawful.86 On further investigation, it emerged that the police had acted on information that 
certain “illegal residents” at the single quarters possessed illegal fire arms and stolen goods. 
Resprop admitted to having given permission to the police to protect Eskom’s employees 
from the delinquency of the illegal residents.87 They had mentioned that there were a number 
of illegal businesses operating at the single quarters with only three official businesses in 
operation.88 NUM and Numsa were outraged by the police raids and Numsa suggested that 
the single quarter management take care of the eviction of illegal businesses, rather than the 
police.  
Despite the difficulties inherent in room-like accommodation, houses proved too expensive 
for Eskom’s employees. On 11 July 1997 one of the points of discussion at a meeting 
between management and trade unions was that Eskom-owned houses sold on the local 
housing market had proven unaffordable for Eskom’s employees. But the proportion of 
83 Minutes of Regional Housing Steering Committee, August 22, 1997, item 5.4. Personal collection of Stephen 
Kekana. 
84  Minutes of Joint Forum, October 9, 1997, item 4.8. Personal collection of Stephen Kekana.  
85 Minutes of Regional Housing Steering Committee, August 22, 1997, item 4.9. Personal collection of Stephen 
Kekana. 
86 Minutes of Meeting held in the Esprop Conference Room, October 1, 1997. Personal collection of Stephen 
Kekana. 
87 Minutes of Meeting held in the Esprop Conference Room, October 15, 1997. Personal collection of Stephen 
Kekana. 
88 Minutes of Meeting held in the Esprop Conference Room, October 8, 1997. Personal collection of Stephen 
Kekana. 
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employees who could not afford the houses is not clear from the records.89 On 24 November 
1997, a representative of Resprop presented the findings of a study into the local housing 
market, which found costs for both purchasing and renting were “extremely high.” He 
recommended that Eskom’s employees purchase the empty plots owned by Eskom, which 
numbered 524 in Marapong and 123 in Onverwacht. The stands would also be “serviced” by 
Resprop and employees would have to finance the construction of their houses themselves.90 
Eskom also offered a housing loan to certain employees.  
The implementation of market-related rentals at Matimba was a long drawn out and 
controversial process, as NUM and Numsa debated the extent of service provision to be 
provided at the single quarters. The unions were particularly concerned with the sparseness of 
recreational facilities, including the library, gymnasium, a football field serviced by the 
power station, and TV sets in rooms. They considered recreational amenities to be the 
“prerequisites for minimum single quarter standards.”91As part of a compromise they reached 
at the end of the year 2000, they agreed to introduce a 50% rental for 2001, holding open the 
option to raise outstanding demands.92 In November 2001, unions argued that their members 
would not be able to afford the new rentals for the following year. In 2002, the question of a 
pay-out was taken more seriously because unions argued that rentals were too high, and that 
empty stands in Marapong owned by Eskom could be bought by these employees. The unions 
stated that the majority of the residents were in favour of moving out of the single quarters, 
with just 15 out of 250 residents against it.93 Another survey was conducted in 2003, by the 
power station’s Services Manager, which found that 151 out of 199 people surveyed agreed 
to the buy-out while 12 were against it.94 Eventually unions and management agreed that 
R30 000 would be paid to workers, a sum that was on par with the Majuba and Hendrina 
power stations.95  Later that year 86% of the single quarter residents “applied to be bought 
out”. In terms of Eskom’s Conditions of Service, these workers could also apply for rental 
and housing subsidies.96 This ended the period of transition to the free market but also 
encouraged the continuation of racial segregation through economic stratification.  
89 Minutes of Task Work group meeting, July 10 &11, 1997.  Personal collection of Stephen Kekana.  
90 Minutes of a Joint Forum, November 24, 1997, Personal collection of Stephen Kekana. 
91 Minutes of the Joint Forum, February 2, 1998, Personal collection of Stephen Kekana. 
92 Minutes of the BU Forum, December 4, 2000, Personal collection of Stephen Kekana. 
93 Minutes of the BU Forum, August 5, 2002, Personal collection of Stephen Kekana. 
94 Minutes of the BU Forum, May 5, 2003, Personal collection of Stephen Kekana. 
95 Minutes of the BU Forum, September 1, 2003, Personal collection of Stephen Kekana. 
96 Minutes of the Bu Forum, August 8, 2003, Personal collection of Stephen Kekana. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted the shifts in the nature of labour relations in the district from 
being characterised as paternalist to one based on the nominal consent of the free market. 
While the paternalist system contained some understanding between the managers and 
employees, the relationship remained fundamentally unequal. The arrival of independent 
black trade unions in the late 1980s thus signified a fundamental shift in the nature of labour 
relations in the region. This coincided with Eskom’s emphasis on the free market during the 
early 1990s, highlighting the perils of economic freedom and the constraints of affordability. 
But the incorporation of independent trade unions into the power station’s formal negotiation 
channels meant that the network gradually adjusted to the demands of transformation and 
affirmative action. This necessitated the implementation of a system of redress to handle the 
effects of the historical exclusion of the country’s black majority from institutions of higher 
education. The transition from a migrant labour system to one that recognised the 
permanency of an African urban population also gave rise to the pressures of stabilisation. 
While it created the incentive for people to remain in the Ellisras district, it also increased the 
demands of citizenship for the local populace. These pressures of localisation were to play a 
large role in the prospects for the Medupi power station’s construction. 
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Chapter 6: Medupi 
Introduction 
The Medupi power station was intended to be the largest dry-cooled power station in the 
world, with a capacity to generate 4800 MW of electricity. Eskom’s pressure to realise its 
ambitious scale was compounded by the high stakes for the power station’s timeous 
completion. Medupi’s completion date has been repeatedly postponed. While Eskom 
expected the first set to reach production by the end of 2011, its completion was delayed until 
2015. Like the construction of Matimba, the Medupi power station was driven by 
desperation. The press and politicians painted Medupi as the panacea to the national 
electricity shortage crisis that manifested in periodic electricity outages for households and 
businesses.  Electricity shortages had a devastating effect on the country’s economy and on 
its growth prospects. Medupi was designed and commissioned alongside a sister power 
station, Kusile, which is situated among the coal fields of Mpumalanga. Many of the 
problems that plagued Medupi were similarly encountered during the construction of Kusile. 
But in the interests of brevity, this chapter will only focus on the construction of Medupi.  
Medupi was hastily planned amid unpropitious global market conditions. A long time-lag 
between the commissioning of Medupi and Eskom’s last power station development in the 
1980s meant that Eskom’s power station construction network had to be desperately revived 
following decades of lethargy. Amid the threat of splintering posed by democracy and neo-
liberalism, Eskom faced severe challenges of long-term planning and stabilisation. The 
absence of long-term planning and seamless network continuity meant that Medupi was from 
its inception a patchwork of various incompatible elements. It was also a high-tech power 
station utilising elements that Eskom had little experience with. In this case the road to 
successful innovation involved numerous and costly instances of backtracking. Rather than a 
massive failure, Medupi was a case of the network adjusting to new circumstances and 
finding ways of absorbing unexpected challenges.  
Medupi was also built during a time of global hostility to coal-fired power stations. Eskom 
was reluctant to embrace renewable energy sources, asserting that the technology was not 
reliable enough to meet the country’s electricity demand.  To reduce the power station’s 
pollutants Eskom opted for the technologically sophisticated super-critical boiler design. But 
the manufacture and installation of the boiler required an intricate welding technique that few 
in the country were familiar with. Welding faults are one of the main reasons for the power 
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station’s delay. The importation of skilled labour to perform the welding resulted in strike 
action from local residents of Lephalale, who argued that the contractors should have 
implemented training in the welding. This conflict was a manifestation of the challenge 
Eskom faced to encourage as much national and local-level development as possible 
alongside the speedy construction of the Medupi power station.  
Persistent labour unrest at the construction site is another reason for the power station’s 
delay. While Eskom kept a safe distance at first, not willing to interfere in the relationship 
between the contractors and their employees, its eventual intervention in 2013 alleviated the 
hostility of labour relations. Government also encouraged the resolution of labour strife 
because of Medupi’s national importance. The heterogenous complexion of the workforce at 
the power station meant that the management of labour surpassed the bounds of normal 
corporate employer-employee relations, under which corporations sought to maximise profit. 
Rather the various managers at Medupi had to recognise the legacy of under-development 
wrought by the large-scale dispossession of land and capital of African residents.  
Part of the rhetorical success of South Africa’s hosting of the Fifa World Cup in 2010 was 
that it demonstrated that Africa’s organisational and infrastructural prowess was worthy of a 
place on the infrastructural world stage. The construction of the World Cup stadiums and its 
transport infrastructure carried a message of defiance to Afro-pessimists. For the public then, 
Medupi’s recurring delays were disappointing in what they implied about the state of 
modernity in South Africa. Blame too often rested on the oft-presumed symptoms of African 
political dysfunctionality, in particular on allegations of corruption that curtailed the efficient 
working of technical instruments. Like many other parastatals, by the 2010’s Eskom had 
become a tool of enrichment for political enrichment, both at the party and individual level. 
However, there also exists a body of managers and engineers, long-standing employees of 
Eskom, who have resisted the undue interference of politicians. At the same time the story of 
Medupi shows that the state also played a facilitating role because it helped to resolve 
paralysing labour conflict. Thus the state acted as both a stabilising and de-stabilising force in 
the development of Medupi.  
Load Shedding  
By 2007 the country faced a desperate shortage of electricity. To ease the pressure of 
consumer demand, Eskom initiated a controversial programme of forced electricity outages at 
regular and pre-announced intervals, termed “load shedding”. In November 2007, the Mail 
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and Guardian expressed its despair over the future of electricity provision in the country: 
“Despite previous assurances by Eskom that there will be enough electricity to go round 
come 2010, this week many South Africans again sat in their dark, silent homes as another 
round of load shedding kicked in.”1 Load shedding had a devastating impact on the country’s 
economic growth. In January 2015, the deputy director-general of the Department of 
Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) estimated that load shedding cost the country 
between R8 billion and R11 billion a day in lost economic activity.2 In 2008, Cosatu 
expressed its concern over the impact of electricity on unemployment: “The Congress of 
South African Trade Unions shares people’s anger at the enormous disruption to their lives 
and the economic prospects for the country caused by Eskom’s ‘load shedding’. It has 
become a serious national embarrassment and could have a major impact on economic 
growth and job creation.”3 By 2011, Medupi and Kusile were expected to come online in 
2017 and there was no respite in sight for the electricity crisis. Eskom expected an “energy 
gap” for 2012, where demand overshot supply. In an interview with the Financial Mail, Brian 
Dames said: “Even if we use all the mechanisms we currently have, there will still be an 
energy gap for 2012.”4 Eskom then began to intervene in the sphere of electricity demand by 
negotiating with its large industrial consumers to reduce their electricity usage. In subsequent 
years, largely due to the slowdown in electricity demand caused by the economic recession, 
load shedding reduced in intensity and public pressure on Eskom receded.  
The period of Medupi’s construction was also one of great optimism over the power of large-
scale infrastructure projects to deliver what was considered sorely needed connectivity 
infrastructure across the African continent. In July 2010, a pan-African infrastructural 
development initiative, called the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa 
(PIDA), was formed with support of the African Development Bank. South African president 
Jacob Zuma stood at its helm, the success of his candidacy boosted by the country’s 
successful hosting of the 2010 World Cup. In his inaugural speech, Zuma described PIDA as 
grappling with an important gap in communications infrastructure on the continent, stating 
that “we cannot trade on the continent because of our lack of infrastructure”.5 As such the 
1 “Dark Times Ahead,” Mail and Guardian, November 15, 2007.  
2 “Load Shedding Costs SA Dearly,” The Star, July 30, 2015.  
3 “Eskom’s ‘Load Shedding’ Crisis,” Cosatu Press Statements, January 16, 2008. 
http://www.cosatu.org.za/show.php?ID=309#sthash.VERr8T6s.dpuf 
4 “Power in Process,” Financial Mail, January 14, 2011. 
5 “Africa Launches an Ambitious Programme for Infrastructure Development | NEPAD,” July 26, 2010. 
http://www.nepad.org/content/africa-launches-ambitious-programme-infrastructure-development. 
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growth in connectivity was, at least in rhetoric, intended to stimulate trade between and 
within African countries.   
There also existed a substantial global antipathy to coal fired power stations at the time that 
Eskom commissioned Medupi. Its large institutional funders, the World Bank and the African 
Development Bank (AFDB), confronted the wrath of environmental organisations once they 
agreed to fund the power station.6 Eskom initially estimated that Medupi would cost R 
125.63-billion, 47% of which it hoped to borrow from institutional funders. Other sources of 
funding for the construction of Medupi were increases in electricity tariffs and Eskom 
bonds.7The World Bank agreed to provide a $3.75-billion loan in 20108 and the African 
Development Bank agreed to lend Eskom 1.86-billion euros (an estimated R21-billion at the 
time) at the end of 2009.9 As a testament to the haste with which Medupi was planned, 
Eskom raised these funds after the main contracts were awarded. In April 2010, the 
environmental conservation organisations Earthlife Africa and groundWork laid complaints 
with both the AFDB and the World Bank, urging them to investigate various aspects of 
Medupi’s construction they argued constituted instances of improper environmental 
management. Eskom viewed the environmental organisations with suspicion and in 2013 was 
forced to apologise to Greenpeace for spying on their activities. 
South Africa’s electricity supply crisis and the consequent pressure on the country’s 
economic growth were enough to quell the Banks’ fears about the power stations’ 
environmental destruction. Both the World Bank and the AFDB argued that the construction 
of a coal-fuelled power station was the only way in which South Africa’s electricity demand 
forecast could be met, which would in turn assure the country’s 4% projected GDP growth. 
The sense of urgency and crisis surrounding Medupi thus affected their decision to provide 
the funding. Responding to accusations that Medupi’s environmental impact contradicted the 
Banks’ own conservation policies, both the African Development Bank and the World Bank 
stated that their funding was retroactive. At the time that the AFDB approved its loan to 
Medupi, Eskom had already awarded the boiler and turbine contracts and the contractors had 
already spent twenty months on the design of the boilers and turbines.10 The Bank was unable 
6 “World Bank Approves Eskom Loan,” Mail and Guardian, April 9, 2010.  
7 African Development Bank, Management response to the request for verification of compliance to bank 
policies regarding the Medupi power project, South Africa. 
8 “World Bank Approves Eskom Loan,” Mail and Guardian, April 9, 2010. 
9 “Eskom Will Get R21 bn Loan to Build Power Station,” The Star, November 27, 2009. 
10 African Development Bank, Management response to the request for verification of compliance to bank 
policies regarding the Medupi power project, South Africa. 
172 
 
                                                 
to align its own specifications for environmental conservation with those of Eskom’s. 
Similarly, the World Bank argued that Eskom conducted the Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) for Medupi before it agreed to the loan and that it could not provide input 
into the EIA. Construction work had already started for the power station when the loans 
were granted. Thus the country’s electricity crisis and its effects on economic growth 
encouraged the power station’s funders to bypass normal environmental impact evaluation 
procedures. 
The Banks’ investigative reports into Medupi’s environmental impact are also useful 
explanatory sources for Eskom’s reluctance to place its entire faith in renewable sources of 
energy. Scholars have attributed the continued dominance of coal-powered electricity 
generation to the peculiar institutional configuration and lasting hold of the Minerals-Energy 
Complex. This idea suggests that Eskom has used its monopolistic position, and historical 
relationship with the country’s coal mines, to continue building fossil-fuelled power plants.11 
Joel Krupa and Sarah Burch argue that historic long-term coal contracts drawn up between 
Eskom and the country’s coal mines have rendered the power station coal comparatively 
cheap. But this supposition ignores the fact that the long-term coal contracts were not always 
to Eskom’s advantage. The fickle nature of the coal export market meant that during 
downturns, Eskom’s coal contracts provided a lifeline to coal suppliers. In addition Eskom 
was more experienced in constructing coal-fired electricity power stations, emphasising the 
importance of the long-standing role of the large technical systems network.  
In its report, the AFDB, drawing on Eskom’s own analysis, stated that renewable energy 
sources of solar and wind power were not viable alternatives because they were “not possible 
to develop in a scalable and timely manner”12 to meet the country’s supply deficit. One 
possibility involved generating electricity from “heavy fuel oil”, but this was considered too 
expensive because it would rely on imported oil and “would not provide the same level of 
energy security and self-sufficiency.”13 In addition Eskom could not place its faith in the 
efficacy of South Africa’s electricity generating neighbours, which together formed the 
Southern African Power Pool (SAPP). Ideally, South Africa could import electricity from the 
Democratic Republic of Congo’s Inga 3 hydropower project. This involved the construction 
11 Joel Krupa and Sarah Burch, “A New Energy Future for South Africa: The Political Ecology of South African 
Renewable Energy,” Energy Policy, Sustainability of biofuels, 39, no. 10 (October 2011): 6259. 
12 African Development Bank, Management response to the request for verification of compliance to bank 
policies regarding the Medupi power project, South Africa, p5. 
13 ibid. 
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of a dam and a 4800 MW hydroelectric plant at the Inga Falls on the Congo River.14 But the 
eventual completion of the project lay beyond Eskom’s control. The dam was only in its 
planning stages at the time and its commissioning date had yet to be confirmed.15 In addition, 
South Africa’s importation of electricity from the DRC would place pressure on an already 
straitened power supply in the SAPP. Thus Eskom considered the possible alternatives to a 
coal-fired power station to be unfeasible considering the large volume of electricity it had to 
generate. 
Medupi: Contractors and Technical Difficulties 
As decades before, with the design and construction of the Matimba power station, many 
observers doubted Medupi’s feasibility. Critics argued that the scale of the project was too 
ambitious – in terms of its generating capacity and its technological sophistication. In 2013, 
when its delay had become apparent amid the strains of load shedding, the Mail and 
Guardian reported the opinions of Eskom watchers from various sectors. They proclaimed 
that Medupi was cursed from inception. A member of the South Africa-based Free Market 
Foundation’s Energy Policy Unit argued that Eskom failed to prioritise speed by opting for a 
complex, high-tech “mega station”. Eskom’s boast that Medupi was the first of its kind, and a 
global pioneer in power station construction, was not necessarily desirable considering that 
“off-the-shelf” standard models, commonly used in India and China, of power station 
development would have satisfied the same function. According to the AFDB report, a 
smaller power station with a lower capacity would not have satisfied Eskom’s electricity 
supply requirements.16 But a coal analyst interviewed by the Mail and Guardian defended the 
economies of scale, arguing that the nature of the Waterberg coal made it suitable for a large 
power station in the area. Coal mining was only economically efficient when mined in large 
quantities, and a power station with a large generating capacity was needed to receive the 
coal supply.17 
 
Brian Dames, Eskom’s CEO at the time of Medupi’s construction, denied the idea that the 
large-scale nature of Medupi necessarily meant that the power station planning was 
misguided from the start. However he conceded that its construction might have run smoother 
if Eskom had started planning earlier and if construction had started on three units at first, 
14 http://www.internationalrivers.org/campaigns/the-inga-3-hydropower-project. 
15 See the Introduction to this thesis for more on the troubled history of the Inga hydropower project. 
16 African Development Bank, Management response to the request for verification of compliance to bank 
policies regarding the Medupi power project, South Africa, p6 
17 “Medupi Mission Impossible,” Mail and Guardian, July 18, 2013. 
174 
 
                                                 
with the other units incrementally added.18 He argued that Eskom found itself in a weak 
bargaining position in 2007 when it first approached the handful of engineering global 
corporations to supply the power station’s specialised components. Buoyed by the rising 
industrial powers of India and China, global demand for power stations was high and these 
corporations were swamped with orders. In September 2013, Dames further described the 
dire effects of the electricity supply crisis on Medupi’s design. Because of the cessation of 
capital investment during the 1990s, Eskom’s decision to construct Medupi and Kusile came 
too late to allay the electricity supply crisis. Dames stated that: “building Medupi and Kusile 
too late meant we also had little opportunity to complete all the upfront planning. We went 
ahead based on virtual designs, and using the best footprint available in Eskom at the time - 
the designs for the Majuba power station, which had been designed in the 1980s and 
completed in 2001.”19 Majuba and Kendal were also dry-cooled power stations and the 
immediate predecessors of Medupi and Kusile.  Nonetheless, he attributed the delay of the 
power stations’ completion, from the first estimate of 2011 to the then current target of 2014, 
not to an inherently flawed plan but to “underperformance by key contractors.”20 Thus, he 
argued, the contingent factors in the process of construction played as important a role in the 
power station delay as any faults in the initial design.  
The Expansion of the Grootgeluk Coal Mine 
To prepare for the coming of Medupi, the Grootgeluk coal mine underwent a process of 
expansion. According to Joe Mayer, the General Manager the Medupi Expansion Project at 
the Grootgeluk coal mine during this period: “Medupi expansion on our side involved the 
expansion on the side of the mine: we doubled up the mine to meet Medupi’s demand and 
that meant more housing, accommodating a lot of contractors. At our peak when we did the 
mine expansion, we accommodated about 5 000 contract workers which had to be 
accommodated in all kinds of accommodation.”21 The expansion process involved the greater 
use of capital intensive, automated mining operations. In 2009, Mayer told Mining Weekly: 
“we will actually just be mining faster.”22 The mine had opted for an in-pit crushing and 
conveying system (IPCC), which meant that coal was crushed inside the pit and then 
transmitted via a conveyer belt to a spreader for further dispersal. The IPCC is generally 
18 ibid. 
19 Brian Dames, “The Lessons That Eskom Have Learnt the Hard Way,” Infrastructure News, September 17, 
2013, http://www.infrastructurene.ws/2013/09/17/the-lessons-eskom-learnt-the-hard-way/. 
20 ibid. 
21 Interview with Joe Meyer, 17 March 2015, Onverwacht. 
22 “Exxaro’s R9bn Medupi Coal Expansion Project at Grootegeluk,” Mining Weekly, December 11, 2009. 
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intended to reduce reliance on what was the previous “haul and dump” practice at the coal 
mine. In this model, massive trucks drove into the pit where it was loaded with tonnes of coal 
and then driven out the pit. The IPCC was more automated than the truck-driven system and 
was most attractive under conditions of high fuel and labour costs.23  
Exxaro confidently completed the expansion of the Grootgeluk coal mine to schedule. The 
company was at the time engaged in a broader process of expansion, seeking to exploit 
previously untouched coal reserves. The rise of the industrial powers in East Asia had opened 
the market for coal exports and in 2014, it was reported that 70% of Exxaro’s coal exports 
were geared for India and China. Asia had overtaken Europe as Exxaro’s chief continental 
client for coal. 24 In 2012, its CEO Sipho Nkosi described the possibilities Exxaro’s 
management had considered opening a new coal mine, building on the increased skills and 
capabilities the company had accrued from the Grootgeluk coal mine. Prospects on the 
horizon included the exploitation of other areas of the Waterberg, at an incipient mine called 
Thabametsi, as well as a potential coal mine in Mozambique. At the time, Exxaro had 
established itself as a global coal mining player, and was in the process of developing a coal 
mine called Moranbah South in Australia, with a production capacity of 12-million tonnes of 
coking coal a year.25 
Coal Contract 
However, Exxaro’s readiness to supply Medupi with coal came up against the power station’s 
inability to receive it. This was ultimately to Eskom’s disadvantage, and necessitated a 
review of the coal contract. On 30 March 2007, Eskom signed a forty year, long-term coal 
contract with Exxaro. This initial contract covered the coal supply for only the first three 
units of Medupi, and for an estimated 7.3 million tonnes.26 In 2009, following a review of the 
coal contract, Eskom temporarily suspended the agreement. At the time, Eskom was also 
reviewing its coal contracts at other power stations in a bid to lower its input costs. Brian 
Dames told the Business Day that “the world has totally changed since the conclusion of the 
agreement.”27 Changes in the coal industry emanated from the historic concern of the 
unwieldy private sector and the attractive opportunities for coal export thrown up by the 
growth in demand from India and China for South Africa’s lower quality coal. Eskom also 
23 “Spreading the Load,” Inside Mining, September 2014. 
24 ibid. 
25 “Exxaro’s Grootegeluk Medupi expansion project to start production in latter half of 2012,” Mining Weekly, 
August 26, 2011.  
26 “South Africa: Exxaro Seals Coal Contract with Eskom,” Business Day, March 30, 2007.  
27 “Eskom to Review Exxaro Coal Contract,” Business Day, December 9, 2009.  
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opted to draw up short-term coal contracts with the collieries because of inadequate supply 
from the “tied-mines” that Eskom had signed long-term coal contracts with.28  
 For Eskom this was due to years of pressure to cast off any “wasteful expenditure”. This can 
be seen in Eskom’s expression of a newfound desire to do away with long-term contracts.29  
In many cases these had been “cost-plus” arrangements where Eskom owned part of the coal 
mine as a measure to allay the risks of starting up or expanding production for the mine 
owners.  In early 2016, Engineering News reported that: ‘Using the analogy of a bakery, 
acting CEO [of Eskom] Brian Molefe said the idea would be to source “healthy bread”, or 
“healthy coal”, without actually “owning the bakery”.30 “I don’t see the coal industry 
objecting to us getting the correct quality of coal for our power stations and getting out of the 
cost-plus arrangements. We are not interested in owning mines; we are not interested in 
contributing capital expenditure to the mines. We would like to buy coal from the suppliers 
that can give us coal at the best price,” he said.’31 Part of Eskom’s managers’ discontent was 
that the tied coal mines were not performing as they would have liked and inefficiencies were 
shifted onto the price of coal.   
This broader background of concern for the price of coal did not have the same effect on the 
relationship between Grootgeluk and Medupi as it did at Eskom’s other power stations. 
However, the timing of the coal delivery became an issue of recurring concern. The 
agreement was eventually confirmed in April 2010 and Exxaro resumed its funding of the 
project. The revised agreement postponed the delivery of the coal from the mine to Medupi 
by a year, from the end of 2010 to 2011. This was important because if Medupi’s boilers 
were not ready to receive the coal by the time specified in the coal contract, Eskom would 
still have to pay for what was in effect unused coal. This situation of wasted expenditure 
materialised in 2013 when Eskom paid penalties of R1.6-billion to Exxaro in 2013 and R352-
million in 2012 for its inability to receive the coal. Exxaro also expected Eskom to pay R1.6-
billion in penalties for 2014 because Eskom could not receive the six million tonnes of coal 
that were ready for delivery.  
28 “Eskom’s Coal Moans Find a Sympathetic Ear,” Business Day, November 23, 2010. 
29 “Exxaro Opts to Stoke up Its Coal Business,” Business Day Live, August 21, 2015. 
30 “Eskom Unveils New Coal-Sourcing Strategy as It Pursues R2bn Optimum Claim,” Engineering News, 
August 11, 2015.  
31 ibid. 
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Contractors  
Medupi’s delay was due to a series of cascading problems, not least interminable trouble with 
the contractors.  In July 2013, Eskom’s chief financial officer Paul O’Flaherty said in an 
interview with the radio station SAFM, that Eskom had faced adverse conditions since 
Medupi’s inception. “We have continued to be on [the] back foot for most of this project,” he 
said.32 As reported, Eskom had a less than ideal relationship with its contractors due to the 
high global demand for power station equipment.  When the main contracts were awarded 
Medupi had a budget of R78.6-billion, of which the boiler and turbine contracts made up an 
estimated R33-billion.33 Similar contracts were simultaneously awarded to the same 
companies for the Kusile power station. This large capital expenditure meant that Eskom was 
more likely to proceed tenaciously against the odds when faced with technical failure rather 
than abandon the power stations entirely.  
While these contracts were awarded to global engineering corporations, Eskom set down 
strict requirements for the involvement of local industry because of its high levels of capital 
expenditure. While accepting that some of the equipment would be imported, Eskom 
expected that at least half of the installations at Medupi would be supplied locally.34 To fulfil 
the requirements for localisation, these companies merged with South African companies. 
The president of Alstom in South Africa Didier Farez said that the country had sufficient 
capacity and expertise to render the local targets realisable.35 To enlarge its capacity, Alstom 
was then in the process of establishing a subsidiary called Alstom Africa holdings, which 
would oversee the delivery of Eskom’s equipment. Alstom Africa had compiled a list of the 
equipment and material that could possibly be sourced from local suppliers. These included: 
“air coolers, pumps, auxiliary equipment for the turbine island, and structural steel and piping 
fabrication related to the turbine hall”.36As with the construction of the Matimba power 
station, this equipment was mainly intended for auxiliary use; to assist in the installation and 
housing of the main power station equipment. This meant there was an extensive process of 
vertical integration.   
32 “Eskom on Medupi Delay: We take full Responsibility,” Mail and Guardian, July 9, 2013.  
33 “Eskom Awards Biggest Contracts in SA’s History to Hitachi and Alstom,” Engineering News, November 13, 
2007. 
34 “The Spending Begins,” Financial Mail, August 15, 2008. 
35 ibid. 
36 “Alstom Looks to Place Upwards of €1,4bn of SA Power Work with Local Industry,” Engineering News, 
February 28, 2008. 
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Boilers 
The continued appeal of a fossil fuel power station was that technological advances had 
significantly reduced the scale of the air pollutant emissions. One of the distinctive features 
of Medupi is its use of super-critical boilers. Super-critical technology made more efficient 
use of steam pressure within the boiler and reduced the sole dependence on the power of the 
heat generated by the coal combustion. Super-critical boiler technology rose to prominence in 
the 1980s when technologists became concerned to reduce the harmful environmental 
impacts of coal combustion. In countries like South Africa and Germany, coal was the 
cheaper and the more competitive option for electricity generation, but was denounced by 
environmental activists who progressively achieved a growing clout.37  A super-critical boiler 
favoured high capital investment over operating costs. It was thus the preferred option where 
coal was expensive because the boilers required less of it. But at Medupi, there is no 
indication that coal costs were higher than the ideal. Rather the Grootgeluk coal mine 
continued to be one of Eskom’s lowest cost collieries. Thus the main incentive for the 
installation of a super-critical boiler was its ability to reduce environmental pollution.38 
Awarding the Contract 
Amid widespread suspicions of corruption from ANC officials in the awarding of contracts, it 
appears that those seeking to profit off the large infrastructure expenditure have manipulated 
rather than completely eroded Eskom’s internal, legal processes.39 Eskom awarded the 
contract to manufacture and install the super-critical boilers at Medupi to the company 
Hitachi Africa. This decision was controversial because the ANC owned 25% of the 
company’s shares through its investment arm, Chancellor House. The stark coincidence gave 
rise to suspicions that the contract was improperly awarded. In 2009, following a request 
from Helen Zille, South Africa’s main opposition leader, the Public Protector launched an 
investigation into Eskom’s tender decision-making process. During the investigation the role 
of Eskom’s chairperson Valli Moosa, who was also a member of the ANC’s fundraising 
committee at the time that the contract was awarded, came under particular scrutiny. In the 
report of his findings the Public Protector cited an article published by the Mail and 
Guardian which detailed the fact that in the same month Eskom decided to construct Medupi, 
37 “Can Coal Be Clean?” The Economist, November 30, 2006. 
38 African Development Bank, Management response to the request for verification of compliance to bank 
policies regarding the Medupi power project, South Africa, p2 
39 Neopatrimonial politics, as Cristopher Clapham has noted, is characterized by a peculiar combination of 
formal institutional design and the predatory pursuit of individual wealth accumulation. Mkandawire, 
“Neopatrimonialism and the Political Economy of Economic Performance in Africa.” 
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Chancellor House acquired a 25% stake in the shares of Hitachi Africa.40 Moosa had been the 
chairperson of Eskom for four months at the time. In his evidence to the Public Protector’s 
Commission of Inquiry, however, Moosa argued that Eskom’s tender process was sound and 
that there was no room for an “arbitrary” ruling on his part. His statement was backed by the 
findings of an independent review conducted by the auditing firm Deloitte, which concluded 
that the tender process had been fair. While the Public Protector concluded that the tender had 
not been improperly awarded, he faulted Moosa for his failure to manage his conflict of 
interests in accordance with Eskom’s policy. This potential conflict of interest arose because 
of Moosa’s capacity as a member of the ANC’s National Executive Committee and as 
Eskom’s chairperson.41 
The controversy died down following the Public Protector’s investigation and the matter 
remained a surprising coincidence until October 2015, when an investigation by the United 
States’ Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) revealed that Hitachi had “inaccurately 
recorded improper payments” to the ANC. The payments consisted of a $1-million “success 
fee” and $5-million in dividends from the ANC’s shares in the company and were related to 
the award of the Medupi boiler contract.42 In response to these allegations, Hitachi opted to 
remain mute, agreeing instead to pay a $19-million fine to settle the charges. The evidence 
unearthed by the SEC’s investigation, which included internal company emails, together with 
Hitachi’s unwillingness to launch a defence provides compelling reasons to suspect a 
relationship of impropriety between the ANC and Hitachi. However, this does not mean that 
Eskom’s tender process had been compromised and there is little evidence in the public 
domain to support this claim.  
The SEC’s investigation revealed that the relationship between Chancellor House and Hitachi 
began in late 2005. The following year Hitachi submitted its tender application for the boilers 
and turbines at Medupi, and in 2007 similar tenders for the Kusile power station. In May 
2007, an executive member of Hitachi Africa emailed his or her colleagues in the company, 
stating that while the company ““had not been successful in receiving any update [from 
Eskom]," Chancellor House and “HPA's 5% shareholder” were doing "their very best" to 
40 “Report on an Investigation into an Allegation of Improper Conduct by the Former Chairperson of the Board 
of Directors of Eskom Holdings Limited, Mr V Moosa, Relating to the Awarding of a Contract,” Report of the 
Public Protector of South Africa, ML Mushwana, February 18, 2009, 8. 
41 ibid, 35. 
42 “Hitachi Fined in US for Paying ANC ‘front,’” Business Day, September 29, 2015. 
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bring Hitachi's offer for the Eskom contracts "in first place."”43 Their efforts were clearly 
unsuccessful because in August 2007 Eskom awarded the boiler contract to the French 
multinational, Alstom. Alstom had been Hitachi’s only rival in the tender race. If Hitachi and 
Chancellor House indeed worked hand in hand, their initial failure was proof of the fact that 
the latter did not have a direct influence on the tendering process. Eskom’s tender evaluation 
board retained remained accountable to its internal procedures.  
Nonetheless, Hitachi eventually acquired the contract following the breakdown of 
negotiations between Alstom and Eskom. The SEC argued that Hitachi had gotten wind of 
the fact that Eskom was having difficulties negotiating its terms with Alstom. Hitachi 
consequently “directed Chancellor House to help Hitachi win reconsideration of the boiler 
component of the Medupi power station contract.”44 By July 2008, Chancellor House had 
received its “success” fee together with the dividend payments from its shares. In addition, 
the SEC alleged that when Hitachi bought back its shares from Chancellor House to dampen 
the surrounding controversy, the latter received a 5000 % return on its shares. There is thus 
evidence of an improper relationship between Chancellor House and Hitachi, but the degree 
to which Chancellor House could influence Eskom’s tender process is unclear. It is however 
probable that the appearance of success was enough for Chancellor House to claim payment 
of its “success fee”.  
Difficulties with Installation 
Hitachi was not a new entrant to the South African electricity generation market.  It had in 
fact a long and deep rooted relationship with Eskom through its control of the boiler 
manufacturing company Steinmuller. As discussed in Chapter Three, Steinmuller was 
previously responsible for manufacturing and installing the boilers at the Matimba power 
station, as part of a consortium of contracting companies. In 1999 Babcock Borsig bought 
Steinmuller and then in 2003, Hitachi bought the energy division of Babcock Borsig.45 
Despite the continuity in installing the equipment at a local level, they were also faced with a 
changed set of operating conditions in the development of the power station.  
But the installation of the boiler was not as smooth as hoped. In March 2013, the Business 
Day reported on Eskom’s suspicion that the reports it received from Hitachi detailing 
43 Securities and Exchange Commission vs Hitachi ltd, 10 (United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia 2015), 13. 
44 “From Hitachi Deal with Arm of ANC to Power Cuts,” Bloomberg, October 5, 2015. 
45 Hitachi and Steinmuller at odds over SA boiler reference sites, Engineering News, December 5, 2007.  
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progress on the boiler work may have concealed the true threat of the welding faults. 
Investigations had revealed that some of the welding performed on the boiler at Hitachi’s 
factory in the Johannesburg East Rand town of Nigel, did not meet the required specifications 
and that “9 000 pressure welds had not been post-weld heat-treated…”46 Paul O’Flaherty, 
Eskom’s financial director at the time, claimed that Eskom had repeatedly warned Hitachi 
about potential problems with the welding procedures. He was quoted as saying: “We have 
been telling Hitachi we don’t believe you are conforming to your specifications and they have 
said, ‘Don’t worry, we’ll take the risk, we’ll take the risk.’”47  
The welding was a very delicate process, consisting of thousands of intricate welds to 
connect pipes and equipment. Since Eskom and the subcontractors had no experience in 
installing super-critical boilers, they encountered a desperate shortage of skilled labour. 
According to interviewees who were employed at Hitachi during this time, the boiler at 
Medupi was fundamentally different to any boiler installed at any of Eskom’s power stations, 
including its Waterberg predecessor Matimba. The super-critical technology utilised by the 
boiler meant it could withstand far higher temperatures and pressure.48 In September 2013, 
the Hitachi Power Africa representative responsible for both Medupi and Kusile, Mark 
Marais, discussed at a Department of Science and Technology seminar the catastrophic 
consequence of the lack of competent welders in the country. The power stations required a 
particular type of welding called “mirror welding” which meant that the welder would have 
to perform the weld on the basis of a reflected image in a mirror before him. Commenting on 
the complexity of the operation, Marais quipped: “I can’t even tie my shoelaces while 
looking in the mirror.”49 
This discontent manifested in a violent strike in 2011 that resulted in an estimated R104-
million in damages and 221 677 lost “working days”. A key source of dissension was that 
contractors had employed “foreign” workers to perform specialised tasks- in this case Thai 
welders- and striking workers argued that members of the local community should be trained 
to perform the same function.50 Murray and Roberts’ spokesperson described in response the 
company’s efforts to train 1 000 workers, which were not entirely successful because the 
training had taken longer than the time available. At the time when their skills were most 
46 “Eskom Says Medupi Welding Faults Were ‘concealed,’” Business Day, March 19, 2013. 
47 ibid. 
48 Interview (anonymous), Johannesburg Country Club, 25 June 2015. 
49 “Skills Shortage Inhibiting Success of Local Infrastructure Projects – Hitachi,” Engineering News, September 
12, 2013. 
50 “Strikers Riot at Power Project,” Times Live, May 11, 2011, 
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needed, not enough of the trainees had qualified and the skills shortfall was made up by 
importing foreign workers. He estimated that 200 foreign artisans were employed at Medupi, 
a number matched by the number of local workers in employ. 51  
The factory in question was situated in the Johannesburg East Rand town of Nigel and was 
nominally run by a subcontractor of Hitachi, DB Thermal. DB Thermal also had a long-
standing presence in South Africa, dating back to the 1970s when it supplied cooling 
equipment to the mines. In partnership with Hitachi, it invested in the development of a brand 
new boiler manufacturing facility in 2009. Its stated motivation in expanding the factory in 
Nigel in 2009 was to fulfil Eskom’s 60% local manufacturing requirement by establishing a 
local manufacturing presence and to invest in training a skilled welding workforce. This 
development was an extension of the company’s already existing manufacturing facilities in 
Nigel, which were initially established during the 1970s to supply the boilers for Sasol’s own 
electricity generating units. The company was also involved in manufacturing parts for 
Eskom’s new power stations in the 1980s. In 2002, the company became the subject of 
interest of global capital when the US based global manufacturing company of SPX became 
its majority shareholder.52  
 On July 25, one of the subcontractors responsible for welding on the boiler was charged with 
fraud. Forensic investigations instituted by Hitachi discovered that the subcontractor had 
submitted fraudulent documents, in covering up the extent of irregularity in the boiler work.53 
After ongoing investigations, Eskom reported in September 2013 that the nature of the fraud 
was so sophisticated that it had gone undetected by the professional bodies responsible for 
quality assurance. Eskom asserted that the subcontractor had used the incorrect welding 
procedures in the boiler equipment it intended supplying to Medupi. The welding procedures 
did not fit Eskom’s quality control assessments and thus could not confidently withstand the 
high heat and air pressures that would be created within the boiler by the super-critical 
technology. In addition, the post-weld heat treatment was incorrectly performed.54 Post-weld 
treatment is generally required for the material surrounding the weld which is ordinarily 
damaged during the intense heat treatment of the welding process.55 This corresponded with 
the insights of a Hitachi employee who requested anonymity. He described the problem as 
51 “Medupi Dispute ‘Hinges on Lack of Special Skills,’” The Star, May 13, 2011. 
52 http://www.spx.com/en/db-thermal/about-us/ 
53 “Medupi Contractor Charged with Fraud,” Business Day, July 25, 2013. 
54 “Police Investigating Fraud over Welding Work at Medupi,” Business Day, September 11, 2013. 
55 http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/130911medupi_0.pdf, p17 
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due to the fact that “it was a new type of boiler tube material (which required higher welding 
skill) coupled with inexperience and aggravated by poor management and QA processes.”56 
The technical failure was thus due to a combination of inexperienced welders employed at the 
Nigel factory, who were not suitably trained to handle the required welding, and the failure of 
quality assurance management to notice that welding did not fulfil the proper requirements.  
The programme subsequently put in place to repair the fault repaired the boiler to fit the 
technical specifications. The repair work involved a team of about 50 workers, carrying out 
repairs on the welds so that the workmanship fitted with the Weld Procedure Qualification 
Record protocols.57 In addition, a subcontractor had to replace four “separators”, a device 
used to separate water from steam within the boiler system.58 Eventually in November 2013, 
Hitachi reported that its boiler work at Medupi was mainly complete. This followed Eskom’s 
postponement of Medupi’s commission date from the end of 2013 to the second half of 
2014.59 This also came after the budget was revised from R91.2-billion to R105-billion, 
excluding interest. Thus, the pressures for localisation in terms of tailoring the power station 
to fit South Africa’s unique environmental and social conditions meant the utilisation of 
particularly innovative materials. But the “networks’” lack of experience with this innovative 
technology fell on the lack of a readily skilled workforce to install the boilers. 
Alstom and the Control and Instrumentation system  
As mentioned above, in November 2009 Eskom announced that the contract for the control 
and instrumentation system would be awarded to French multinational Alstom. At an update 
to the Parliamentary Monitoring Group in September 2013, Eskom Group Executive Dan 
Marokane described the role of the Control and Instrumentation system, stating that “the 
whole of Medupi would be controlled by a Distributed Control System, which was a complex 
computer and instrumentation system that allowed operators to safely monitor and control 
what happened to the plant, internally and externally.”60 Alstom already held the contracts to 
install the power station turbines at Medupi and Kusile. The control and instrumentations 
system contract was worth Rl.1-billion but Eskom had made the award only for Medupi, and 
held back on its decision to award the contract for Kusile. The piece-meal awarding of 
56 Email correspondence, follow-up to: Interview (anonymous), Johannesburg Country Club, 25 June 2015. 
57 “Hitachi Confirms Medupi Progress, Insists It Can Meet Revised Schedule,” Engineering News, November 
14, 2013. 
58 ibid. 
59 ibid. 
60 Eskom, “Medupi Power Station Issues: Updates by Eskom and the Department of Public Enterprises,” 
September 11, 2013, https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/16367/.  
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contracts was because Eskom was wary of committing itself entirely in a context where 
demand from South African industry was generally low.61  
Further technical crisis ensued in July 2013 when Alstom reported that tests on its boiler 
protection system, which included a component of its overall control and instrumentation 
system, had failed. Its explanation for the failure was that the configuration required was too 
complex for its design capacity, considering that “no other coal plant has been built on this 
scale.”62 Eventually in January 2014 the contract to install the Boiler Protection System 
(BPS), was awarded to the German electrical engineering company Siemens. Nonetheless, 
the boiler protection system was a small component of the overall C&I system, which Alstom 
had successfully developed.63The overhauling of the contract came at a heavy cost to Eskom, 
but Siemens managed to successfully develop the software. 
By mid-2013, it became clear that Medupi’s delay had significant consequences on Eskom’s 
financial well-being. Bloomberg reported that Eskom’s bonds had taken a blow following its 
announcement that Medupi would be postponed. Investor perception that Eskom was a risky 
venture had skyrocketed.64 Analysts quoted in the article suggested that the only reason 
Eskom remained investment-grade was because it was backed by government guarantees.65 
During the same week, O’Flaherty promised that Eskom would take stricter action in 
recovering penalties from contractors for non-delivery. In September 2013, Eskom’s 
commercial director Dan Marokane confirmed this sentiment in a statement to the 
Parliamentary portfolio committee that “we will be going after contractors”66. This led to 
legal battles which went all the way to the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA). Eskom sought to 
utilise its right to call in its performance bonds against Hitachi as penalties for non-delivery. 
Performance bonds are a commonly used mechanism in capital intensive projects, intended to 
function as a guarantee for the client if the contractor failed to deliver. The funds are set aside 
by the contractor as part of its contractual obligation. The SCA eventually ruled in Eskom’s 
favour in September 2013, by upholding Eskom’s right to call in its performance bonds from 
61 “Eskom Awards New R1,1bn Medupi Contract, Holds Back on Kusile,” Engineering News, November 23, 
2009. 
62 “Alstom admits Boiler Protection System tests were not ‘fully satisfactory,’” Mining Weekly, July 9, 2013.   
63 “Cancelling Alstom’s Boiler Protection Software contract ‘proactive’ step,” Business Day, January 31, 2014. 
64 “Investors Punish Eskom for Delays,” The Star, July 10, 2013. 
65 ibid. 
66 “Eskom Tries to Keep Hitachi in Line,” Engineering News, September 11, 2013. 
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the Mizhuo Corporate Bank of Japan, which had acted as guarantor for Hitachi’s work for 
Eskom.67 The guarantees amounted to about R600-million.  
Small Contractors 
Further problems with localisation can be seen in Eskom’s struggle to incorporate Ellisras-
based contractors. One of the prerogatives of Medupi was to assist local entrepreneurs in 
Lephalale. In a letter written to the community based newspaper of Mogol Pos, Lephalale 
resident Wayne Derksen, who represented the Lephalale Builders Forum complained that 
Medupi did not pay contractors in time. Small, Lephalale-based contractors were unable to 
cope with payment delays from Medupi in the same way that large-scale “corporate 
companies” could. These large corporations were generally based outside of Lephalale. 
“Most businesses in Lephalale,” he argued “have never received a written order in the excess 
of R100 000 let alone R1 000 000.”68 Failure to receive payment after 30 days meant that the 
company struggled to cover its running costs for the month, paving the way for liquidation. In 
addition, the small contractors complained about the fact that when construction stopped due 
to labour unrest, so did the payment processes. 
This stemmed from Murray and Roberts’ overt policy of empowering small contractors and 
local entrepreneurs. Rather than sourcing goods and services directly, sub-contracting 
increased the number of corporations in the supply chain. But these contractors struggled 
against the reins of what they considered Eskom’s mistakes, which curtailed their ability to 
work efficiently. In one case the small construction firm Baraata Construction and Projects, a 
subcontractor of the construction firm Basil Reed, applied for the latter’s liquidation because 
of alleged non-payment.69 Baraata had been tasked with the installation of ceilings and 
partitions in some of the buildings at Medupi. As such, while it was Eskom’s policy to 
encourage local industry and economic development, small contractors struggled to produce 
at the same level of efficiency as large corporations which contained some bulwark against 
risk in the form of economies of scale and expertise outside of Lephalale.70  
67 Eskom Holdings Soc Limited v Hitachi Power Africa (Pty) Ltd & another, Supreme Court of Appeal, 
September 12, 2013. 
68 “Corporate Contractors Bad Payers,” Mogol Pos, September 2, 2011. 
69 “Subcontractor applies for Basil Read liquidation,” Moneyweb, September 4, 2015. 
http://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/companies-and-deals/subcontractor-applies-for-basil-read-liquidation. 
70 “Medupi contractors blast Eskom,” Fin24, April 29, 2012. 
http://www.fin24.com/Companies/Industrial/Medupi-contractors-blast-Eskom-20120429. 
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Labour 
Medupi has been beset by labour strife at the construction site for the years 2011 to 2015, 
resulting in work stoppages and remarkably low levels of productivity. The twin imperatives 
of transformation and speedy construction have bedevilled the state of the current 
infrastructure projects. The challenge of democratisation to the development of the 
infrastructure project was thus its ability to cater to the many demands for transformation and 
uplift attached to the idea of the grand project. Resolving the labour disputes involved wide 
ranging interventions from government officials and from Eskom. A key challenge has been 
to contain all the disparate desires. One of the persistent sources of discontent at the Medupi 
site has been the implementation of the Project Labour Agreement (PLA), an agreement 
signed between the contractors and trade unions at the beginning of the build project. 
Intended to govern labour relations for the duration of the construction, the PLA was 
designed to enforce construction stability by reducing labour disruption. But the labour 
agreement has a controversial history, with critics describing it as generally authoritarian.  
In the case of Medupi, the wide range of activities involved in its construction meant that its 
workforce was heterogeneous, containing different skills, aspirations and income levels. In 
considering the particular nature of union activity in South Africa, the lead representative of 
one of the main trade unions at the Medupi construction site, the National Union for Metal 
Workers of South Africa (Numsa), described trade unions in South Africa as having to face 
the particular challenge of organising workers in an unequal society. Managing aspirations 
was particularly challenging because a trade union victory on one set of worker demands 
tended to widen the parameters of the realisable. Workers that were otherwise excluded from 
the concessions would agitate for similar benefits in a bid to level the playing field. In 
describing the heterogeneity, he said: “Within the class there are classes. Within this working 
class there is the middle class, and they’ve got different interests than the poor. And the poor 
of the poor have got different interests than the unemployed. And that creates all the tension 
within them.” 71 This shaped notions of justice and the basis for the “moral economy” that 
Dunbar Moodie has described in his study of the 1946 Black Miners’ Strike of 1946.72  
Early in the twentieth century, colonial officials had recognised the importance of tempering 
worker aspirations by limiting the realm of the possible. At issue was the age-old debate of 
71 Interview with Numsa’s Medupi representative, Numsa HQ, Johannesburg, October 2015. 
72 E. P. Thompson, “The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century,” Past & Present, no. 
50 (February 1, 1971): 76–136. 
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determining a living wage, which began during the decolonising period in Africa, and during 
which British and French colonial powers began to seriously consider the idea of improving 
the living conditions of Africans. The policy of “stabilisation” meant that the living wage 
came under debate, because underlying its calibration was a whole range of assumptions of 
the type and quality of life due to African workers. In this conception, trade unions were a 
desirable, rather than an antagonistic, force of modernisation that would rationally consider 
wage demands and in the long-term, endow Africans with the necessary capabilities for 
eventually realising political autonomy. But interestingly, Fred Cooper writes of a senior 
colonial labour official who argued that it was necessary to divide the wage calculation on a 
racial basis to prevent inter-African dispute and aspirational fights. In other words, stark class 
stratification among Africans was considered more likely to lead to discontent than class 
stratification between whites and Africans.73  
In South Africa, various ministries and government officials proclaimed that the large build 
projects would absorb members of the vast unemployed. The Expanded Public Works 
Programme (EPWP), which began in 2004, promised massive amounts of job creation in the 
construction industry. Despite the capital-intensive nature of the country’s economic 
development, employment rates in the construction sector rose consistently since the end of 
apartheid. Statistics cited in a Bargaining Indicators report in 2014 show that construction in 
employment increased by 174% from 438 665 in 1994 to 1 204 000 in 2013.74 However, 
these were jobs of a short-term duration, intended to last as long as the construction itself. 
Unskilled and semi-skilled workers constituted an estimated 76% of this workforce.75 In 
2012, some of the erstwhile defenders of the EPWP professed their disillusionment after 
observing its actual implementation. Rob McCutcheon, professor of Civil Engineering at 
University of the Witwatersrand, complained that contractors had failed to modify their 
construction design to accommodate labour-intensive methods, instead continuing to 
incorporate high levels of mechanisation.  He detailed the lip service contractors paid in 
practice to the employment creation imperative: “Not only were contracts implemented using 
conventional capital-intensive methods; in some cases extra people were hired to sit under a 
tree alongside the site where the equipment was working in order to raise the numbers. 
73 Frederick Cooper, Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa 
(Cambridge University Press, 1996), 343. 
74 Eddie Cottle, “Twenty Years of Transformation of the Construction Sector in South Africa since the End of 
Apartheid,” in Bargaining Indicators 2014: Twenty Years- A Labour Perspective, vol. 14 (Labour Research 
Services, 2014), 142. 
75 ibid. 
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Mostly, even this tokenism was not considered necessary.”76 Despite these reservations over 
its efficacy, government remained committed to job creation through infrastructure 
development and various ministers restated their commitment to job creation in the press, 
although they scaled down the number of jobs initially promised.  
 
The construction of the football stadiums for the 2010 FIFA World Cup was one of the major 
infrastructure projects of South Africa’s post-apartheid era. The mass retrenchment of 
110 000 construction workers preceded the World Cup opening ceremony in June 2010. A 
year earlier, in July 2009, thousands of construction workers had downed tools, cognisant of 
the impending dismissals. Murray and Roberts, one of the largest construction companies in 
the country, had promised some security for its demobilised workforce in the form of 
redeployment. In August 2009 its spokesman, Eduard Jardim, said the company planned to 
transfer some of its workers from the World Cup stadiums to its new construction projects, 
including the Medupi and Kusile power stations. At the time, Murray and Roberts had 
already redeployed construction workers from Gautrain and the Green Point stadium in Cape 
Town to work at the power stations. It is not clear how many workers were part of the 
redeployment plan, but it is probable that these comprised only the more skilled and 
permanent component of the workforce. In 2012 the Minister of Economic Development 
Ebrahim Patel described the government’s determination to make the Presidential 
Infrastucture Coordination Commission (PICC) work, by streamlining what were in effect the 
state’s own blockages to the infrastructure roll-out, for instance in environmental legislation 
and in speedily gaining servitudes for land through which railway lines would pass. He 
argued that the PICC would make it possible to gather all the key players in government 
needed to clear bottle necks in one room. But state bodies were more easily streamlined than 
workers.77 
Labour Unrest 
The constant strike action at the Medupi power station led notable voices in the press to label 
Medupi’s workforce as possibly “the most pampered ever”.78 The narrative of labour 
indulgence included that workers travelled on Eskom-provided buses free of charge and were 
76 Robert McCutcheon, “The Expanded Public Works Programme : Policy, Rhetoric, Reality and Opportunities 
Foregone during the Expenditure of over R40 Billion on Infrastructure : Construction and Project Management,” 
Civil Engineering, 20 (6), (July, 2012)  43. 
77 “Patel Cracks the Whip,” Mail and Guardian, February 22, 2012. 
78 “Medupi Workforce: The Most Pampered Ever?” Financial Mail, August 8, 2013. 
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compensated in the form of hourly wages for each hour spent travelling to the construction 
site. Other “abnormal benefits” included free lunches, with an average of 14 000 lunches 
being handed out at the site each day. One press analyst blamed Numsa for encouraging the 
government to lean on Eskom, which in turn convinced contractors to accede to the workers’ 
outrageous demands.79 But these suppositions of manipulation at a national level do not rest 
on concrete evidence and detract from the local, context-specific nature of labour demands. 
Taking the nature of the demands more seriously is an important step towards understanding 
the complexity of labour relations at the construction site.  
The challenge of managing aspirations in a postcolonial context of stark inequality is best 
illustrated in the first major strike to occur at the power station’s construction site. In June 
2010, workers went on strike over the quality of food provided to workers on site. According 
to an Eskom circular describing the strike, the striking workers numbered 1 200 out of a total 
of 3 762 workers employed by the main contractor, the Medupi Power Station- Joint Venture 
(MPS-JV).80 The MPS-JV was a consortium composed of the chief construction companies 
on site: Murray and Roberts, Grinaker Ltd and Concor. As part of the strike action workers 
refused to eat the food provided by the contractor and had reportedly dumped their lunch 
packages.81 Die Beeld, South Africa’s major Afrikaans- language newspaper, termed the 
incident a “scandal”, echoing the sentiment of its more vocal readers. The indignation went 
along the lines that workers at Medupi were wilfully wasting their food, while there were 
starving citizens who would “give their arms” for it. The food packages in question typically 
consisted of a sandwich, an apple, fruit juice and a bottle of water.82 Protesting workers 
demanded they be served hot meals for lunch, and Eskom eventually conceded. In a 
subsequent press release, Eskom announced that an agreement had been reached between the 
contracting companies and the trade unions, under which workers would be fed hot meals 
from 21 June 2010. Dining halls, which had been under construction at the time of the strike, 
had their completion expedited so as to become operational in August 2010.83  
Despite the middle class’s outrage at the notion of the poor dumping food, the matter had 
more complicated roots in the heterogeneous quality of labour activity at the power station. 
Numsa became more actively involved at Medupi only in 2010, three years after construction 
79 “Medupi Mess Is Result of Numsa Strategy,” Business Day, August 16, 2013. 
80 “Food wastage situation at Medupi Power Station,” Eskom Press Release, June/July 2010. 
81 ibid. 
82 “'n Gemors Met Die Kos,” Beeld, June 11, 2010. 
83 “Food wastage situation at Medupi Power Station.” 
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first began in 2007. The union’s greater involvement during this time signifies the shifting 
nature of the construction project from one of civil works construction which generally 
required low-skilled labour towards the more intricate installation that required more skilled, 
artisanal labour. It was from these artisanal ranks that Numsa’s membership was drawn. 
Construction workers were generally low-skilled and less affluent.  They were also drawn 
from Lephalale and its immediately surrounding districts as part of the contractors’ 
compliance with Eskom’s directive to increase local employment. According to Numsa’s 
representative at Medupi, while these workers were willing to tolerate cold food, artisan 
labourers expected a higher quality of meals at the construction site. 84 Many of these 
artisanal workers, who also constituted a large portion of Numsa’s membership at Medupi, 
had worked through a continuous channel on some of the country’s major industrial projects, 
including the aluminium plant Alusaf, Coega and Sasol. Thus Numsa played an important 
role, not only in its fight for reasonable working conditions, but also as a place of belonging 
for these travelling artisanal workers.85  
Migrant or Foreign Labourers 
Friction in the main township of Lephalale stemmed also from a class cleavage between local 
workers and those considered outsiders or recently settled inhabitants of Marapong. But this 
was not a strict claim to autochthony on the part of Marapong residents or a persistently 
hostile relationship. In 2013, the Financial Mail reported that a large proportion of the house 
owners in Marapong had rented their backyard rooms to migrant workers.86 Class cleavages 
mapped on to the divide. According to Numsa’s representative at Medupi, “foreigners” were 
conspicuously present in the township as the drivers of “fancy cars” 87  and locals complained 
that they were being short-changed because of their higher standard of living. The latter were 
also entitled to company-provided housing and living out allowances, which to some 
appeared to be extra compensation.88 Low-skilled migrant labourers who settled in the 
township were also a source of some consternation. A new informal settlement has formed on 
the outskirts of Marapong, generally populated by the low-skilled migrant labourers from the 
Eastern Cape and other impoverished rural districts in the country. According to one 
interviewee and long-time resident of Marapong, these migrant labourers, whose employment 
84 Interview with Numsa’s Medupi representative, Numsa HQ, Johannesburg, October 2015. 
85 ibid. This also relates to Amcu’s (a competing union) difficulty in penetrating the ranks at Medupi. 
86 “No Meat on These Bones,” Financial Mail, February 22, 2013. 
87 ibid. 
88 “No Meat on These Bones,” Financial Mail, February 22, 2013. 
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prospects were often precarious, were considered a force of trouble and unrest. 89 During 
protests against the employment of welders from Thailand, Numsa’s chief concern was with 
the lack of development opportunities for local workers. Its spokesperson, Alex Mashilo, 
stated that the union did not oppose the employment of foreign skilled workers in principle. 
Instead workers were upset that contractors appeared to exploit migrant workers. He argued 
this had a knock-on effect on the restrictive employment opportunities for locals and caused 
site managers to neglect health and safety measures.90 This related to Eskom’s inability to 
source skilled labour locally and of the artisanal training facilities to suitably develop a 
skilled labour force timeously.  
The term “local” was open to interpretation. Eskom defined “local” as not only restricted to 
Lephalale, but also those resident in the surrounding districts that were close enough to allow 
workers to commute daily to the construction site rather than being housed  onsite. But the 
commute took an average of three hours in one direction by bus, complicating their ability to 
be characterised as “local”.91 Numsa counted as its success a concession on travel 
allowances, according to which management agreed to pay workers for the time they spent 
travelling to the construction site in the form of hourly wages. Management had agreed to 
include the time workers spent travelling in their hourly wages. But this did not include the 
first hour of travel so that the workers nearest the construction site, such as residents of the 
Marapong township, felt disadvantaged if for instance they spent less than an hour to travel to 
the construction site. This resulted in strike action by workers from Marapong, who were not 
compensated for their travel.92 Thus the differential between locals and “outsiders” was based 
on a perceived class differential and on variations in access to the benefits of employment. 
Project Labour Agreement (PLA) 
 Construction at Medupi began under the auspices of a controversial agreement negotiated 
between the contracting companies and labour. The MPS-JV undertook the initial 
negotiations with labour representatives and the PLA was signed on 13 December 2008 at the 
Mogol Club in Lephalale. While the Agreement boasted the signature of labour 
representatives, Numsa’s representative at Medupi claims that the Agreement was not signed 
at the national bargaining forum. Rather the signatories were local shop stewards, eager for 
89 Interview with Kgantshi Makubela, March 2015, Marapong (Lephalale). 
90 “Medupi Dispute ‘Hinges on Lack of Special Skills.’” 
91 Interview with Numsa’s Medupi representative, Numsa HQ, Johannesburg, October 2015.  
92 “Travel Fight Causes New Delay at Medupi,” Business Day, August 5, 2013. 
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job opportunities once the construction commenced. They signed without being fully 
cognisant of the implications of the curtailment of labour rights contained within the PLA.93 
Subsequent years saw attempts to revise the PLA. One of the NUM shop stewards present at 
negotiations that took place in 2009 described the main MPS-JV representative at the 
negotiations as appearing to carry a mandate to get the unions to sign the agreement. This is 
an entirely plausible supposition considering the immense pressure Eskom and the 
contractors were under to complete Medupi as timeously as possible. In addition, negotiations 
were held outside of Lephalale and the company provided the shop stewards with transport, 
accommodation and meals for the duration of the stay. Having resented the implications of 
co-option, he arranged with NUM’s headquarters to provide food for the shop stewards at the 
negotiations and ensure a reasonable distance between them and the contractors. The shop 
steward spoke of his perplexity when first confronted with the idea of the PLA, having first 
tried to locate the term in his own Lexus-Nexus copy of the Labour Relations Act and then in 
the Oxford Dictionary, both to no avail.94  
The PLA is a unique form of labour agreement. Medupi was not the first site of its 
implementation – it had in fact a precedent in construction projects in other parts of the world 
– with the fundamental purpose of “stabilising” construction projects in the interests of  
timeous construction. Its roots lay in the dam construction projects in the United States 
during the 1930s before it became a more commonly used tool for construction projects 
during the Second World War. Skilled labour was in demand during this time and the PLA 
aimed at preventing, or at least limiting, work stoppages due to worker demands. Critics of 
the PLA have deemed it oppressive in general. For trade unions, the chief marker of its 
oppressive qualities was that it outlawed strikes, instead mandating that disputes be resolved 
by other, internal mechanisms. It also tried to standardise wage rates and working conditions 
were implemented to be used across the construction site, bypassing the particular 
preferences of individual contractors.95 Some governments viewed its implications as 
problematic: in 2001 President George Bush banned the use of PLAs in federal state-funded 
construction projects. 
93 Interview with Numsa’s Medupi representative, Numsa HQ, October 2015.  
94Interview with Kgantshi Makubela, March 2015, Marapong (Lephalale).  
 
95 http://www.nrtw.org/neutrality/na_6.htm 
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The PLA signed at Medupi contained similar controversial clauses in the interests of 
“minimising risks” and promoting “labour stability”. One of its main sticking points was that 
it banned all strike action. Its dispute resolution procedure stated that grievances had to be 
reported to the Project Industrial Relations Manager and escalated if necessary to the Project 
CDR (Dispute Resolution Committee) for further arbitration. Neither party could refer the 
matter to the CCMA or resort to any form of external arbitration. The internal channels fell 
under employer control, creating the perception of a compromised impartiality. The PLA did 
not provide any indications of how legal impartiality would be ensured.96 It is not clear 
whether or not each employee had to be unionised, but the PLA specified that contractors 
could automatically deduct union fees from the wages of union members and later deliver the 
collected funds to the union headquarters.97 It also made it the responsibility of the contractor 
to provide furnished offices for shop stewards. At first this took the form of interim facilities 
in the main town with the view to eventually relocating to an area closer to the construction 
site once land was available.98 But the achievement of a modicum of consensus for the 
signatories of the PLA was not enough to head off labour unrest. Instead, discontent over the 
PLA led to the work stoppages that drafters of the PLA had sought to curtail. 
Numsa, along with other trade unions, initially called for the disbandment of the PLA in 
2010, but the contractors resisted until the matter’s final resolution in the Labour Court of 
Cape Town. In 2012, the contractors initiated court action at the Labour Court in Cape Town 
in a bid to protest the trade unions’ withdrawal from the PLA. The respondents were a 
consortium of trade unions led by Numsa. Numsa argued for the PLA’s disbandment on the 
grounds that “the parties to it laboured under a mutual error that they were permitted to 
compromise the fundamental rights of workers in permitting the curtailment of the dispute 
resolution process under the PLA.”99 In addition, Numsa argued that under the Labour 
Relations Act, any agreement entered into for an indefinite period, which was the case with 
the PLA, could be terminated if the dissenting party provided reasonable notice. The court 
accepted this argument in the end.  
96 “Medupi Project PLA,” December 2008, 92. 
97 ibid, 25. 
98 ibid. 
99 South African Federation of Civil Engineering Contractors v The National Union of Metalworkers South 
Africa, J2847/12, Judgement delivered on December 19, 2012, Labour Court, Cape Town. 
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Chronology of Strike Action 
The year 2013 saw recurring and increasingly violent strike action that paralysed construction 
at the power station site. The first strike was reportedly initiated by 1 100 Alstom employees, 
working to implement its controls and instrumentation system. They were soon joined by 
workers employed by the boiler manufacturing company Hitachi100 and this critical mass 
compounded the threat of violence, vandalism and the intimidation of non-striking workers. 
On 16 January, work at the construction site was shut down and the workers locked out. 
Numsa’s branch deputy secretary at the time, Seanego Ngakamone, told the Star that “We are 
not going to return to work unless the employer terminates the project labour agreement. 
They are not applying it in fairness, they are applying the part that favours them most.”101 He 
accused the employers of refusing to act in “good faith”. The strike continued with various 
instances of off-site vandalism. In mid-February, 46 workers were arrested at the Medupi site 
after a clinic and two vehicles were set alight and following strike-related violence in the 
Marapong township.102  
 
Workers had also complained about too-easy dismissals, unfair working hours, and 
inexplicable salary deductions. One worker, a grinder operator employed by the largest single 
employer at the site, Murray and Roberts, told the Financial Mail that his grievance stemmed 
from an inexplicable wage deduction on his payslip in December 2012; from R18 891 to just 
R5 000. He found that the pay office, where he sought to query the amount, was filled with 
workers with similar complaints.103 This administrative error on the part of the employer 
quickly escalated under the conditions set out by the PLA. Since strike action was outlawed 
by the PLA, those that did occur were considered to be in breach of the negotiated agreement, 
setting the battle lines by creating an intransigent attitude among employers. In mid-February 
of that year, the contractors Hitachi Africa, Alstom and Murray & Roberts served workers 
with an ultimatum, demanding that they either sign a peace agreement and return to work or 
face dismissal. The employers also insisted that returning workers be subject to disciplinary 
hearings.104 Negotiations had deadlocked the previous week after the two parties failed to 
reach a resolution on the only outstanding issue of the disciplinary processes.105  
 
100 “Medupi Still on Hold after Eskom Vehicle Is Torched,” The Star, February 18, 2013. 
101 “Strike Brings Eskom’s Medupi Power Plant to a Grinding Halt,” The Star, January 17, 2013. 
102 “Grievances Slow Medupi Progress,” Sunday Times, February 17, 2013. 
103 “Medupi Impasse,” Financial Mail, February 15, 2013. 
104 “Medupi Workers Get Ultimatum from Firms,” Business Day, February 19, 2013. 
105 “Medupi Still on Hold after Eskom Vehicle Is Torched.” 
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In early March, as the dispute appeared to be heading to a close, NUM and Numsa parted 
ways. Driven by pressure from their members NUM, along with three other smaller unions, 
was willing to allow workers to return to work. As part of the agreement for returning to 
work, workers would receive a month’s salary, an interest-free loan of two month’s salary as 
well as a final written warning. But Numsa held out on signing the agreement that would 
signal the end of the strike.106 Numsa opposed the fact that returning workers would have to 
face disciplinary action and argued that the question of bonuses had not been adequately 
resolved. NUM’s regional co-ordinator complained that Numsa’s intractable stance was 
adversely affecting their members’ ability to return to work and NUM reportedly raised its 
frustration with the inter-union dispute at a Cosatu forum.107 Union rivalry was further 
compounded by the threat of the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union 
(Amcu), a relatively new union that rose to prominence in the weeks leading up to the 
Marikana massacre of 2012.  
 
Eskom was constantly present in the shadows, encouraging contractors and workers to 
resume work as quickly as possible. It openly disagreed with its contractors’ employment 
practices. In July 2013, Paul O’Flaherty, Eskom’s Chief Financial Officer, stated that: “The 
ability of our contractors to supervise labour has been poor across the board. They have to 
adequately train the person to do the job and supervise them.”108 On 22 February 2013 the 
Minister of Public Enterprises, Malusi Gigaba intervened in the dispute.109 A few weeks later 
Gigaba announced that the strike had ended after his intervention and that harsher penalties 
needed to be imposed on the contractors for lost production time as an incentive for improved 
productivity.110 
While Gigaba’s role in bringing the parties together is not entirely clear, in the immediate 
aftermath of his intervention, the trade unions, contractors and Eskom reached a new labour 
settlement. In June 2013 the new agreement, known simply as the Partnership Agreement 
(PA), came into force. Among other things the PA committed the signatories to greater wage 
standardisation across the different contracting companies. The drafters of the PLA had 
considered the question of wage standardisation but argued that it was impossible to 
completely standardise wages and working conditions across the site because of “individual 
106 “Strikers Stoke up a Turbine of Troubles at Medupi,” Business Day, March 4, 2013. 
107 “Unions in Dispute over Strike at Medupi,” Business Day, February 28, 2013. 
108 “Medupi Delayed: What Went Wrong?" Mail and Guardian, July 8, 2013.  
109 “Work Stoppages at Medupi Worry Eskom,” Business Day, February 22, 2013. 
110 “Minister Refuses Delays to Medupi,” The Star, March 18, 2013.  
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contractor employment agreements”. It had however prescribed a minimum wage for each 
job category. Importantly, Eskom was a signatory to the new agreement, which meant that it 
assumed some of the responsibility for labour relations. Managers at Eskom recognised that 
this was not the ideal position for the corporation to assume. Speaking to the Mail and 
Guardian in July 2013, O’Flaherty said that while Eskom was then “driving the management, 
development and supervision of labour,” this was not its main responsibility.111 The PA 
allowed Eskom to intervene in the relationship between the contractors and their employees, 
thereby diluting the corporate model of profit making. However, it also brought into view the 
state and government’s responsibility of social upliftment and equality. In an interview with 
the Sowetan in November 2013, Medupi’s General Manager, Roman Crookes, said that the 
new labour agreement played a fundamental role in smoothing labour relations. According to 
the Sowetan: 
  
“We facilitated a new agreement and we also became the signatories, and this, for the 
first time, made Eskom the ultimate employer and no longer a silent party. Hence, we are 
now actively involved in the labour management on site.” Crookes said labour issues 
that took time to resolve were now speedily dealt with. “The rapid resolution of labour 
disputes has brought relative calm to the construction site,” he said.112 
 
Following the new agreement, strikes continued, although on a much more limited scale. On 
25 July 2013, a strike occurred following a visit to the construction by a parliamentary 
oversight committee. Workers of 500 to 1 000 in number protested over the subject of 
allowances. Vandalism during the strike that saw five vehicles set alight and several graders 
(a type of construction equipment) being pelted with stones - led to the arrest of 45 
workers.113 The workers were charged with “malicious damage to property, public violence 
and unlawful gathering”, and ordered to appear in a court in the Limpopo province. Then in 
August 2013 another strike occurred which saw instances of vandalism of vehicles and 
construction equipment, injured security staff and the shutdown of the construction site.114 
Contractors labelled this strike the “last straw,”115 threatening mass dismissals with the view 
to begin a massive re-hiring process. The City Press reported that in response to the strike 
111 “Medupi Mission Impossible.” 
112 “Medupi Progressing Well,” Sowetan, November 1 2013.  
113 “Workers Set Five Cars Alight as Medupi Protest Turns Violent,” The Citizen, July 25, 2013. 
114 “Travel Fight Causes New Delay at Medupi.” 
115 “Latest Strike Is the Last Medupi Straw,” City Press, August 11, 2013. 
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Eskom raised the minimum wage across the construction site to R25 per hour, which was 
higher than the sector’s minimum wage of R20.50 per hour. Complaints abounded that 
Eskom had allowed the unions too much power, and was interfering in the sacred relationship 
between contractors and workers by standardising labour conditions across the construction 
site.116 In this way, Eskom exercised its power set out in the PA to facilitate the resolution of 
labour disputes.   
 
In the ensuing years labour unrest assumed an increasingly subversive character, occurring 
outside the sphere of formal trade union negotiations. During strike action in 2015, the 
erosion of worker faith in formal channels of negotiation is evident in the increasingly 
anarchic character of the protests. Instances of anonymous vandalism and arson attacks, 
committed by masked protestors, abounded and Numsa had begun to lose control over the 
strike action that sporadically occurred. Following labour unrest in August 2015, a Numsa 
official explained that “it was almost impossible to identify Numsa members in a crowd. If 
we are sure they are Numsa members, our jobs would be a bit easier,” he said.”117 Eskom 
believed that the source of the trouble were the “demobilised” workers who were still resident 
in the hostels.118  
Eskom and the contractors faced the challenge of demobilising the majority of the 
construction workers. Demobilisation was a slow spiral rather than a definitive tranche of 
“retrenchments” and the trade unions played a role in negotiating the packages workers 
received at the end of their contracts. In 2013 contractors expressed their fears about the 
discontent likely to arise from the mass retrenchments. Murray and Roberts had by May 2013 
reduced its workforce from 5 000 to 2 700.119  The continued irresolution of the PLA was one 
of the contributing factors to the long strike of 2013. But the subsequent PA served the 
purpose of rebuilding trust among the unions and contractors. Unions allayed strike action 
enough for work to resume to sufficient levels. It also allowed demobilisations to continue in 
an incremental fashion. 
Numsa argued that the companies Murray and Roberts Projects and Medupi Fabrication had 
retrenched workers in September 2013 under the guise of the PLA-mandated 
116 ibid. 
117 “Inside Medupi’s Labour Pains,” Fin24, August 23, 2015, http://www.fin24.com/Economy/Eskom/Inside-
Medupis-labour-pains-20150822. 
118  “Medupi Strike Madness,” City Press, May 10, 2015. 
119 “Medupi Firms Fear Labour Unrest as Contracts End,” SA Construction News, July 29, 2013.   
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“demobilisation” clause. According to Numsa’s representative at Medupi certain pertinent 
aspects such as the dispute resolution mechanism, had not been fully resolved in the Project 
Agreement and dispute resolution continued to utilise the mechanism set out in the PLA by 
default. In 2014 Numsa brought court action against Murray and Roberts due to what they 
argued was the continued application of the PLA in the demobilisation process. Numsa’s 
quarrel at the time was not with the principle of demobilisation but with a particular tranche 
of worker dismissals that occurred in September 2013, which they argued had been carried 
out incorrectly. At the time of the court hearing, Murray and Roberts’ industrial relations 
manager said: “About 2 000 workers at Medupi have already been demobilised in 
consultation with Numsa and other unions.”120   
The last major strike at Medupi occurred in March 2015. Workers at Unit 6, which was 
expected to start generating electricity in July of that year, went on strike over the non-
payment of exit bonuses they claimed had been promised by contractors. As a result of the 
strike action, sub-contractors at Medupi fired 1 700 workers by SMS, promising disciplinary 
action would follow. Workers were “locked out” of the construction site and barred from 
entry. 121 Numsa’s representative at Medupi explained the issue of bonuses as follows: 
Now the project bonus, the PLA said that you work until the project is finished and when 
it’s finished you get your bonus. Now there were conditions that you can’t go on strike, 
you can’t be absent etc. …Now in terms of the PLA, the old one, they were supposed to 
get their bonuses when the project was finished. Now if it took us nine years to complete 
one unit, to complete the last five units, it might take us 20 or 30 years, now who’s going 
to wait for that money…122  
On 14 April Eskom reported that it had offered to reinstate the workers unconditionally, 
although in reality the conditions of return had to be hammered out between Numsa and 
Eskom at the negotiation table.  
Nonetheless, Medupi had a decidedly diminished workforce at that stage because contractors 
had gradually retrenched workers over the course of the previous two years. By the beginning 
of 2016, it was clear that a proportion of the remaining workers had lost faith in the 
organising structures of Numsa and NUM. A new union called the Liberated Metalworkers of 
120 “Numsa Applies for Order against Murray & Roberts,” Moneyweb, May 28, 2014, 
http://www.moneyweb.co.za/archive/numsa-applies-for-order-against-murray-roberts/. 
121 “Eskom Offers to Reinstate 1700 Workers at Medupi Power Plant,” Mail and Guardian, April 4, 2015. 
122 Interview with Numsa’s Medupi representative, Numsa HQ, October 2015. 
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South Africa (Limusa) made its presence felt at the power station. Limusa was formed in July 
2014 at the national level by the former secretary general of Numsa, Cedric Gina. Since 
Numsa had opted to leave the fold of Cosatu, Limusa was intended to fill the empty space in 
Cosatu wrought by Numsa’s decision to leave Cosatu. Limusa thus organised workers in the 
same sector as Numsa. In March 2015 a former NUM shop steward had signed up some of 
the remaining workers to Limusa’s fold. The proliferation of representative unions however 
has appeared to dilute the effect of the labour demands.  
Conclusion 
The eventual completion of one of the units of Medupi was largely due to the tenacity of 
Eskom’s engineers. This tenacity was conditioned by the power station’s massive cost 
expenditure which meant that it was more expensive in the long term to retreat than to persist. 
Thus Eskom and the South African government had no choice but to marshal all their 
resources to ensure that the power station became operational. This tenacity enabled a new 
balance of forces in the absence of the strong-arm rule of the apartheid regime. While the 
political and economic liberalisation of the early 1990s threatened the completion prospects 
for the power station, Medupi has demonstrated the possibility for these otherwise disparate 
forces to come together. Cohesion was however wrought at considerable, and often 
unexpected, time and expense. The longevity of this new balance of forces, and the extent to 
which it can be re-created, remains to be seen.  
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Conclusion 
Across the world disillusionment with democracy has set in with some leaders openly 
disdainful of its inherent political value. These leaders have achieved some measure of 
political success with contra-democratic methods. In Africa in particular, certain governments 
have boasted of superficial economic growth and glossy infrastructure development while 
condoning ignominious crackdowns on human rights.  The “illiberal state builders”, which 
include countries such as Rwanda, Ethiopia, Angola and Sudan, have marshalled the strong 
arm of government, combining intolerance for dissent with infrastructure development for the 
elite. Ethiopia, for instance, has embarked on a state-led infrastructure development 
programme with backing from the Chinese government. In early October 2016, the Ethiopian 
government announced the completion of a $3.4-billion train-line that connected the capital 
of Addis Ababa to the Red Sea port city of Djibouti. But the ribbon-cutting celebration was 
marred by mass anti-government uprisings across the country. A few weeks later the 
Ethiopian government announced the commencement of what would become a six-month 
long state of emergency. The Emergency suspended the due process of law and by 20 
October, an estimated 1 600 people had been detained under its auspices.1 This raises the 
question of the value of sophisticated and expensive infrastructure projects in a context of 
repression and anti-democratic politics. The challenge faced by the post-colonial state is to 
expand the fruits of infrastructure development outside the narrow bounds of the elite enclave 
to include and serve the interests of the majority of the country’s population.  
In considering the changing context of infrastructure projects from the apartheid era to the 
democracy, it is important to recognise the continuities between the two periods. These 
continuities were not conditioned by changing political factors but by the institutional 
autonomy of the state corporations, which absorbed the various political prerogatives into 
their operations. I use the term “large technical systems” coined by Thomas Hughes to 
describe the inter-connected nature of infrastructure projects and the corporations that 
maintain them.  Because the management of large technical systems combines both social 
and technical elements, authoritarian control can more effectively unite and coordinate the 
otherwise disparate elements required for infrastructure development.  
Large technological systems are also subject to failure if not properly maintained. Their 
unwieldiness has allowed engineers to become autonomous figures in their own right. This 
1 “Ethiopia cracks down on protest,” The Economist, October 15, 2016. 
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autonomy is embedded in the organisational nature of the state corporations or parastatals. 
Iscor and Eskom, the parastatals discussed in this thesis, were formed during the 1920s to 
steer the country’s industrialisation. The parastatals geared their technological expertise to 
serve the growth of industry in the national interest. In the aftermath of the Sharpeville 
massacre of 1960 the apartheid government defined the national interest in terms of the need 
to protect white rule on the southernmost tip of the African continent. This meant attaining 
domestic economic self-sufficiency amid an intensifying threat of international sanctions. It 
also meant securing the country’s borders against the threat of invasion from the newly 
decolonised Southern African countries that neighboured South Africa. The parastatal 
network of large technical systems did not die along with the apartheid regime. Instead it 
adapted, as best it could, to the changing prerogatives of democratic rule. This involved 
expanding the fruits of development outside of the mineral rich enclave; a project that was 
begun by the apartheid government during the late 1970s in response to growing unrest in the 
black townships. But the political liberalisation in the early 1990s formalised and legitimised 
the demands for the material upliftment of the black majority.   
The neo-liberal era saw the gradual withdrawal of paternalist systems of labour management 
in favour of the free market. But rather than levelling the playing field, this shift laid bare the 
severe under-development that apartheid had wrought. Years later, this affected the 
construction of the Medupi power station in the form of the shortage of suitably skilled 
labour and in a stark socio-economic inequality that complicated the management of labour. 
In addition, the pressure on state entities to undertake commercial reform and improve their 
cost efficiency led to Eskom’s curtailment of its capital investment. But this was not the only 
reason for Eskom’s lack of capital investment in the early 1990s. Following its power station 
construction spree during the 1980s, the country confronted a situation of electricity over-
supply. This was because the country’s actual economic growth rate fell short of Eskom’s 
earlier forecasts. As the 1990s wore on, debates over the possible privatisation of Eskom 
hampered the corporation’s ability to plan for the expansion of its generation capacity.  
When South Africa’s looming electricity supply crisis became apparent in the 2000s, two 
new giant power stations had to be hastily planned. The design and commissioning of the 
Medupi and Kusile power stations coincided with the seismic rise of China as a global 
powerhouse. India was then also expanding its industrial base. Thus Eskom had to expand the 
country’s electricity-generation capacity in the context of a growth in global demand for 
power station equipment. In the context of intense global hostility to fossil-fuelled power 
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stations, Eskom attempted to alleviate the concerns of environmental lobbyists by opting for a 
super-critical boiler design. The novelty of this technological choice is one of the main 
reasons for the construction delay of the Medupi power station. But it is important to note 
that Eskom always had to deal with novel technology it had little experience in handling. This 
is illustrated in the case of the Matimba power station, built twenty years before Medupi, 
among the Waterberg coal fields. Like Medupi, Matimba had to contend with the arid 
environmental conditions of the Waterberg. Matimba was designed to function as a dry-
cooled power station. During the 1980s this was a novel technological choice for Eskom. But 
the risk associated with adopting the technology was cushioned by the inbuilt ability of large 
technical systems for revision and auto-correction. This is akin to Thomas Hughes’s 
description of the “reverse salient”. Technological risk is not only an accepted component of 
the large technical system, but it is also valued for the fact that it encourages innovation. Thus 
unexpected obstacles call on the problem-solving techniques that professional engineers are 
trained to perform.  
The novelty of the technology was not an inherently problematic component of the Matimba 
and Medupi power stations. Rather, the main problem lay with the imperative of managing 
the changing dynamics of the social and political elements that comprised the large technical 
system. But the system also contains a tendency towards resolution due to the “locked-in” 
nature of the investors and engineers responsible for the large technical system. Thus it tends 
toward correction and problem-solving rather than retreat in the face of unexpected obstacles. 
The success of the development of the infrastructure projects depended on the network’s 
successful incorporation of social and political elements into its ambit.  
For most of the twentieth century, infrastructure development was tied to the nation-building 
project. But amid abundant indications of its autonomy from the wiles of politicians, its 
relationship to the state and to the political project has not been properly interrogated. As this 
thesis has demonstrated, Iscor and Eskom combined a project of nation-building with one that 
emphasised regional development. From the 1960s the government imagined that the various 
geographical regions would develop in an autonomous fashion, utilising the labour and 
natural resources peculiar to each region to spur economic growth. In this conception of 
development the private sector and the public sector, mainly through the parastatals, would 
provide the capital investment to encourage autonomous regional growth. In this ideal 
conception the black homelands would serve as a perpetual source of low wage black labour 
while simultaneously restricting the movement of the African population to the white urban 
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areas. In Lephalale, the parastatals operated in a similar, though inadvertent, manner to 
encourage autonomous regional development.  
The apartheid government did not attempt to directly control the processes of regional 
development. Instead it delegated this function to local officials, businesses and the parastatal 
engineers. But the parastatals were not merely channels of the government’s instruction and 
instead retained a distinctive autonomy from the government. As I demonstrated in Chapter 
One, Iscor was driven primarily by its search for the materials necessary to sustain its steel 
manufacturing operations. Its decision to enter the Waterberg was based on its own internal 
operating requirements rather than any government directive. But once its engineers arrived 
in the Waterberg they acted as regional and political players in their own right. 
The parastatals and their engineers under apartheid enjoyed a high risk threshold and free rein 
in much of their decision- making. This was conditioned by the government’s concern to 
defend its borders and ensure economic self-sufficiency in the face of an internationally 
unpopular apartheid regime. This high risk threshold allowed Iscor and later Eskom to leap 
over the obstacles that would otherwise have rendered the Waterberg coalfields impossible to 
exploit. But the disadvantage was that this high risk translated into a large amount of capital 
investment. The critique of the parastatals from the government and members of the public in 
the late 1980s was based in large part on a perceived excessive expenditure. The late 1980s 
also saw the rising illiquidity of the apartheid regime. In an effort to rejuvenate its flailing 
rule the government considered serious commercial reform and the question of the 
privatisation of the parastatals fell under review. I have argued that government was not 
ideologically committed to privatisation during this period but was concerned to curb 
parastatal expenditure. Iscor was however privatised and unbundled. Its mining and steel 
manufacturing components were separated and sold to private investors as individual 
companies. The Grootgeluk coal mine fell under new corporate management. The company 
changed hands over the years so that it was owned by Exxaro Resources at the time of the 
construction of the Medupi power station. After long years of deliberation among 
government officials, both in the late apartheid and early democratic era, Eskom escaped 
privatisation. To meet the imperative of commercial reform, its management demonstrated a 
commitment to restructuring the organisation on commercial lines. In a firm break with 
tradition, the newly appointed chairman of Eskom held a university degree in finance rather 
than in engineering.  
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This emphasis on commercial reform, anchored in Eskom’s commitment to cost saving, 
signalled the informal arrival of neo-liberal management principles of governance. During the 
early 1990s the paternalist system that governed labour relations for much of the twentieth 
century gradually gave way to one which saw workers as agents of the free market. In 
concrete terms this meant the introduction of market related rentals at Eskom-owned housing 
and it meant in some cases the removal of automatic salary deductions. But this caused 
anxiety among workers and trade union officials over the issue of affordability. Importantly, 
this neo-liberal reform was enacted during the 1990s alongside the formal recognition of 
independent black trade unions at the Matimba power station. The gradual dissolution of the 
paternalist system laid bare the fundamental capitalist dispossession of the majority of the 
local African residents and the stark economic inequality between and within race groups. 
But the transition was also managed by the independent black trade unions, which agitated 
for the greater spread of benefits from the infrastructure project to the residents of the region. 
In this way trade unions assisted with managing expectations in a context of stark inequality 
and mitigated the splintering effects of neo-liberalism. But this was an only partial resolution 
of the labour management dilemma. Unforeseen obstacles arose during the time of Medupi’s 
construction that called on Eskom’s capacity for tenacity and problem-solving for resolution. 
During the construction of Medupi the relationship between the contractors and labour broke 
down. Eskom and the government had to intervene in a manner that took into account factors 
beyond the pure employer-employee relationship between the contractors and workers.  
This thesis has demonstrated the continued coherence of the network of large technical 
systems despite the potentially splintering effects of the political and economic liberalisation 
of the 1990s. The uncertainty over the privatisation of Eskom during the late 1990s inhibited 
the parastatal’s ability to plan for the expansion of its electricity generating capacity. This 
reluctance to commit to substantial capital expenditure led to the electricity supply crisis that 
precipitated the hasty commissioning and planning of the Medupi and Kusile power stations. 
Medupi was built during an era of global hostility to coal-fuelled power stations. Eskom 
faced heavy pressure to focus on renewable energy sources for electricity generation, which 
by their nature, allowed independent power producers a greater share of the electricity 
generation market. Renewable energy electricity does not require the large economies of 
scale of coal-fired power stations thus allowing many, smaller-scale electricity producers to 
enter the market. But Eskom persisted with the construction of the two new power stations. 
Its dominant justification was that the electricity supply crisis was too serious and renewable 
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energy technology too unreliable to ensure a consistent supply of base-load electricity. 
Eskom’s large institutional funders, the World Bank and the African Developmental Bank, 
asserted that without the construction of Medupi and Kusile, South Africa’s economic growth 
would be severely curtailed. Thus the electricity supply crisis provided the justification for 
the hasty commissioning of the Medupi power station. 
The seemingly endless problems plaguing the Medupi construction site gave rise to a 
fatalistic attitude among public commentators about its prospects for completion. 
Complications arose through unforeseen difficulties with the technical equipment, 
particularly in the installation of the boilers. A super-critical boiler of the size that Medupi 
required had never been manufactured anywhere in the world. It was a novel technology for 
the specialised engineering corporations who could potentially take charge of its completion. 
The gradual dissolution of the South African boiler manufacturing industry in the roughly 
twenty years since Eskom had last constructed a power station compounded the difficulties 
with the boiler manufacture. 
Labour unrest also impeded productivity at the construction site. But the frequency and 
intensity of strike action was alleviated by Eskom’s active intervention in the management of 
labour relations. This was embodied by a new labour agreement termed the Project 
Agreement (PA) that was signed by Eskom, the contractors and trade union representatives in 
2013. The PA differed from its controversial predecessor, the Project Labour Agreement 
(PLA), the legality of which trade union representatives challenged in the Labour Court. The 
employers who drew up the PLA had tried to guarantee the speedy completion of the 
construction project by curtailing workers’ rights to strike. But this restricted the legitimate 
channels for workers to voice their dissatisfaction and inadvertently intensified worker 
grievances. The recurrent strike action at Medupi was in part targeted at the disbanding of the 
PLA.  
In Chapter Three, I discussed the report of one of Eskom’s engineers on a gathering of 
electricity system planners. One of the delegates to the conference had argued that electricity 
utilities had to be wary of the growing influence of trade unions and environmental activists. 
These two pressure groups threatened the feasibility of long-term planning. They surfaced 
during the construction of Medupi, and contributed to the power station’s seemingly 
incessant delays. But this did not destroy the power station’s chances of success. Rather 
Eskom adapted the power station design to allay criticism about environmental degradation 
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and intervened in the relationship between contractors and labourers when conflict appeared 
intractable. Thus to deal with the pressures of democracy, Eskom’s engineers acted to remedy 
unforeseen problems as they arose during the construction. But the longevity of the new 
balance of forces, and its ability to be re-created, has yet to be tested. 
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Borckenhagen Reports. Pretoria: Republic of South Africa, 1971.  
Interviews (some interviews are not listed to ensure the anonymity of interviewees) 
All interviews were conducted by the author.  
Interview with Ponk Ellis, August 2013, Lephalale  
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Interview with Michael Deats, September 2, 2013,  Woodmead, Gauteng. 
Interview with Sam Sekati, August 4, 2014, Lephalale (interview conducted with Ntombi 
Mpofu). 
Interview with Willie Loots, August 6, 2014, Lephalale (interview conducted with Ntombi 
Mpofu). 
Interview with Clive le Roux, February 18, 2015, Megawatt Park, Gauteng. 
Interview with Dr Lazarus Seodisa, translated by Kgantshi Makubela, March 2015, 
Marapong (Lephalale). 
Interview with Johan Pistorius, March 2015, Lephalale. 
Interview with Melton Mothoni, 16 March 2016, Matimba power station 
Interview with Joe Meyer, 17 March 2015, Onverwacht.   
Interview with Kgantshi Makubela, March 2015, Marapong (Lephalale).  
Interview with Stephen Kekana, Matimba power station, 14 April 2015; follow-up interview, 
March 16, 2016, Matimba power station, Lephalale. 
Interview with Dries de Ridder, April 2015, Lephalale. 
Interview with Melton Mothoni, April 2015, Matimba Power Station, Lephalale.  
Group interview with Johannes Mfisa, Hellen Kekae, Hendrik Ndebele, April Selema and 
Kgantshi Makubela (translator), August 25, 2015, Marapong (Lephalale).  
 
Archives Consulted 
 
National Archives of South Africa (Pretoria) 
Eskom Corporate Archives (Megawatt Park, Sunninghill) 
Eskom Heritage Archives (Megawatt Park, Sunninghill) 
Matimba Power Station Documents Centre (Lephalale) 
217 
 
Minutes of meetings of Matimba bargaining forums (Personal collections of S Kekana and M 
Mothoni, Lephalale) 
 
Newspaper Publications 
 
Rand Daily Mail  
Mail and Guardian 
City Press 
Business Day 
Engineering News 
Mining Weekly 
The Star 
Mogol Pos (Lephalale-based publication) 
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